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Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are 
not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer 
taken for granted.  To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy. 
(Foucault, 1994b, p.456) 
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In this thesis, I examine constructions of youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002.  In 
2002, New Zealand had a national election in which adult commentators and observers 
concentrated and speculated on the reasons for a supposed increase in youth deviance and 
a spate of extraordinarily violent youth crimes.  Youth-at-risk, early intervention, the family, 
and education were words that emerged continuously in commentator discussions.  There 
was no critique of these words, or the practices they implied, and very little discussion of the 
implications the use of these words and practices posed for young people.   
In this thesis, I address this gap in the discussion by critically exploring the ways in which 
authors in institutional contexts constructed deviant youth and the implications of these 
constructions for youth.  In this research, I sampled published texts in 2002 from academia, 
government, and media; three institutions which produce and reproduce knowledge in New 
Zealand.  I applied a form of discourse analysis to the texts to explore and contextualise 
evident constructions.  This analysis involved a bricolage of poststructural methodologies in 
the attempt to make an accessible argument, which effectively addressed the purposes of 
the research. 
I found that authors did not apply a knowledge devoid of power.  Whether used to construct 
a picture of the deviant youth, or to describe necessary interventions into deviance, they 
used knowledge to construct the deviant youth as powerless effects of development and risk.  
Authors used knowledge to divide young people into the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk 
and the normally-deviant adolescent.   
Applying knowledge allowed those writing about youth crime to construct and position young 
people as powerless.  Authors reinforced this when they used knowledge to inform practices 
and interventions, which allowed adults to control the young person’s access to, and use of, 
power.  In particular, authors and other experts saw mass education as a powerful practice 
of control and socialisation.  Through education, adult society could remove the abnormally-
deviant youth from the dysfunctional family environment and re-socialise the young person 
into conformity.  Those writing applied a similar reasoning in other described interventions 
such as surveillance, conferencing, and early intervention.  Interventions allowed adults to 
control the deviance of youth. 
I finish this thesis by arguing that interventions and contradictions in constructions show that 
power is not one-sided.  That is, power is not always in the hands of adults.  Rather, 
sociological theory can be applied to demonstrate and explore a power struggle between 
adults and young people where resistance coexists with power.  I argue that resistance can 
provide an alternative explanation to the dominant ideas held by those working with, and 

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talking about, deviant youth.  Resistance allows for a concept of agency in which both 
deviance and non-deviance can be seen as a reactive response by the young person.
   v 
 
 
 
The last few years have been a challenging time for me as I have travelled two journeys.  
Not only have I felt myself transformed through this PhD but also through needing to address 
my past through an unexpected onset of PTSD.  Hence, in this part of the thesis, I want to 
thank those who have helped me on both of these journeys because it has only been 
through the conquering of PTSD that I have been able to finish this doctoral thesis. 
First, I want to thank my God who has been there in my own struggle and is there in the 
struggles facing young people today.  Thanks for the opportunities you have opened for me 
in Wainuiomata and for the young people you have brought into my life. 
To Dr. Joanna Kidman, my primary supervisor, I have learned lots under your guidance and 
have had opportunities to try new things.  Thank you so much for your support and for being 
there when I needed it.  Thanks also to Dr. Allison Kirkman, my second supervisor.  Allison, I 
would recommend you to any student looking for a supervisor who cares but also can give 
effective and critical feedback on all stages of the doctoral journey.  To Dr. Jane Gilbert, who 
was my primary supervisor in the early stages of the journey.  Jane you have always been a 
role model for me and I am thankful that I had the opportunity to be one of your students.  
Finally, to Chris Bowden, thanks for being there in my research, work, and life in 2005 while 
Joanna was on leave.  I have enjoyed debating with you the importance and relevance of 
psychology in today’s world.  Outside of the university climate, I would like to acknowledge 
the support and help of my husband Eric.  Eric thanks for being there and loving me.  Thank 
you also for reading each of the chapters as I finished.  This helped me to make my writing 
more accessible and usable.  Thanks also to the publishing team at the College of Education 
for reading and checking my writing.  Thanks to the folks at NZAARD – especially Kristen Le 
Harivel.  I appreciated your support of my research and the opportunities you opened for me 
to share the possibilities of this research with others.  Thanks to my old colleagues at 
NZCER – especially Robyn Baker and the Learning Curves team (Rose Hipkins, Karen 
Vaughan, Hilary Ferral, and Ben Gardiner).  I have learned to research and to write with your 
support and encouragement. 
I would also like to thank those who have been there for me and have travelled the journey in 
differing ways.  To Marcia King – there were times that you held my hand to make sure that I 
survived.  This thesis is a testament to your faith in me.  To Paul and Christine Edlin – thanks 
for supporting me in my other challenges and for believing in me.  Thanks to Marion Kirker, 
Mel and Karl Dickson, and Georgina and Ross Gratton for your support and help over the 
last year.  Finally, thanks to my family; if it were not for your support I would have never 
ventured this far in my writing. 
	
  

   vi 
                                       
 
 
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................. III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................V 
CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................VI 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................X 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: A DISSECTION OF KNOWLEDGE.................................... 1 
SOURCES OF MOTIVATION....................................................................................................... 1 
RATIONALE............................................................................................................................. 3 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW ................................................................................................. 6 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................. 8 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY: THINKING BEYOND METHODS..................................... 11 
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS: FOUCAULT, ROSE, AND OTHERS ......................................... 12 
DEFINING APPROACH: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 17 
The contexts of discourse.............................................................................................................................. 18 
Looking at discourse and knowledge in context ............................................................................................. 21 
Locating My Research ................................................................................................................................... 22 
WORKING WITH THE DATA: HOW I APPLIED THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS..................................... 24 
Determining the Sample ................................................................................................................................ 24 
Applying the Method of Discourse Analysis.................................................................................................... 26 
Stage One: Contextual .............................................................................................................................. 26 
Stage Two: Analysis.................................................................................................................................. 27 
Stage Three: Reconstruction..................................................................................................................... 28 
ETHICAL DECISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................. 29 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................... 30 
Strengths ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 
Addressing Limitations................................................................................................................................... 32 
IMPLICATIONS OF MY METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH ............................................................ 33 
CHAPTER 3: PLACING THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT: ACADEMIC CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF YOUTH IN THEORY AND RESEARCH.......................................................................... 34 
CONSTRUCTING YOUTH......................................................................................................... 34 
The Influence of Age...................................................................................................................................... 35 
The Biological Dimension to Developmental-Psychological Constructions ..................................................... 36 
The Social Dimension to Developmental-Psychological Constructions........................................................... 37 
Contextual Understandings of Youth.............................................................................................................. 38 
THE DEVIANT YOUTH ............................................................................................................ 39 
The Normally-Deviant Youth.......................................................................................................................... 39 
The Abnormally-Deviant Youth ...................................................................................................................... 42 



   vii 
The Socially-Created Deviant ........................................................................................................................ 43 
IMPLICATIONS OF YOUTH THEORY.......................................................................................... 45 
CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTING AND DIVIDING YOUTH: THE ABNORMALLY-DEVIANT 
YOUTH................................................................................................................................... 49 
DISGUISING PATHOLOGY: PSYCHOLOGY AND RISK IN CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE ABNORMALLY-
DEVIANT YOUNG PEOPLE ....................................................................................................... 50 
The Family and the Community ..................................................................................................................... 53 
Ethnicity and Gender ..................................................................................................................................... 54 
Power and Self-Control.................................................................................................................................. 56 
INTERVENTIONS: IDENTIFICATION AND EDUCATION .................................................................. 57 
Socialisation and Social Control..................................................................................................................... 60 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABNORMALLY-DEVIANT CONSTRUCTION......................................... 62 
CHAPTER 5: CONSTRUCTING AND DIVIDING YOUTH: THE NORMALLY-DEVIANT 
YOUTH................................................................................................................................... 65 
JUST A PASSING PHASE: THE VULNERABLE BUT NORMAL DEVIANT ........................................... 66 
Building the Family: Interventions into the passing phase of deviance ........................................................... 71 
MORE THAN JUST A PHASE: THE THREATENING BUT NORMAL DEVIANT .................................... 73 
Controlling Youth: Interventions into the threatening nature of adolescence................................................... 77 
IT’S SOCIETY, NOT THEM AT FAULT: SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTING DEVIANCE ............................... 78 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORMALLY-DEVIANT CONSTRUCTION ............................................ 80 
CHAPTER 6: YOU CAN PICK A CRIMINAL AT AGE 5: DEVELOPMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 
IN CONSTRUCTIONS OF YOUTH DEVIANCE.................................................................... 82 
SOCIAL CONTROL: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND CONTEXT........................... 83 
THE LANGUAGE OF DEVELOPMENT ........................................................................................ 85 
The Liminal Youth: The language of becomingness....................................................................................... 85 
Dichotomous Outcomes: The scientific language of developmental knowledge ............................................. 86 
Stepping Stones, Pathways, and Trajectories: The popular language of developmental knowledge .............. 87 
THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DEVIANT CHILD: PRODUCED THROUGH TIME ..................................... 88 
Explaining Deviance ...................................................................................................................................... 89 
Becoming Evil: The malleability of the working-class child ............................................................................. 90 
Controlling the Problem: Education and psychology to the rescue ................................................................. 90 
A NEW TIME, A NEW CONSTRUCTION: THE ADOLESCENT ........................................................ 92 
The Development of Ideas of Normal Deviance: The adolescent in the 20th century ...................................... 93 
Capturing a New Identity: The rise of the consumer society and adolescent identity development............. 94 
Controlling the Risk: The rise of the risk society and the adolescent risk-taker .......................................... 95 
AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND 2002: THE USE OF DEVELOPMENTAL KNOWLEDGE IN POLICY AND 
RESEARCH............................................................................................................................ 96 
The Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa ................................................................................................... 97 
The Youth Offending Strategy........................................................................................................................ 98 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL KNOWLEDGE FOR YOUTH ................................................. 99 
   viii 
CHAPTER 7: THE DOUBLE RISK OF YOUTH: RISK KNOWLEDGE IN CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF YOUTH DEVIANCE ....................................................................................................... 101 
THE LANGUAGE OF RISK ..................................................................................................... 101 
Controlling the Future in the Present: Focusing on outcomes ...................................................................... 102 
The Scientific Language of Risk................................................................................................................... 103 
Having a One-In-Six Chance: Probability in risk identification .................................................................. 103 
The Political Language of Risk..................................................................................................................... 104 
Identifying the Causes............................................................................................................................. 104 
Identifying the Costs................................................................................................................................ 105 
THE DANGEROUS RISK – PRODUCED THROUGH TIME............................................................ 106 
YOUTH AND RISK: PRODUCED THROUGH AGE ....................................................................... 108 
Controlling the Risk: Risk technologies in the control of youth deviance....................................................... 110 
The Effect of Risk: The youth-at-risk ............................................................................................................ 111 
THE MERGING OF KNOWLEDGES ......................................................................................... 112 
AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND 2002: THE USE OF RISK KNOWLEDGE IN POLICY ........................... 114 
Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989.................................................................................. 115 
Families and the CYPF Act 1989............................................................................................................. 116 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISK KNOWLEDGE FOR YOUTH .................................................................. 117 
CHAPTER 8: BLAME THE PARENTS: CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE FAMILY AND 
SCHOOL IN DISCUSSIONS OF DEVIANT YOUTH........................................................... 120 
FAMILIES IN HISTORY: THE PATHOLOGICAL FAMILY................................................................ 120 
FAMILIES IN HISTORY: THE GOVERNING FAMILY .................................................................... 121 
CYPF ACT AND FGCS: THE ‘IR’REPONSIBLE FAMILY IN NEW ZEALAND .................................. 122 
THE DYSFUNCTIONAL FAMILY AS A POINT OF SUPPORT AND A TARGET.................................. 124 
COUNTERING FAMILY RISK: THE STATE’S PSEUDO FAMILY..................................................... 125 
Social Control: A function of schools............................................................................................................ 126 
Separating and Dividing: A function of schools ............................................................................................ 127 
Reflecting on Education............................................................................................................................... 128 
IMPLICATIONS OF FAMILY AND PSEUDO FAMILY CONSTRUCTIONS.......................................... 129 
CHAPTER 9: GET THEM WHEN THEY ARE YOUNG: INTERVENTIONS AND POWER IN 
THE CONTROL OF YOUTH DEVIANCE............................................................................ 131 
STRUGGLING TO MAINTAIN CONTROL................................................................................... 131 
WHAT ARE INTERVENTIONS? ............................................................................................... 133 
THE FLOW OF POWER: POWER AS A CAPILLARY ................................................................... 134 
NETWORKS OF INTERVENTION: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER .................................................... 135 
CREATING A SUBJECT OF POWER: POWER AND DEVELOPMENTAL KNOWLEDGE IN 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF YOUTH DEVIANCE ................................................................................. 137 
TARGETING THE YOUTH-AT-RISK: INTERVENTIONS INTO THE ABNORMALLY-DEVIANT YOUTH .... 139 
RE-DIRECTING THE MISSGUIDED YOUTH: INTERVENTIONS INTO THE NORMALLY-DEVIANT YOUTH
.......................................................................................................................................... 141 
THE IMPLICATIONS AND (DESIRED) IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTIONS.................................... 142 
   ix 
CHAPTER 10: ACKNOWLEDGING POWER AND RESISTANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE 
CONSTRUCTION OF YOUTH DEVIANCE......................................................................... 145 
THE SPACE OF UNCERTAINTY AND FREEDOM: THE ‘POWER’ IN CONTRADICTIONS ................... 146 
FOUCAULT: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POWER AND RESISTANCE............................................ 148 
BRINGING AGENCY INTO THE DISCUSSION............................................................................ 152 
Agency, Freedom, and Choice..................................................................................................................... 153 
Agency, Freedom, and Resistance .............................................................................................................. 157 
Objectifying the Youth Through Knowledge: The adult side of domination and possibilities for resistance160 
What Does This Resistance Look Like? .................................................................................................. 161 
RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE ............................................................................................. 163 
TWO TYPES OF RESISTANCE ............................................................................................... 163 
IMPLICATIONS OF A KNOWLEDGE OF RESISTANCE................................................................. 164 
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION: BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER....................................... 166 
THE THESIS AND THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 166 
WHAT ABOUT TODAY?  AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND IN 2006 .................................................. 168 
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? ...................................................................................................... 170 
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................... 172 
APPENDIX 1: ANALYSED TEXTS (ACADEMIA) .............................................................. 194 
APPENDIX 2: ANALYSED TEXTS (GOVERNMENT)........................................................ 196 
APPENDIX 3: ANALYSED TEXTS (MEDIA) ...................................................................... 198 
 
   x 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical and Methodological Representation of Discourse Analysis................. 12 
Figure 2:  Social Understanding in Contexts.......................................................................... 84 
Figure 3: Developmental Knowledge and Risk Knowledge Prior to the 1970s ................... 112 
Figure 4: Developmental Knowledge and Risk Knowledge After the 1970s ....................... 113 
 

   1 
… knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.    
(Foucault, 1984, p.88) 
For Michel Foucault (1984), knowledge is something to be critiqued, questioned, and 
reflected upon; that is, knowledge is “made for cutting”.  This thesis is my attempt at a cutting 
of the institutional knowledges used in New Zealand discussions about youth and crime.  I 
had three aims in my research: to expose commonsense and expert understandings about 
youth and crime used in the institutional contexts of academia1, government, and media; to 
critique these understandings; and, to conceptualise an alternative construction of youth 
deviance.   
These aims led to two overarching questions.  First, how are criminally-deviant youth 
represented and constructed within the institutional contexts of academia, government, and 
media?  Second, what alternative possibilities exist for the ways in which youth and crime 
are constructed and represented in institutional contexts?  The assumption that any 
construction entails implications for those being constructed underpins these questions.  In 
this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions and pose an alternative explanation of youth 
deviance.  I had several sources of motivation for exploring this topic of youth crime. 
 

My motivations for this thesis came from prior experiences in research, from my own 
personal experiences, and from topical youth issues in the media during the year I started 
my doctorate (2002).  In my Masters research (Beals, 2002a), I explored the ways in which 
women who had committed a crime positioned themselves into, and out of, criminological 
knowledge.  This was a psychological investigation into subjectivity, knowledge, and 
positioning (e.g. Butler, 1993, 1995a; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 
1998).  However, I found my Masters unsettling in a theoretical and methodological sense 
because the psychological focus in my analysis resulted in a ‘dissection’ of each woman’s 
concept of self into categories of subjectivity, power, and resistance.  Furthermore, my 
experiences gaining ethical approval (which took some time as the committee wanted to 
ensure that I was safe from ‘criminal violence’), and my literature review of academic 
theories of criminality and punishment implied that in many ways these women were defined 
                                                    
1
 I use the word “academia” to refer to tertiary education institutions as defined by the New Zealand 1989 Education 
Act. 
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and confined within institutional knowledges of criminality.  It was these knowledges that they 
resisted through their own conceptions of who they were as individuals.  Consequently, I 
finished my Masters feeling that I needed to focus on institutions and the forms of knowledge 
produced and reproduced in institutional contexts (c.f. Chomsky & Foucault, 1997). 
My second motivation was more personal in nature.  During secondary school, my teachers 
told me to prepare myself for a negative future.  I was destined for prison, unemployment/low 
paid employment, and/or early parenthood because I came from a lower socio-economic 
one-parent (i.e. disadvantaged) family.  The ‘commonsense’ reasoning of my teachers 
positioned me as a ‘youth-at-risk’ of desolate outcomes due to the presence of multiple risk 
factors in my life.  This motivation flowed through to my doctoral research, as I attempted to 
explore and question the institutional commonsense/s which enabled adults to construct and 
position me in the 1990s and which continue to be evident in contemporary New Zealand 
society.   
Finally, in addition to academic and personal motivations, institutional discussions that took 
place in 2002 also influenced my thinking.  These included a national election and public 
discussion about several unrelated and violent youth crimes in the mainstream court system.  
Being an election year, many ‘experts’ and commentators focused on “New Zealand’s 
worsening youth offending problem” (Ryall, 2002, para.1), which was exacerbated by the 
extraordinary youth crimes that were in the courts.  The youth crimes of 2001 and 20022 
were not only extraordinary in that they involved young people, they also were unique in the 
profiles of the young people involved.  One crime involved the youngest person ever 
convicted of manslaughter in Aotearoa/New Zealand3 (Bailey Kurariki Junior in the death of 
Michael Choy).  Another crime involved three young females in the murder and 
manslaughter of an adult male (Renee O’Brian, Puti Maxwell and Kararaina Te Rauna in the 
death of Kenneth Pigott).4  Consequently, youth crime was a focus of academic, 
government, and media discussion.  Within each of these contexts, adult ‘experts’, such as 
researchers, criminologists, psychologists, educationalists, police, media reporters, ministers 
of parliament, and local government councillors, spoke out about youth crime and 
constructed young offenders as pathological and problematic.  It was this institutional 
expertise and the ways in which adults applied ‘expert’ knowledge in constructions and 
representations of deviant youth that I attempted to explore and question in my doctoral 
research.  However, my reasoning for the need for this research did not just arise from 
personal motivations.  The events of 2002 and the institutional focus on early intervention 
provided a further rationale for my research. 
                                                    
2
 Several of the crimes that featured in the courts in 2002 had been committed in 2001. 
3
 ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand’ combines the Mori and English names of New Zealand.  Whenever possible I have used 
both terms together.  However, I have used ‘New Zealand’ at points in order to simplify reading.  
4
 Youth were also involved in the deaths of Detective Constable Duncan Taylor (Daniel Luff), Marcus Doig and John 
Vaughan (Ese Junior Falealii), Tanya Burr, and Mamoe Kaisala.   
   3 
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In 2002, writers in academia, government, and the media focused on identifying the causes 
of youth crime.  Identifying common causes broke down the disparity between individual 
crimes by focusing on commonalities shared by individuals committing crimes.  Whether 
voiced in a language of blame or a language of responsibility and accountability, writers 
associated causes to a wide range of risk factors from individual factors within young people 
and their families to breakdowns in societal structures.  A reflection and critique on media 
coverage of youth crime by Steve Price (2002) provides an excellent summary of the variety 
of causes given by institutional experts in 2002: 
In their quest for context, the papers carried dizzying numbers of finger-pointing 
stories.  The police blamed CYPFS [Children, Young People, and Families Service] for 
not following up on its duties.  Phil Goff [a government minister] blamed the bickering 
between police and welfare agencies.  A youth aid officer blamed the government for 
not properly funding early intervention.  Criminologist Greg Newbold blamed violent 
computer games, videos and music lyrics.  Columnist Garth George blamed youth 
lawyers, liberal politicians and educationalists for failing to set boundaries.  The 
Richmond Fellowship blamed a lack of multi-systemic therapy.  The Sunday Star 
Times suggested it might be genetic.   
(Price, 2002, para.15-16, media context, radio commentary) 
Experts also used statistical analysis to quantify the youth crime problem.  Election 
campaigners and media reporters focused on increases in police apprehensions whilst 
university academics and government spokespeople argued that the reporting of these 
statistics misled the public5.  With the adult public having most access to news and current 
events publications (i.e. media reports), it was generally perceived that youth crime was out 
of control and needed a solution (c.f. Sternberg, 2004). 
Early intervention and prevention was the commonsense solution proposed for youth crime, 
particularly by institutional experts in public media forums like radio and television.  For 
example, on National Radio, broadcaster, Linda Clark (2002) interviewed a panel of crime 
experts (a criminologist, retired police officer, lawyer, advocate for punitive sentencing, and a 
victim’s family member) about the causes of, and solutions to, youth crime.  The panel 
agreed that causes stemmed from dysfunctional families and that prevention/early 
intervention was the only solution to youth crime.  Prevention/early intervention would reduce 
crime through the early identification of young criminals in public institutions of socialisation, 
such as the school.  Once identified, practitioners and professionals would redirect the youth 
on to a ‘path’ of positive and productive citizenship within institutional environments like the 
classroom.  Government policies, such as The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice 
& Ministry of Social Development, 2002) and The Youth Justice Plan for Child, Youth and 
Family (Child, Youth and Family, 2002) and popular discussions of youth crime, such as 
                                                    
5
 Police apprehension statistics focus on individual offences; not number of offences per individual.  They also 
include offences in which a person may have been later found ‘not guilty’. 
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Celia Lashlie’s (2002) book The Journey to Prison reflected and endorsed this argument in 
2002.   
For example, Lashlie, a former prison officer and self-named ‘social advocate’, argued in 
2002 that the “destiny” of young people was in place by the age of five and teachers could 
identify and influence the youth’s future: 
In classrooms around New Zealand, right now, there are a number of children whose 
destiny is already in place – unless a miracle occurs in their life, they will come to 
prison …  And the age of these children?  It would be serious enough concern if the 
answer to that question was 17 or 18 years of age, the ‘stuff’ of rebellious adolescence 
and children whose desire to experience life fully means they don’t stop to think until 
the concrete walls of a police cell detain them … the children I am thinking of are 
currently only 5, 6 and 7 years of age.  They are children who occupy the thoughts of 
their teachers as they try to change the destiny already visible; children who will 
struggle every moment of their life simply because of the reality into which they were 
born.  
(Lashlie, 2002, p.12) 
The argument for early intervention is not a new argument – evidence can be traced back to 
1939 and the Cambridge-Somerville intervention (Dodge, 2001).  Nor is the argument new in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand.  For example, in 2000, two government reports (one by Kaye 
McLaren and one by Debbie Singh & Clem White) identified early intervention as a key crime 
control strategy.  In these reports, the authors argued that New Zealand social institutions 
should identify young people destined for a criminal future “as early … as possible, and then 
shepherd them into effective interventions” (McLaren, 2000, p.18).  Within these arguments, 
we can see that early intervention centres on two central practices – identification and social 
control. 
Early intervention requires practitioners and professionals to use a psychological knowledge 
of risk and protective factors to identify adult offenders whilst they are young children and 
construct them as ‘youth-at-risk’.  In this logic, these young people are at risk of a criminal 
future and as such are a potential threat to society (c.f. Donzelot, 1979; Poynting & White, 
2004).  That is, they pose a risk to society.  Strategies like early intervention control this risk.   
Through applying an early intervention argument, adults writing about youth crime reinforce 
a division between youth and themselves where youth are in a position of powerlessness 
succumbing to the effects of risk factors.  In contrast, these writers position youth 
practitioners as powerful influences on child development nurturing or “shepherd[ing]” 
(McLaren, 2000, p.18) the young person into adulthood through early intervention.  Those 
applying this argument rarely question it and assume it to be logical and near one-hundred 
percent effective.   
However, there are three pragmatic problems with early identification/intervention.  These 
problems intensify the positioning of young people as powerless.  First, there is a risk of 
generalisation where the definition of youth-at-risk includes youth who later develop into 
   5 
normal adults and do not need early intervention (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; Ministry of 
Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002).  These youth may manifest some of the risk 
factors but, if left to ‘develop’ on their own, they will not develop into criminals.  Second, and 
directly related to the first, there is also a risk that intervention/prevention initiatives may 
encourage criminal behaviour (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002; 
Poynting & White, 2004; Singh & White, 2000) or result in ‘undesirable’ outcomes (Bessant, 
2001).  Indeed, the Cambridge-Somerville intervention demonstrates this point, where the 
young people who participated in the early intervention later posed a greater risk of criminal 
deviance in adulthood than those in the control group (McCord, 2002).  Finally, the 
subsequent role that institutions, such as the school, have with young people may, as 
Michael Apple (2001, p.xi) notes, “create tensions that last forever” between society and the 
young people identified.    
Possible tensions between youth and society can be either structural or linked to knowledge.  
For example, in The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social 
Development, 2002, p.16) the writers express caution about “‘labelling’” young people6; the 
reasoning being that, when practitioners identify young people before they commit a crime 
as ‘at-risk’, they position the youth or child as a criminal.  Hence, in a structural sense, a 
society can ‘label’ the young person through formal institutional practices.  There can also be 
implications at the level of knowledge where practitioners and other experts apply knowledge 
to separate, or divide, young people into particular positions (Foucault, 1972b, 1983).  For 
example, experts and practitioners may apply psychological knowledge to position some 
individuals as pathological and others as normal.  They might also use psychological 
knowledge to argue for early intervention.  For youth-at-risk, the early 
identification/intervention argument positions them as pathological through a knowledge of 
psychological risk; thus, removing them from a position of normality.  In these circumstances, 
it takes a strong resistance from the young person to oppose such positioning.   
Consequently, there is a need to analyse and critique the early identification/intervention 
argument.  This involves exploring dominant ways in which adults in positions of authority 
construct deviant youth, the types of interventions they argue for, and the logic of their 
presented argument.  It also involves exploring the implications for young people of 
constructions and arguments.  This means looking at the positioning of young people in 
constructions.  Such an exploration into knowledge opens a space for the examination of 
alternative and neglected constructions of youth.  Overall, this ‘cutting’ of knowledge involves 
making the familiar strange (Lesko, 2001) – exposing knowledge/s about youth and crime 
held by adult New Zealand society and questioning its legitimacy.  It is about applying a 
method grounded in a theory of critique. 
                                                    
6
 This is a contradiction in the Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) as the Strategy 
cautions against labelling whilst advocating for formal risk assessment tools.  In effect, these formal tools would 
allow for practitioners to name young people and subsequently ‘label’ these youth ‘at-risk’ (c.f. Becker, 1963). 
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In Chapter 2, I expand upon the theoretical underpinnings of the methods I applied in this 
research.  In this section, I give a brief overview of the methodology I applied.  Primarily, I 
focused on institutional constructions of youth and crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand during 
2002.  I limited my investigation to a single year and to Aotearoa/New Zealand as it allowed 
me to construct a feasible and workable project.  Because of the institutional focus on youth 
crime and youth justice, 2002 was an apt year for investigation.  Living in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand encouraged me to focus on what was happening within the country.  Furthermore, 
the youth justice system in Aotearoa/New Zealand is unique in its incorporation of restorative 
justice principles and recognition of the indigenous people of New Zealand – the tngta 
whenua7 or Mori people (Watt, 2002).   
I also limited my study to the institutions of academia, government, and media.  I chose to 
focus on these institutions because of the role that they have in the re/production and 
dissemination of knowledge.  This role has been shown in several examples of research 
exploring a variety of topics (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Foucault, 
1970, 1976, 1977; Fowler, 1991; Griffin, 1993; Panelli, Nairn, Atwool & McCormack, 2002; 
Rose, 1990, 1996a; Van Dijk, 1991).  Most recently, in New Zealand youth studies, Susan 
Jacka (2003) looked at media and government constructions of truant youth in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand during the 1990s. 
However, researchers looking at institutional knowledge have tended to focus on one 
institution or on institutions separately; thus neglecting the interaction that occurs within 
institutional contexts and the complexities of the role of institutional experts.  Whilst the 
actual production of texts may differ across institutions, authors, and the evidence they draw 
upon, indicates a complex relationship between institutions. For example, institutions may 
share particular theories and jargon about a phenomenon; additionally, experts may be 
located in one institution but speak in a variety of institutional contexts.  Furthermore, an 
expert may be located in one institutional context, such as a research institute at a university, 
but could just as easily be located in another context, such as a research division of a 
governmental department.  For this reason, when referring to data, I have cited the 
institutional publishing context rather than calling the author an ‘academic author’, 
‘government author’, or ‘media author’.  Thus, I have attempted to endorse the focus of my 
research on institutions and the texts produced rather than individuals or the methods of 
production.   
Furthermore, gathering data from three institutional contexts allowed me to triangulate the 
institutional meanings and knowledge/s surrounding youth crime and to acknowledge the 
complexities surrounding the application of same and different knowledges in institutions (c.f. 
                                                    
7
 ‘Tngta whenua’ means ‘people of the land’ and is used to refer to the indigenous people in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand – the Mori people. 
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Janesick, 1998).  It allowed me to work with the data closely and work with data in a variety 
of formats.   
Texts published and archived in printed and recorded form comprised the data selected for 
analysis.  Published texts are a major form of knowledge production, reproduction, and 
dissemination (c.f. Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991).  Academia, government, and media 
produce a weight of information, both published and unpublished, which can range from 
commentaries (e.g. news reports, live interviewing, press releases, academic commentaries, 
and political commentaries) to formal articles and reports (e.g. conference papers, journal 
articles, documentaries, policies, current affairs articles, feature articles, keynote papers, and 
website information pages).  In this research, I endeavoured to ensure a workable sample of 
data by focusing on the formal articles and reports published in each context.  Overall, I 
found thirty-one texts published in a media context, fifteen texts in a government context, 
and fifteen8 in an academic context9.  The frequency of media-based publishing, and the 
focus of media-based publications on newsworthy and spectacular events, explains the 
slight dominance of media articles (c.f. Fowler, 1991).  Once I brought these texts together, I 
began to focus on analysis and the answering of my initial research questions. 
As my research questions focused on constructions and representations of youth and crime, 
I applied an analysis methodology that allowed me to explore the knowledges that construct 
criminally-deviant youth.  For this research, I used a discourse analysis to explore the 
constructions and representations of youth in academic, government, and media texts.  The 
type of discourse analysis I applied was poststructural as it focused on the positioning of 
individuals through a combination of power and knowledge.  Consequently, much of the 
theory behind the discourse analysis I applied came from the work of Michel Foucault 
(1972a, 1972b, 1976, 1977, 1980e) and the work of Nikolas Rose (1990). 
However, my following of Foucault and Rose was only on a theoretical level.  In this 
research, I did not follow the archaeological or genealogical methods of Foucault, which 
focus on providing a historical investigation into a phenomenon.  Theorists have criticised 
these methods for being internally flawed (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) and not allowing for 
alternative possibilities (Hoy, 1986a; C. Taylor, 1986).  Rather, the method of discourse 
analysis I applied was an analysis of a phenomenon (youth crime) in a historically located 
time (2002).  History was important as it laid the context for my analysis, but history was not 
the object of analysis; it was institutional knowledge.  Hence, although the theory of 
discourse I applied had roots in the work of Foucault, the methodology of discourse analysis 
I applied had roots elsewhere. 
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 This includes one text (Panelli, Nairn, Atwool, & McCormack, 2002).  In this text, Panelli and colleagues applied a 
textual analysis of constructions of youth in media texts.  Because this text is a critical analysis of media texts, I 
chose not to include this text in my final analysis. 
9
 I have placed complete lists of these articles in the three appendices at the end of this thesis. 
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Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1997, p.3) describe qualitative research as a 
“bricolage” of methodologies, where the researcher uses a variety of methods to explore a 
phenomenon.  My primary aim was to provide a critique of knowledge.  In order to do this I 
drew upon several methodologies, but I did not limit my analysis to one methodology such as 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992), psychological discourse analysis (Parker, 
1992) or political discourse analysis (Howarth, 2000).  Instead, I drew upon these 
methodologies with the methodological ideas of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) and the 
approaches to research analysis by Michelle Fine (1992) and her work with Judi Addelston, 
(1996).  Bringing these approaches together, I devised a methodology that would enable me 
to look at the use and application of knowledge. 
Through using a discourse analysis, I was able to explore the commonsense and expert 
knowledge used in constructions of youth and crime.  This enabled me to look at the 
limitations that exist for young people in relationship to knowledge and structural conditions.  
This is quite different to the critical research currently occurring in Australasia (e.g. White, 
1998; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997, 1998, 2000).  These researchers tend to give 
partial recognition to the implications of developmental knowledge on young people.  Their 
focus is on structural limitations for young people, particularly class.  In contrast, in this 
doctoral research, I attempted to explore the complexities of the relationship between 
knowledge and the production, and reproduction, of structural conditions.   
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I finish this chapter by giving an overview of the chapters that follow.  Chapter 2 is a 
theoretical discussion of the methods I applied in this research.  I define the key concepts of 
discourse, commonsense, and expertise, and expound upon the type of discourse analysis I 
applied to the texts analysed.  I examine the importance of context in my research as well as 
exploring how I have defined and used contexts.  I also discuss the strengths and limitations 
of discourse analysis I applied to the texts analysed.  Finally, I look at the ethical implications 
of this research.  Essentially, in Chapter 2, I provide the reasoning to the methodology 
outlined in this chapter. 
The chapter that follows is a literature review on youth theory.  In this chapter, I explore the 
construction of the concept and the object ‘youth’ in youth theory – particularly 
developmental-psychology.  I have divided this chapter into two sections.  In the first section, 
I explore the developmental-psychological construction of youth.  This construction has been 
central to adult commonsense understandings of young people.  I finish this section by 
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introducing critical youth studies research10 and contextual understandings of youth.  This 
research questions the status quo of current, and popular, conceptions about youth.  I have 
consequently found critical youth studies research invaluable in my own research.  I look at 
theories of youth deviance in the second part of this chapter.  In this section, I look at three 
representations of youth – the normally-deviant, the abnormally-deviant and the socially-
created deviant.  These constructions resonated throughout the institutional constructions of 
youth and crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002.  In this chapter, I introduce the knowledges 
central to my analysis and argue that definitions of youth are not static but contextual. 
I start the presentation of the formal analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 by outlining the two 
dominant constructions of young people committing crime.  Reflecting the literature review, I 
describe these two groups as the abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant.  Using examples 
from the text analysed, I demonstrate how a knowledge of human development and an 
expertise of risk dominate discourses and constructions of youth.  Finally, I discuss the 
contradiction that exists when the words ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ come together and the 
absence, and at times, contradictory presence of the socially-created deviant. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I discuss the key intertextual knowledges of human development and 
risk.  In these chapters, I expand upon the literature review and findings as I explore the 
knowledges within the context of their own historical development and within the context of  
Aotearoa/New Zealand.  Within these chapters, I attempt to show the complexities and 
contextual nature of these knowledges.  I critique the assumption that these knowledges 
allow for the truth about youth and youth deviance to be exposed.  I then posit that these 
knowledges may be a technique used within societal institutions to maintain some order 
within an unpredictable climate.  I argue that, within a neo-liberal climate, many adults have 
redefined risks associated with modernisation and technology as human risk, or 
developmental risks, within the individual.   
I explore the rationality and objectives of crime interventions in Chapters 8 and 9.  In Chapter 
8, I examine the application of a concept of ‘family’ in crime prevention arguments in 2002.  I 
explore the relevance of this concept in New Zealand youth justice and how it is connected 
to an idea of the self-governing and autonomous family.  I also look at how, within 
institutional texts, the school and mass education have become a form of pseudo family – a 
central point of identification, division, and intervention into dysfunctional families and/or 
abnormally-deviant young people.   
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 Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘critical youth studies’ broadly to refer to a corpus of research which 
analyses and critiques contemporary representations and constructions of youth.  I particularly focused on the work 
of Christine Griffin (1993, 1996), Nancy Lesko (1996a, 1996b, 2001) and Johanna Wyn & Rob White (White, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2002, 2003; White & Wyn, 1998, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997, 1998, 2000).  These writers have critiqued 
extensively constructions of youth which draw upon knowledges that are often seen as universal and applicable to 
all young people.  Other researchers I used to a lesser extent included Tina Besley (n.d., 2002), Judith Bessant 
(2001, 2002, Bessant & Hil, 2003, Bessant, Sercombe & Watts, 1998) and the work of researchers in the New 
Zealand project YouthFirst (Smith et al., 2002).   
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In Chapter 9, I take this notion of intervention further by exploring the relationship between 
power, knowledge, practice, and expertise within described interventions.  I build upon the 
idea that interventions illustrate a site of struggle between adults and young people.  I 
describe how, through interventions, adults attempt to control the deviance of young people 
and transform them into self-governing individuals.  I discuss the difficulty of this strategy as 
adults need to position youth as objects of power in order to control their deviance whilst at 
the same time there is a requirement that, at some time, the young person will become a 
self-governing subject.    
I present an alternative construction to the young deviant in Chapter 10 based on an idea of 
agency.  I argue that agency is about power and, concurrently, resistance (Foucault, 1980b).  
That is, agency occurs within points of struggle and is about forms of resistance that not 
necessarily involve choice.  I show that possibilities for agency manifest, or occur, in the 
internal contradictions and indeterminate moments of constructions.  At this point, agency is 
directed either towards the socialising mechanisms of interventions or towards the structural 
and material limitations (produced and reproduced through knowledges) surrounding the 
young person.  Hence, agency and deviance are contingent and reflective of the 
unpredictability of the human condition (c.f. Douglas, 1992). 
Chapter 11 is a chapter of conclusions.  I look at the continual implications that the crimes 
and youth justice policies of 2001 and 2002 are having on New Zealand society.  I 
summarise the conclusions and possibilities that arise now that this research is finished.   
My key argument is that the application of an expertise of development and risk allows adult 
experts and commentators to divide young people (and their families) into the normally-
deviant and the abnormally-deviant.  These people then argue that these young people can 
be socialised into self-governing, controllable individuals through intervention practices – a 
position necessary in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s neoliberal climate.  This combination of 
knowledge and practice produces and reproduces structural, material, and ideological 
limitations.  It also produces and promotes deviance through positioning particular types of 
young people as pathological and needing socialisation into a norm.  Consequently, there is 
a need to bring the concept of agency and resistance into conceptions of deviance, and to 
conceptualise young people as resisting, consciously or subconsciously, structures and 
knowledge.  These young people are not ‘risks’ but are resisting the flows of power 
constructed and developed through knowledge.  These young people are engaged in a 
struggle. 
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You take your first step into discourse research as you take your first step away from 
language … Language is so structured to mirror power relations that often we can see 
no other ways of being, and it structures ideology so that it is difficult to speak both in 
and against it.  
(Parker, 1992, p.xi) 
In Chapter 1, I gave a brief overview of the methods I used in this research.  In this chapter, I 
expand upon those methods.  I will present the logic behind the method or the methodology.  
As such, this chapter is a blend of theory and method as I define central theoretical concepts 
and elaborate on the form of discourse analysis applied to the institutional publications in my 
research.  The theory that informed my research originated in the theoretical works of 
Foucault (1970, 1972a, 1976, 1977, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d, 1980e) and, later, Rose (1990, 
1996b), whilst, how I applied this theory involved a bricolage of poststructural discourse 
methodologies found within sociological and psychological research11.   
I started this research with the assumption that the researcher holds theoretical positions in 
research a priori to the research (Honan, Knobel, Baker, & Davies, 2000; Lather, 1986).  As 
such, poststructural and postmodern ideas about the contingent ‘nature’ of truth and 
knowledge influenced my initial thinking, the research questions, and the developed 
methodology.  These ideas also provided parameters to the later analysis.  In addition to this 
‘poststructural’ positioning, the work of researchers in critical youth studies (such as Griffin, 
1993; Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997 and the others referred to on p.9) on the connection 
between knowledge and context also influenced my research.   
Bringing the postmodern, poststructural, and critical youth studies research influences 
together, I developed the following research questions.  These questions allowed me to 
examine constructed truths about criminal deviance in young people, implications of these 
truths for youth, and alternative possibilities for constructions of criminally-deviant youth: 
1. How are criminally-deviant youth represented and constructed within the 
institutional contexts of academia, government, and media?    
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 One part of my research involved designing a suitable methodology to ensure effective answering of research 
questions.  Although there are many types of discourse analysis methodologies, I found that most were unsuitable 
for the purpose of my study as they focused too heavily on either semiotic features or historical traces.  
Consequently, a key objective that emerged during my doctoral research was to design a discourse analysis 
method which would focus on knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense; a tool that would also 
be usable by other researchers.  I also wanted to expand some of the feminist work in discourse analysis (e.g. Fine, 
1992; Fine & Addelston, 1996), in which the analysis does focus on knowledge and power but does not provide a 
‘step by step’ methodology. 
"
 #$
	
#
 
 12 
2. What alternative possibilities exist for the ways in which youth and crime are 
constructed and represented in institutional contexts?   
Through these questions, I sought to examine five specific theoretical concepts – 
knowledge, power, positioning, commonsense, and expertise.  These theoretical concepts 
stemmed from the philosophical underpinnings of my research and come from my 
understanding of discourse.  I used these concepts, and the theories that informed them, to 
apply a theoretical position for myself as a researcher. 
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Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the theory and methodology within my 
research.  In this section, I will expand upon and explain this diagram, starting with 
Foucault’s (1977) writing on the development of the disciplinary society.  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical and Methodological Representation of Discourse Analysis 
In 1975, Michel Foucault first published his famous book Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la 
prison which was later translated, in 1977, into the English Discipline and Punish: The birth 
of the prison.  In this book, Foucault introduces us to an alternative history of the prison and 
he begins to challenge our understanding of psychology as a natural and truthful knowledge.  
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He, instead, encourages us to see psychology as a constructed knowledge, reflective of the 
contexts in which it arose, and as a contingent knowledge which ‘just happened to be’ the 
right knowledge at the right time.   
Foucault (1977) argues that prisons are a relatively new phenomenon of contemporary 
industrial societies.  He does this by charting the development of the prison system in 
Europe.  He argues that, before the industrial revolution, people in European society tended 
to see crime as being an act against the body of the sovereign.  Hence, punishment for 
crime tended to display the sovereign’s power on the criminal’s body.  Common 
punishments, such as hanging and stocks, demonstrated the power of the sovereign and 
reinforced the structure of society.   
Foucault (1977) then argues that sudden changes occurred in Europe, within the industrial 
revolution, which transformed governance and punishment.  On one dimension, the stability 
of society no longer depended on a sovereign wielding power but, instead, depended upon 
individuals contributing to society and governing themselves.  Hence, power moved from 
being an overt demonstration of the sovereign to a covert force within the individual.  On 
another dimension, reflecting the changes in governance, forms of punishment transformed 
from an overt demonstration of power on the individual into techniques of self-discipline 
exercised by the individual.  Hence, power became internalised within the human body.  
Foucault argues that in this emerging and developing context, psychology as well as other 
‘psy’ knowledges (for example, psycho-analysis, and psychiatry) emerged as the sciences of 
the body.  People within these changing societies were able to use the psy knowledges to 
reconceptualise the body, and to instigate practices of governance, that encouraged the 
development of self-discipline. 
Foucault (1977) allows us to look at the role of knowledge within the societies we live.  He 
allows us to see knowledge as more than the ‘natural truth’ but as something that arises at 
particular times in reflection of change in society.  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
presents an argument that knowledges, like psychology, just appear.  In this thesis, I want to 
suggest that there is a constitutive nature between ourselves and knowledge where our 
understanding of ourselves is determined, to a certain extent, by the knowledges to which 
we have access, but also that knowledge is fluid and changing all the time as we interact 
with others on a social dimension.  In a way, we do have a role in the production and 
reproduction of knowledge.  Knowledge is not a deity that produces itself.  So, using 
Foucault as an example (with this caveat about the development of knowledge), I brought to 
my research several assumptions about knowledge.   
I brought to the research an assumption that truths of criminal deviance in young people are 
socially and institutionally constructed knowledges (c.f. Sarup, 1993).  In this way, we do not 
use knowledge to discover truth; rather, we use knowledge to construct a truth (Foucault, 
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1980e; Walkerdine, 1990).  This knowledge, in itself, is a social construction.  In this way, 
over the last 200 years we have used psychology to construct a truth about ourselves. 
Following the notion that knowledge and truth are socially constructed, I also assumed that 
knowledges, or truths, are reflective of the contexts they arise from – contexts of time, 
location, ideology, and societal group (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995; Foucault, 1972a; Rose, 
1990).  In such a way, the knowledges we use to construct ‘truth’ are also contingent 
because differing constructions of ‘truth’ arise from differing social contexts (Foucault, 1976, 
1977).  These knowledges are reflective of, and conducive to, the contexts in which they are 
embedded (Foucault, 1977).  This is true of the development of psychology which arose from 
a particular context in history. 
In this way, I assumed that knowledge is constructive, contextual, and contingent.  This 
same assumption directly reflects the argument found in critical youth studies (Griffin, 1993; 
Lesko, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1998).  These theorists agree that 
researchers should recognise the contextual construction of youth in developmental-
psychology in order to establish the structural and material implications for youth.  This 
assumption also reflects the research questions I developed where the focus is on 
constructions, and constructing, rather that discovering the truth of deviance in youth. 
It is clear within Foucault’s (1977) writing on the history of prisons that knowledge also 
implies power.  Foucault encourages us to see the history of psychology as a history that is 
not power-neutral but intermingled with the governance of society.  Linda Tuhiwai Smith 
(2002) poses a very similar argument about ‘western’ academic knowledge.  Smith argues 
that academic knowledge privileges scientific knowledge.  Smith finds this problematic as the 
history of science involves the colonisation and ‘othering’ of indigenous peoples.  Like 
Foucault (1977, 1980c) Smith argues for a connection between knowledge and power.   
From Michel Foucault (1977) and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) we are able to understand that 
when we construct knowledge, we are also applying power.  We can never use or assume 
knowledge to be pure power; rather, when we use knowledge, we involve an exercising of 
power in communication and practice (Foucault, 1977, 1980c; Hoy, 1986b; Parker, 1992) 
(Figure 1, p.12).  As Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish (1977), and later in Power and 
Strategies (1980c), knowledge and power always imply and involve each other: 
Power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and 
accumulates new bodies of information … The exercise of power perpetually creates 
knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power … It is not 
possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge 
not to engender power   
(Foucault, 1980c, pp.51-52). 
The relationship between power and knowledge can be described as constitutive, where the 
application of knowledge (and, therefore, power) through communication and practice 
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produces and reproduces knowledges and ‘truths’.  This moment of constitution between 
knowledge and power appears in Figure 1 (p.12) as the shaded box between power and 
knowledge.  Hence, when we apply knowledge, we are engaged in producing, reproducing, 
changing and challenging structural and material conditions in a society.  Each time we do 
this, we position individuals differently (Bordo, 1993; Foucault, 1977; Hoy, 1986b; Lacombe, 
1996; Mills, 1997; Ransom, 1997, L.T. Smith, 2002)12.   
So, when we apply knowledge we produce and reproduce difference.  Often this difference is 
based on power.  For example, in a construction of truth we may position one group as 
‘powerful’ and another group as ‘dependent’ or powerless.  Hence, we combine knowledge 
and power in social communications and practices to position individuals (c.f. Foucault, 
1977).  This constitutive relationship between knowledge and power also influences the 
types of relationships possible between individuals and societal institutions (Foucault, 1977).  
Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (2002) work on academic knowledges and methodologies highlights 
how an application of knowledge positions individuals and reproduces difference.  Taking a 
post-colonial approach, Smith describes how researchers using ‘western’ research 
methodologies have continuously positioned indigenous people as ‘other’ through 
classification and the reaffirmation of ‘western’ values and knowledge.  We can find the 
same argument about classification in Foucault’s (1977) work on prisons and Nikolas Rose’s 
(1990) work on psychology. Both Foucault and Rose argue that we use methods of 
classification to position different groups of people into abnormal and normal categories. 
Dany Lacombe (1996) and Charles Taylor (1986) argue that Foucault’s presentation of the 
relationship between power and knowledge is deterministic as it assumes human subjects to 
be the effect of power and knowledge.  To a certain extent, I agree with their argument – 
Foucault’s original presentation is a deterministic portrayal of society as he does describe 
and portray individuals as nothing more than ‘cogs’ on the wheel of power and knowledge.  
His original argument is also limited, as he does not account for the ways in which change 
can occur in contexts of power and knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).  In my own 
analysis, I draw upon later developments in Foucault’s (1980b) writing about resistance to 
address these issues.  In this writing, Foucault argues that there cannot be any relationship 
of power without resistance and that the subject is formed in this relationship.  In this way, 
change is possible in the moments of freedom between power and resistance.  These are 
the indeterminate moments (Bhabha, 1995) in which we cannot be certain about others and 
ourselves.  They are moments of possibility and impossibility – they are moments in which 
contradictions become freedom.  It is these moments that I focus on in Chapter 9.  
I approached my research seeing the need to focus on the constitutive role of knowledge 
and power, and the possibilities that are apparent when resistance is brought into the 
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 Foucault (1977, p.27) used a hyphen (“power-knowledge”) to illustrate the constitutive relationship between 
knowledge and power. 
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analysis.  I used the theoretical notions of expertise (Rose, 1996b) and commonsense 
(Griffin, 1993; McWilliam, 2002; Rose, 1990, 1996b) to explore the constitutive relationship 
between knowledge and power.  The notion of expertise allowed me to explore institutionally 
constructed knowledge, whilst, the notion of commonsense allowed me to explore how 
individuals apply expertise as popular knowledge.   
Rose (1996b) argues that expertise is a combination of institutional knowledge and 
institutionally validated practices.  In other words, expertise is a validated and specialised 
knowledge with a specific language or terminology that has arisen from institutional practices 
– particularly research.  Validation of expertise knowledge tends to occur at an intertextual 
level where authors and others refer to ‘experts’ and ‘proven’ practice.  These people also 
apply a theoretical language, common to the discipline in which it has arisen, to verify the 
constructed knowledge as truth.  Academic research and academic writing are clear 
examples of expertise.  Academic authors often validate their statements and research with 
reference to others and reference to validity and reliability.       
In contrast, commonsense is a societal group’s popularly held knowledge and beliefs about a 
particular phenomenon (c.f. Griffin, 1996; McWilliam, 2002).  Unlike expertise, those using 
commonsense appeal to an inherent ‘Truth’ and use tautological references to a supposed 
universality of truth (c.f. Douglas, 1992).  Often an author may use the rhetoric of the text to 
bury these tautological references so that they are difficult to pinpoint.  This can often 
happen when they use both tautological references to universal ideas (through metaphors, 
proverbs, and stories) and terms of expertise.  For example, an author might talk about the 
youth-at-risk (expertise term) as being on a pathway (metaphor) to deviance.  Although we 
would expect to see clear evidence of commonsense knowledge in media writing, we can 
also see examples of this knowledge in the use of metaphor and symbolism in other 
institutional writing.  Authors often appeal to metaphors to portray their arguments as clear 
commonsense.  Across chapters 4 to 9, I will explore the complexity between expertise and 
commonsense as it appeared in the New Zealand texts of 2002. 
Hence, expertise and commonsense do not exist independently of each other; both expertise 
and commonsense exist within a societal group’s dominant knowledge/s, or ‘ideologies’.  
Hence, there can be a cyclic relationship between expertise and commonsense.  Rose 
(1990, 1996b) indicates this in his discussion on the application of psychology in 
contemporary society.  According to Rose, psychology has become so dominant that now 
everyone refers to it – even if they are not aware of it.  It is recognised as an expertise – but 
it is also seen as a universal truth.  Psychology is now the ‘Truth’ of contemporary society.   
Psychology is an institutional and socially constructed knowledge, which we use to position 
individuals in knowledge and practice.  This psychology is never pure expertise or pure 
commonsense.  Often researchers use a psychological expertise to construct a truth of 
youth.  However, this expertise is never pure and distinct, as it has stemmed from other 
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commonsense knowledge and popular ideas.  It has arisen again later in expertise but has 
become so entrenched in a society that it is now commonsense.  Hence, researchers have 
used expertise to give new words to old assumptions, which, in turn, become new metaphors 
for understanding social contexts.  Furthermore, both expertise and commonsense involve 
knowledge, power, and positioning.   
Through expertise and commonsense we create a knowledge to communicate meaning and 
to inform practice.  This combination of knowledge and practice in expertise and 
commonsense neatly depicts the operation of knowledge and power, where the application 
of knowledge not only constructs (which in itself is an exercising of power) but it also informs 
practice.  Both knowledge and practice lead to a particular positioning of all those involved 
(Rose, 1990, 1996b).  For example, educational psychologists position teachers and 
students differently.  They tend to see the teacher as an older, more mature, person who is 
there in the classroom to educate students – teachers are the instrument of education.  In 
contrast, educational psychologists would see the student as being in the classroom to learn 
by, or with, the teacher – students are the target of education. 
In my own research, I used commonsense and expertise in my analysis to explore how 
authors applied knowledge, power, and positioning to construct and represent criminally-
deviant youth.  This entailed my questioning the taken-for-granted truths surrounding youth 
criminal deviance (c.f. Sarup, 1993; Walkerdine, 1990).  In other words, I was involved in a 
critique of knowledge, in which I did not use knowledge to understand youth but, instead, I 
attempted to cut, dissect, and deconstruct the knowledge, or ‘Truth’, constructing criminally-
deviant young people (Foucault, 1984).  I then brought together the gaps existent within 
differing constructions to explore alternative possibilities.  In order to achieve this, I used the 
theoretical elements (knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense) together 
within the poststructural concept of ‘discourse’ and applied a discourse analysis.  This 
allowed me to explore current constructions of criminally-deviant youth and to develop 
possible alternative constructions. 
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I want to first define what I mean by the word ‘discourse’ before describing the discourse 
analysis approach I applied13.  I used a bricolage of discourse methodologies found within 
psychology and sociology to build a definition of discourse that enabled me to use 
knowledge as a primary unit of analysis.  I did not follow explicitly one approach to analysis; 
                                                    
13
 Researchers and theorists have developed many discourse analysis approaches.  Each of these approaches 
concentrates on differing aspects of discourse and/or language.  My own approach incorporated a variety of 
theoretical concepts about discourse found within psychological and sociological writing.  For further information on 
the types of discourse analysis approaches see Fairclough (1992).  Fairclough provides an excellent summary of 
approaches available and their historical development. 
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instead I drew upon elements in approaches that allowed me to focus on the theoretical 
concepts of my analysis. 
I use the term ‘discourse’ in a poststructural sense to encompass my idea that we construct 
truth or truths in social contexts (see Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972b; Fowler, 1991; 
Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Van Dijk, 1991).  By using discourse as a concept of 
analysis, I was able to explore knowledge, power, and positioning.  Various theorists (e.g. 
Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1976, 1977; Howarth, 2000; Mills, 1997; Willig, 2001) recognise 
these elements as essential components of any one discourse.  For example, the 
constitutive relationship between knowledge and power, and the associated positioning of 
individuals, are evident in Fairclough’s (1992) description of discourses: 
Discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct 
or ‘constitute’ them: different discourses construct key entities … in different ways, and 
position people in different ways as social subjects.  
(Fairclough, 1992, pp.3-4) 
Hence, I took the term discourse to mean a social practice or communication that produces 
and reproduces social understandings.  When we use discourses we incorporate knowledge, 
power, and positioning in practices that involve language and silence (i.e. the implied but not 
said) (c.f. Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1977; Mills, 1997).  In short, we apply discourses to 
understand our world and ourselves.  When we use discourses, we also position ourselves 
whilst positioning others (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1977; Howarth, 2000; Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000; Mills, 1997; Willig, 2001).  In other words, discourses are languages in 
action in particular contexts.  This is evident in the work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002), but 
we can also see an example of how discourses can be used to position people in the work of 
Michelle Fine and Judi Addelson (1996).  In their study on gender and power, Fine and 
Addelson describe how gender is often conceptualised through discourses of sameness and 
difference.  These discourses often tend to exclude women from full participation in society 
or require the woman to ‘behave like a man’.   
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Because we socially construct and use discourses, we also need to recognise that 
discourses insinuate contexts of time, social group, ideology, and location (Fairclough, 1992; 
Foucault, 1984, 1999) (Figure 1, p.12).  We can understand the context of time to be that of 
a historical moment.  However, in saying this, we also need to recognise that a particular 
point of view, or a particular group’s knowledge, often dominates our understanding of 
history.  Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) says this quite aptly in Decolonizing Methodologies: 
History is also about power.  In fact history is mostly about power.  It is the story of the 
powerful and how they became powerful, and then how they use their power to keep 
them in positions which they can continue to dominate others.   
(L.T. Smith, 2002, p.34) 
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Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2002) points out that the history we have access to often reflects, and 
is, the history of a dominant social group.  For Smith, this group is the colonizing Anglo-
American.  However, we can also find social groupings across many structural dimensions 
such as class, gender, sexuality, and age.  In my research, I primarily based the groups of 
my analysis around age (adults and young people), although I was analysing one group’s 
perspective of the other (that of adult authors).  However, as my analysis will show, social 
groups are often far more complex.  They are often not defined through single dimensions 
(such as class) but, instead, must be seen as involving a cross-section of dimensions that 
lead to complex positionings that others often consider contradictions.  For example, those 
writing about youth in 2002 structured and positioned young people along age dimensions, 
but they also constructed and positioned young people along gender, ethnic, and economic 
dimensions.  Often the ways in which authors wrote about youth led to contradictions and 
gaps in their definitions as their definitions could never fully define young people.  These 
authors drew upon different knowledges and values in their constructions – they drew upon a 
shared ideology. 
Ideology is a complex term meaning different things to different people.  Terry Eagleton 
(1991) argues that we should see ideology as a contested “text” (p.1, author’s italics) of 
divergent meanings and histories.  He argues that we cannot bring the many meanings of 
ideology together into a ‘Grand Theory’ but that we should develop our own definitions whilst 
recognising the arguments concerning ideology.  I initially drew my definition of ideology from 
Marxist theory (Marx, 1978)14 15.  In short, I used ideology to refer to the ideas and beliefs 
that come to represent the essence of a significant social group and enable social cohesion 
within that group and, at times, between groups (c.f. Eagleton, 1991).  In other words, I saw 
ideology as an interpretation of reality from one significant social group often in the form of 
socially-constructed knowledges with associated values and beliefs (c.f. Entwistle, 1979; van 
Dijk, 1998).   
However, in adding a Marxist dimension to my interpretation of ideology, and in 
acknowledging the role of power, I also saw ideology as political in that dominant social 
groups tend to present their ideology as a truthful and accurate representation of reality 
(Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977).  They then use their claim for truth to justify the way in 
which a society is structured and to produce and reproduce this reality (Marx, 1978; Reiman, 
2007).  This does not mean that other groups (or individuals within a dominant group) do not 
contest a dominant ideology; however, overall, different groups in a society generally accept 
that, in some way, a governing ideology does reflect a reality of that society (see Williams, 
1977). 
                                                    
14
 Although there are many definitions to ideology, I will only expand upon the approach I used.  Terry Eagleton 
(1991) and Teun van Dijk (1998) discuss other definitions and provide a multi-disciplinary analysis to the term 
‘ideology’. 
15
 Although I drew upon Marxist theory, I did not agree with the Marxist connection between ideology and false 
consciousness. 
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Foucault (1980d) is critical of the term ideology and its use in Marxist theory.  One of the 
arguments he makes is that the Marxist conception of ideology tends to refer to ideology as 
a mistruth or falsity.  Although I agree with Foucault that Marxist conceptions of ideology do 
refer to a falsity, I do not agree with him on the point that we should refer to ideology in an 
analysis of discourse. A good example of this is Jeffery Reiman (2007) who looks at the 
inequalities in capitalist judicial systems.  However, I disagree that this means that we cannot 
use reference to a power-induced, or political, ideology in a discourse analysis.  Rather, I 
would suggest that ideology is an apt term to use to describe the contested nature of socially 
constructed knowledges, and the relationship between power and knowledge – particularly 
with regard to positioning (c.f. van Dijk, 1998).    Rather, than seeing ideology as a false 
consciousness, in this analysis, I saw ideology as an interpretation of reality open to 
contestation (c.f. Hirst, 1979). 
What makes an ideology dominant is how well ‘we’ perceive it to interpret reality at any point 
in time.  It is this perceived fit, between ideology and reality, that ensures whether an 
ideology is accepted as a true representation by more than one social group (Bourdieu, 
1996; Williams, 1977).  When this fit is strong, there is little critique, contestation, or change, 
and the ideology may remain stable for some time.  However, as I will show in my analysis, 
this fit between ideology and reality is not always as close as it appears and that there are 
moments in which the gap between reality and ideology becomes apparent and we 
reconstruct our thinking and knowledge into new ideologies in which to view our world.   
There are also moments in which we cannot explain what is happening with our 
interpretation of reality and when our interpretation is challenged by another point of view or 
we see contradictions in our understandings of reality.  Often these times can be marked by 
particular changes in society – like the gradual changes that occurred in Anglo-American 
societies during the industrial revolution.  It is at the point of ideology that change occurs 
most often. That is, in moments of social instability, we often find that what we thought to be 
a clear ‘Truth’ or discourse about our reality is being questioned by apparent contradictions 
coming to the surface.  At this point in time, an ideological struggle occurs in which we try to 
gain meaning about ourselves and our world through a negotiation between ourselves, 
others, and the world as we perceive it.  The ideological struggle leads us to reconstruct a 
discourse that enables us to gain understanding and to ‘feel’ some control – we may not be 
able to control change fully – but through constructing a new truth we can attempt to 
exercise some control over something we consider to be out of control.   
We can find a similar argument in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (2001) analysis of 
political revolution where ideological change occurs in moments of articulation and 
rearticulation.  Laclau (1994) sees many of the truths and values of contemporary industrial 
countries as “empty signifiers” (p.167) or key political concepts (such as democracy) in which 
people associate with particular meanings.  Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue that there are 
moments of instability when these meanings become contested and rearticulated.  In my 
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own study, these moments are points of ideological struggle where truths and values about 
ourselves and society are rearticulated.  
Finally, alongside time, social group, and ideology, I also considered contexts of location. 
This meant primarily that I focused on New Zealand.  However, New Zealand does not have 
a distinct history and identity separate to the rest of the world.  New Zealand shares a history 
with other countries, such as Great Britain and America.  New Zealand is often seen as a 
‘western’ country as it accepts a western interpretation of reality – or ideology.  For this 
reason, in looking at New Zealand, I also looked at other contemporary industrial societies 
(or ‘western’ countries) and at the shared knowledges on which these countries based their 
ideas about adolescence and youth.   
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The contextual elements of discourse on which I based my thinking, alongside the argument 
for context in critical youth studies (Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & 
White, 1998), encouraged me to explore the contextual elements of constructions.  Theorists 
and researchers (e.g. Foucault, 1970, 1976, 1977, 1989; Jacka, 2003; Rose, 1990, 1996b; 
Walkerdine, 1998) have attempted to capture this contextual dimension by applying a 
genealogical (Foucault, 1984) or archaeological (Foucault, 1972a) approach to their 
research.  Researchers use these approaches to locate ‘historically’ the emergence of 
discourses or shared understandings (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  In contrast, I was more 
interested in examining the relationship between knowledge and context.  At times, this 
meant that I needed to historically locate the construction used because history influences 
current knowledges.  However, I found that many researchers, both locally (e.g. Jacka, 
2003) and internationally, (e.g. Aries, 1962; S. Brown, 1998; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1977; 
Griffin, 1993, 1996; Lesko, 1996b, 2001; Rose, 1990, 1996b) have already located the 
emergence of particular knowledges such as psychology.  Because of this, I decided to draw 
upon this research for an historical analysis rather than repeating a similar methodology to 
tell a similar story.  By doing this, I was able to build upon the research already done to 
present an original analysis for a different context.    
So, contexts envelop and influence discourses.  In this sense, the discourses we use 
produce and reinforce contexts and the contexts we live in influence the types of discourses 
we use.  Like power and knowledge, the relationship between discourse and context is cyclic 
in nature.  In a way, the discourses we use represent those socially-constructed knowledges 
we see as true.  Those discourses change in moments of ideological struggle in which we 
need to develop a new way to see and understand the world. 
Hence, within my research, I used ‘discourse’ as a synonym for ‘truth’ because I interpreted 
both in the same way; both are socially constructed and contextual, and both involve 
practices of power and knowledge in the positioning of individuals.  However, in contrast to 
‘truth’ which we use to assert some proven reality, the term ‘discourse’ allowed me to 
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emphasize the contingent and contextual nature of knowledge.  However, a focus on 
discourse is different to a focus on truth.   
In a focus on truth, a researcher tends to assume that the relationship between concepts is 
somewhat linear and that commonsense and expertise have little, or no, relationship to each 
other.  In this linear focus on truth, a researcher’s communication of ideas and practice leads 
to knowledge.  This, in turn, leads to expertise, which then leads to power.   
In contrast, in a contingent and socially-constructed theory of discourse, a researcher 
assumes that each concept draws upon others.  That is, each concept implies that another 
exists.  This means that a researcher cannot separate these concepts in an analysis.  I have 
shown this in Figure 1 (p.12) by using double arrows between concepts.  
In summary, I applied a discourse analysis approach to explore how authors applied 
knowledge, through expertise and commonsense, to the phenomenon of youth crime in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002.  This involved me in exploring both the application of 
knowledge and the implications of knowledge when authors applied it.  I also located my 
research in an understanding of the relationship between knowledge, institutions and texts. 
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Primarily, I understood discourses (and the knowledges used in discourses) to be 
institutionally-bound or connected to the social practices of knowledge production and 
reproduction within social institutions (Foucault, 1983).  Foucault (1983) and Chomsky and 
Foucault (1997) argue that institutions are a key site for the analysis of knowledge and 
power in a society.  This is because the production and reproduction of knowledge and 
power occur at an institutional level, particularly through the construction of texts (c.f. 
Fairclough, 1992).  So, in order for me to explore the associated elements of discourse, I 
needed to take institutionally and socially constructed texts as the item of analysis 
(Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Mills, 1997) because it is through texts authors apply the 
elements of discourse (Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Parker, 1992; Van Dijk, 1991).  Both 
institutions and texts are bound to social contexts; as such, it can be argued, authors 
construct texts, in a variety of formats, to reflect and inform contexts. 
Texts are not just written texts, texts are also visual and aural (Parker, 1992).  Discourse 
theorists argue that texts can be conversations (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), written texts 
(e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Fowler, 1991; Van Dijk, 1991), visual texts (e.g. Foucault, 1970; 
Jones, 1991), and/or recorded texts (see Hartley, 2002).  Following the idea that through 
institutions we produce and reproduce discourse and knowledge, I chose to focus on 
institutionally published texts in the analysis, particularly written (incorporating illustrations) 
and recorded texts. 
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No matter what type of text authors choose to construct, they use, and have to use, 
language.  Hence, I focused on language, as it appeared in written, aural, and visual texts, in 
my analysis16.  Through focusing on language, I was able to explore the elements of 
discourse, as they appeared first through language (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972a; 
Fowler, 1991; Mills, 1997; Parker, 1992; Van Dijk, 1991; Weedon, 1987).  However, I did not 
focus my analysis on the words alone – this would have resulted in a semiotic or textual 
discourse analysis (e.g. Panelli, et al., 2002).  I also wanted to focus on the gaps or silences 
in discourses used by authors and those to whom they referred.  These were the assumed 
knowledges and implied positionings (c.f. Horrocks & Jevtic, 1997).  This involved me going 
beyond exploring constructions to exploring implications.  It also encouraged me to explore 
constructions for new possibilities (c.f. Anderson & Jack, 1991). 
How I defined ‘discourse’ did allow me to explore discourses in terms of knowledge, power, 
and positioning.  However, I needed to provide some elaboration so that I could explore the 
elements of discourse within expertise and commonsense.  To do this, I brought to the 
analysis the argument that we use knowledges intertextually on a textual and discursive 
level.  At the textual level, we validate the truthfulness of a text by referring to other texts, 
proven practices (usually through research), or writers (Fairclough, 1992).  On the discursive 
level, we validate the truthfulness of a text by referring to other knowledges, to an inherent 
truth/knowledge, or to a generalised institutional expertise or discipline (such as psychology, 
sociology, and biology) (Foucault, 1972a).  Intertextuality and the ways we use it can show 
both expertise and commonsense.  Intensification of an expertise occurs when a knowledge 
becomes intertextual and a society continuously refers to it on a textual or discursive level in 
conversations.  These knowledges and their associated positionings become evident in an 
analysis of intertextual expertise and commonsense. 
Additionally, the knowledges we apply through expertise and commonsense, we also use to 
inform practice/s.  We also use practices to endorse particular positionings of individuals 
(Rose, 1990, 1996b) and to validate particular knowledges.  For this reason, I felt it important 
to examine the practices informing and informed by expertise and commonsense.  This 
allowed me to identify expertise and commonsense and the types of intertextual knowledges 
used by authors to inform practices.  Focusing on practices added another layer to my 
analysis.  Focusing on practice and knowledge also allowed me to explore the elements of 
discourse rather than discourse itself17. 
So, rather than focusing on discourse, I focused on the elements of discourse.  This is 
because I assumed that discourse did not equate to knowledge, rather that there is a close 
                                                    
16
 I choose to focus on language in texts rather than language in conversations to keep an institutional focus to my 
analysis. 
17
 I struggled with whether I should attempt to locate discourses or knowledge.  I chose to focus on knowledge as I 
found that there was a tendency by some discourse researchers to label and name any social practice ‘discourse’.  
It seemed to me that the word ‘discourse’  has been overused and, perhaps reified to a much higher status than 
necessary).   
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relationship between discourse and knowledge.  That is, we draw upon knowledge to 
construct a ‘truth’ – a discourse.  We use this discourse in expertise and commonsense and 
apply it in practice.  By applying this understanding in my research, I developed three levels 
of analysis. 
The levels of my analysis allowed me to explore all the elements of discourse and the 
dominance of particular knowledges.  In the first level, I looked at the applied knowledge 
through locating points of expertise or commonsense.  This involved looking at what and 
how those writing assumed a particular construction of youth deviance.  Secondly, I looked 
at the positioning of young people (and others) and the implications of the application of 
knowledge.  This second level allowed me to look at the complexities of power as they 
related to knowledge.  Finally, I looked more closely at expertise and commonsense or the 
ways in which writers validated their assumptions through intertextuality and how they used 
this constructed knowledge to inform practice.   
Through focusing on knowledge and its application via discourse I was effectively able to 
apply an approach that would address both questions – it enabled me to explore 
constructions, discrepancies, indeterminate moments, and contradictions.  I used this later to 
develop an alternative possibility or construction of deviance.  This also allowed me to 
explore the implications of knowledge, in context, whilst also moving away from a solely 
structural/material analysis or focus.  To do this I divided the research into three stages. 
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The criteria I set to outline discourse and discourse analysis set two clear boundaries to my 
research – a focus on institutions and a focus on texts.  Hence, my assumptions about 
knowledge and its association to discourse/s set institutional texts as the items of my 
analysis.  From this point, I placed parameters around my research to ensure that I would 
recognise the contextual nature of knowledge and I would locate and explore knowledge, 
power, positioning, expertise, and commonsense.  I used these parameters to determine the 
sample of texts in my research. 
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Rather than exploring many unrelated institutional contexts, I limited my analysis to the 
knowledge producing and disseminating institutions of academia, government, and media.  
This focus corresponded well with my theoretical focus on knowledge.  It also allowed me to 
acknowledge the ways in which authors in New Zealand society construct knowledge within 
institutional contexts.   
By investigating three institutional contexts, I was able to explore the differing ways 
knowledge (and, therefore, expertise, and commonsense) is produced and reproduced, 
whilst also exploring the effects of power that occur alongside the application of knowledge 
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(i.e. positioning).  My focus on three institutions also brought a level of triangulation 
(Janesick, 1998) to my research, as I was able to explore the dominance of themes and 
constructions.  Triangulation also meant I could explore the extent to which differing 
constructions and knowledges were bound to one institution or were dispersed amongst the 
differing institutions. 
Alongside institutions, I also placed parameters around the types of institutional texts I would 
explore.  This allowed me to have a workable and feasible project that would fit within the 
constraints of a doctoral degree.  Furthermore, a poststructural discourse analysis is an 
indepth analysis and is quite intensive.  For this reason, a researcher needs to limit the 
amount of text analysed or the type of text analysed.  I chose to limit the type of text 
analysed as I felt there was a risk to the authenticity of findings when the number of texts are 
limited.  Limiting the type of text allowed me to focus the research on construction of a youth 
deviance within specific genres.   
Specifically, I focused on published and nationally archived texts (written and recorded) 
focusing on youth crime and youth crime prevention/intervention in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
These texts were published during April to November 2002.  This focus allowed me to have 
a workable number of texts from a time where there was much public and institutional 
discussion about youth crime.  It also meant that others could later critique my research 
because the texts analysed could be easily accessed again.  Additionally, I focused on 
formal articles and reports published from each institutional context to ensure a workable 
sample not saturated with media news items. 
My focus on institutions and on formal published and archived articles and reports allowed 
me to gather all those texts recorded in database catalogues, institutional publication 
catalogues, national/institutional libraries, and storage archives.  In this process, I searched 
archives, websites, and databases, and made formal requests to storage archives, libraries, 
and government departments.  I then used purposive sampling (Davidson & Tolich, 1999) to 
select formal articles and reports fitting the parameters of my research.  This focus assured 
me that I could tell a story from the data that was applicable to the contexts of academia, 
government, and media in Aotearoa/New Zealand during 2002.  In the end, I found fifteen 
texts published in government contexts (Appendix 2), fourteen published in academic 
contexts (Appendix 1), and thirty-one published in media contexts (Appendix 3).  The higher 
number of articles published in media contexts reflected the shorter length of publication size 
and the prominent focus of the media on youth crime and responses to youth crime during 
2001 and 2002 (c.f. Fowler, 1991).18   
                                                    
18
 It did surprise me that I found only  31 recorded and archived current event, feature, and focus articles from the 
media.  I had originally anticipated a much higher number, but as my pilot research showed the media interest 
tended to be based around a direct reporting of day to day news and commentary (items that I did not include in the 
analysis as I did not want to have a saturation of media content. 
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Although all the texts gathered focused on youth crime, I found that, in contrast to 
government and academic texts, authors writing from a media context were more concerned 
with informing the public about the progress of cases through the court system and with 
analysing the causes of an assumed ‘growing’ youth crime problem.  Authors writing in an 
academic context tended to focus on presenting findings from evaluation and research.  
These authors also provided some theoretical discussion of youth crime in New Zealand but, 
even through using statistics, they did not present youth crime as a growing problem.  
Authors also presented research findings in texts published through government contexts; 
however, as expected, authors writing in this context also contributed to the development of 
youth crime policies.  Although these authors expressed caution about the reading of youth 
crime statistics, they engaged in reading statistics and examining the variables that, they 
assumed, led to particular cases of youth crime (such as ethnicity and socio-economic 
status).   
The differences within purpose and intention of the different publishing context did not clearly 
situate authors within a certain context.  For example, authors writing in media contexts 
sourced, and referred to, writers and researchers from academic and government contexts.  
Furthermore, writers from academic contexts (such as universities) also published and 
contributed to government texts.  Authors coming from government institutions (such as the 
courts) published texts within academic contexts (particularly conferences) and provided 
commentary on media texts.  Furthermore, despite the differences in publishing intentions 
and purposes, across the institutional contexts authors drew upon, and used, particular 
ideas, and knowledges of, youth which I found through applying a discourse analysis. 
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In order to conduct a discourse analysis, I had to take a step back and first establish a 
contextual picture of Aotearoa/New Zealand and its young people.  I used this contextual 
picture to expand and contexualise the discourse analysis.  Hence, I separated my research 
into three stages: contextual, analysis, and reconstruction.   
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In the contextual stage of my research, I focused on establishing the historical, political, 
judicial, ideological, and social contexts that surrounded New Zealand youth in 2002.  I broke 
the contextual stage into four substages.  First, I reviewed secondary historical texts and 
academic research texts.  In these texts, writers discussed and reflected upon the 
 27 
positioning, and historical construction, of youth in New Zealand and other contemporary 
industrial societies19.   
After looking at the first group of texts, I reviewed and informed my analysis with three 
government policies specifically pertaining to youth in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  One of these 
policies established New Zealand’s current youth system (Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989); whilst, two of these policies were published in 2002 (The Youth 
Offending Strategy and Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa).   
Finally, as a juxtaposition to this analysis, I also reviewed central research projects used in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand to establish a picture of New Zealand youth and youth deviance.  I 
initially used two projects published in 2002 (Blaiklock, et al., 2002, Maxwell & Morris, 2002a) 
which both gave a contextual overview of young people in New Zealand in 2002 (in the youth 
justice system and in the social climate of New Zealand).  They further show that the New 
Zealand adult understanding of youth is not necessarily limited to Aotearoa/New Zealand but 
reflects wider contemporary constructions and understandings of youth. 
This contextual stage to my research allowed me to locate my analysis in a specific time and 
location.  It also meant I could explore the complexities of knowledge and acknowledge that 
knowledge is both localised (connected to a geographic location) and generalised (used 
across geographic locations).  Aotearoa/New Zealand is a contemporary industrial and 
liberal society with unique attributes.  The types of institutions in New Zealand society, as 
well as the liberal-democratic form of state governance, situate Aotearoa/New Zealand 
alongside other contemporary industrial societies.  This positioning allows writers and 
producers of texts in Aotearoa/New Zealand to apply, produce, and reproduce a ‘shared’ or 
‘universal’ knowledge about young people, whilst also expressing a uniqueness to the 
country.  So, the themes I found within the contextual stage of my research, fed into, and 
informed, my analysis.  
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In the second stage of my research, I applied a discourse analysis to the texts.  In this stage, 
I focused on answering the first research question by establishing the ways those writing in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand constructed and represented criminally-deviant youth through 
knowledge and power, expressed as expertise and commonsense.  
Before conducting the analysis, I conducted a pilot study on constructions of youth in 
newspaper reports published in 2002.  This pilot helped me to establish the approach I would 
take to discourse analysis.  Furthermore, whilst it highlighted some potential problems with 
                                                    
19
 I use the words ‘contemporary industrial’ to refer to a societies that emerged during the industrial revolution of the 
19th Century.  These societies share ideas of truth, systems of governance, and various values and beliefs and are 
commonly referred to as ‘western’; however, this term is problematic as it does not  fully encompass societies such 
as Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
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the way I was applying discourse analysis in the beginning, it also highlighted some potential 
themes that might emerge in my research.  Following Ruth Panelli and colleagues (2002), I 
used the approach of codifying and quantifying general themes within the located newspaper 
items (in excess of 200 newspaper news reports) in order to establish a dominant 
construction and a dominant type of knowledge.  This approach did evidence the dominance 
of psychological-developmental knowledge.  However, it proved ineffective because it did not 
capture implied or covert messages (the silences) about youth.  It also was not conducive 
with my theoretical positioning and understandings of discourse.  However, it did show that I 
needed to develop a systematic approach to discourse analysis (c.f. Willig, 2001). 
I developed this ‘systematic approach’ by returning to my theoretical positioning and 
understanding of discourse analysis.  I broke the discourse analysis into three levels, which I 
turned into three questions to focus on knowledge, positioning, and expertise/commonsense.  
First, I focused on the types of knowledge (both covert and overt) used by the producers of 
texts to construct youth.  Second, I focused on the implications of knowledge and looked at 
the construction and positioning of criminally-deviant youth (this involved exploring the 
positioning of other players in a discourse (such as, adults, other young people, adults 
working with young people, and families).  Third, I looked at expertise and commonsense in 
the intertextual validations of a point of view or knowledge through authors’ references to 
texts, experts, practices, a shared knowledge, and/or other knowledges.  I drew upon 
secondary commentary (particularly philosophical commentary such as Philippe Aries 
(1962), Urlich Beck (1992), Mary Douglas (1992), Jacques Donzalot (1979), and Michel 
Foucault (1977)) to further analyse and critique the forms of expertise and commonsense the 
authors used.    
Using this approach, I also attempted to manage the ways in which I applied these levels of 
analysis to the located texts.  Essentially, I read and re-read each text separately several 
times.  In this reading, I attempted to find out how authors incorporated knowledge within the 
texts – within the whole text, within separate paragraphs, and within sentences.  Once, this 
was completed, I re-read all the texts to examine intertextuality and the use of expertise and 
commonsense across the texts.  Exploring the implications for youth in terms of positioning 
was an important aspect of my analysis.  For this reason, I analysed positioning and the 
implications of such a positioning alongside the analysis of knowledge, expertise, and 
commonsense.  In this way, I wove an examination of power through the analysis by 
interpreting power as occurring in the positioning of individuals and groups through 
knowledge.  Finally, I looked at each construction of youth for possible contradictions and 
gaps in order to reconstruct an idea of youth criminal deviance. 
$ 


The final stage of my research was the identification of an alternative construction for the 
deviance of young people or lack of deviance in those constructed as deviant.  Essentially, 
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this involved focusing on the indeterminate gaps or moments in the texts where authors 
positioned youth in more than one, and often contradictory, positions or could not provide an 
absolute definition to deviance.  I broke this reconstructive analysis into two stages.  In each 
stage, I focused on the discursive constructions of youth.   
In the first stage, I focused on the implications of constructions for young people and 
attempted to explore how those writing about youth crime did not construct young people.  
To achieve this, I used critical youth studies literature to explore and compare constructions 
of criminally-deviant youth with constructions of other youth (deviant and non-deviant), 
adults, and children.  This involved me in analysing power with regard to the positioning of 
young people in knowledge-informed practices.  To do this, I explored how authors did, and 
did not, position young people in practices and interventions.  This enabled me to identify 
possible contradictions and to begin to conceptualise an alternative possibility for 
constructing ideas of youth deviance. 
In the second stage, I looked directly at contradictions in the representation of young people; 
namely, the simultaneous positioning, and indeterminate moments in differing constructions 
of youth.  Rather than seeing these contradictions and indeterminate moments as points to 
be resolved (c.f. Wyn & White, 2000), I saw them as points of possibility where young people 
could be positioned as ‘either’, ‘neither’, and ‘both’ at the same time (c.f. Derrida, 1981).  
This enabled me to explore and conceptualise possible alternative constructions to youth 
seen as criminally-deviant.  These alternative constructions could explain some of the 
contradictions in discourses and offer a perspective that diverts from developmental-
psychology.  In effect, the alternative construction I developed challenged institutional 
constructions whilst concentrating on the moments of possibility found within knowledge.   
I based the reconstruction stage of my research on the understanding that the current 
constructions of criminally-deviant youth disenfranchise youth and cause social divisions.  I 
took this understanding from the rationale for my research, from my understandings of 
critical youth studies research, and, later, from my own analysis.  Hence, institutional 
practices of knowledge production and reproduction have ethical implications for youth as 
they position youth and inform the ways in which many adults understand youth.  I further 
saw the connection between ethics and knowledge production and reproduction as being 
central in the ethical decisions that I made in my own research. 
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It would have been possible for me to assume that my own research was devoid of ethical 
implications because I did not ‘involve’ human subjects.  Indeed, most writing on ethical 
practices in research focuses on research with human subjects (e.g. Parsons, 1969; Snook, 
1981; Tolich, 2001) and New Zealand university human ethics committees tend to review 
research projects that involve human subjects.  However, my own experiences in research 
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and the implications of research showed me that research not conducted on human subjects 
is not devoid of ethical considerations.   
My theoretical understandings about truth, knowledge, and positioning meant that my own 
research, which in itself constructed and deconstructed knowledge, would have ethical 
implications in its positioning of young people and others.  Hence, ethics was a central 
feature in my research as ethics guided my decision to focus on institutions and my research 
had ethical implications beyond the research project. 
So far, I have established that I made a theoretical decision to my focus on institutions.  
However, I also saw it as an ethical decision.  From writing about researching with 
disenfranchised and marginalised groups (e.g. Beals, 2002a, 2002b) I found that it is 
important to ensure that the methodology itself (this includes the analysis) does not cause 
any harm to the individuals being researched (c.f. Snook, 1981; Tolich, 2001).  This is 
particularly so in a discourse analysis, which involves a level of deconstruction of reality 
and/or truth.  As I found in my Masters research (Beals, 2002a), when researchers question 
the reality experienced by disenfranchised groups (such as criminally-deviant youth) they 
can potentially cause harm to a participant through questioning a participant’s own 
understandings of self.  I concluded that researchers should first question institutional 
knowledges rather than the experienced reality of those researched.  My doctoral research 
was an ethical response to my findings and experiences in my Masters as I attempted to 
question how institutions constructed young criminal deviants rather than how these young 
people positioned themselves. 
I also had ethical considerations within the implications of my research.  One of my aims was 
to give those writing in institutions an awareness of the ways in which they applied 
knowledge to construct criminally-deviant youth.  Another of my aims was to give an 
alternative possibility to those writing about, and working with, youth.  It was important for me 
to attempt to ensure that this alternative possibility could lead to positive change or debate 
rather than another construction of marginalisation.  This positive aim is also a limitation of 
any piece of research as no author can control how their research is used, rather they can 
only attempt to ensure that what they intended occurs. 
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There were strengths and limitations to the approach that I took.  These were in addition to 
the future application of my own research and the ethical implications.  The strengths 
distinguished my research from other research in youth studies and ensured that my 
research had a robust methodology; whilst, the limitations were embedded within the 
methodology and theory of discourse analysis. 
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As I will discuss in Chapter 3, much of the research in critical youth studies (such as Wyn & 
White, 1997 and the others referred to on p.9) acknowledges a link between knowledge and 
positioning but does not explore this relationship in any detail.  Indeed, the focus of many of 
these researchers has tended to be, first, on structural inequalities and then, second, on 
developmental knowledge.  These researchers assume that structural inequalities come first 
and then the social construction of knowledge is an attempt to reproduce these 
inequalities20.   
My research differs as I assume that the relationship between knowledge and structural 
conditions is more complex and that the ways a society uses knowledge both produces and 
reproduces social conditions.  This is reflective of the contextual, contingent, and constitutive 
‘nature’ of knowledge where we use knowledge to reflect current understandings (reproduce) 
and contribute to the ways we understand ourselves (produce).  For this reason, the 
exploration of knowledge, power, and positioning is a strength of my research as it separates 
my research from that currently produced in youth studies and critical youth studies within 
the Australasian region (e.g. Wyn & White, 1997)21. 
In addition, there were several methodological strengths in my research.  The strong 
congruence of my theoretical positioning with the methodology meant that the discourse 
analysis approach I developed allowed me to address both research questions whilst 
exposing implications.  The focus on three institutions and a particular type of institutional 
text ensured that my research findings were, to some extent, an authentic representation of 
formal New Zealand institutional publications in 2002.   
Additionally, I also applied a multi-dimensional analysis where I looked at context, 
knowledge, and reconstructive possibilities.  Fairclough (1992) argues that effective 
discourse analysis should be multi-dimensional.  Although my dimensions differ to those of 
Fairclough22, they ensure that the research findings are authentic for the period of time in 
which I have set the research.  Furthermore, the reconstruction dimension to my analysis 
allows for an intervention of sorts into established understandings, expertise, and 
commonsense.  Fairclough argues that any discourse analysis should have an intervention 
as it ensures that the argument presented has some resolution.  So my research had clear 
strengths but it also had limitations.  These limitations fell into two groups: methodological 
and theoretical. 
                                                    
20
 In contrast, Urlich Beck’s (1992) analysis of risk shows how societal conditions can be, on some level, produced 
through the application of knowledge. 
21
 In contrast, Nancy Lesko (2001) from the United States and Christine Griffin from the United Kingdom (1993, 
1996) both explore the productive dimension of knowledge in their research. 
22
 Fairclough’s (1992) three dimensions are: textual practices, discursive practice, and social practices.  My 
dimensions differ to suit my research questions and research methodology. 
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The absence of a ‘youth voice’ in my research was a key methodological limitation.  Not 
involving youth placed my research at risk of being called ‘youthless’ and unrelated to the 
realities experienced by youth (Wyn & White, 1997).  However, I chose not to involve youth 
for ethical reasons – rather than deconstructing the actual lives of young people, I chose to 
deconstruct and reconstruct institutional knowledge.   
Connected to the limitations of youthless research is another limitation tied to the 
methodology used.  I had a risk, through discourse analysis, of making young people 
invisible through focusing on text, language, and ideology (see Wyn & White, 1998).  Within 
my own research, I attempted to address this limitation by making youth the focus of my 
analysis.  I used the key theoretical concepts (knowledge, power, positioning, expertise, and 
commonsense) as points through which I could analyse the concept of ‘youth’.  However, 
any discourse analysis also has potential theoretical limitations.   
Through some forms of discourse analysis approaches, a researcher may ignore the 
materiality or the reality experienced by individuals; instead, these researchers may argue 
that discourse constructs and determines the lived reality of individuals (see Howarth & 
Stavrakakis, 2000).  In other words, these researchers argue that everything an individual 
experiences as reality is discursive and limited by language.  To counter this limitation, I 
followed the ideas of Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) and Valerie Walkerdine (1990), who 
argue that reality and the material exist before discourse.  In this way, humans use and 
construct discourses to give meaning to reality and existence.  Discourses and humans 
share a constitutive relationship similar to that shown by the arrows in Figure 1 (p.12) where 
both rely on, and imply, the other.  I will show this theoretical understanding in my own 
writing by wording sentences in such a way that the message is conveyed that authors and 
others use discourses to construct ideas about youth, rather than discourses constructing, in 
themselves, reality. 
A second potential theoretical limitation in my research arises from the work of Foucault 
(1977) and concerns the relationship between power and knowledge.  This is also reflective 
of the first theoretical limitation and the idea that all reality is discursive.  As I have 
mentioned earlier, Foucault’s presentation of the constitutive relationship between power and 
knowledge depicts individuals as objects, or consequences, of power, knowledge, and 
discourse (Al Amoudi, 2002; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Hoy, 1986b; Lacombe, 1996; 
Ransom, 1997).  This perspective reifies discourse and shows humanity and reality to be the 
consequence of discourse (e.g. Jones, 1997).  In such a way, authors construct discourses 
as agents, or subjects, and people as the objects, or consequences, of discourses.  
Alongside avoiding reifying discourses, I also attempted to counter this limitation by looking 
at both the moments in which authors construct young people as objects and the moments in 
which they construct young people as subjects (Foucault, 1983; Henriques, et al., 1998).  My 
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focus on the construction of young people as subjects and objects fed into the reconstructive 
stage of my research, as I was able to explore the implications when writers constructed 
young people as object and/or subject. 
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Before I started the research, I had the assumption that institutional constructions of 
criminally-deviant youth could be potentially harmful for youth.  The questions that I designed 
and the theoretical and methodological approach I took from these questions allowed me to 
explore the implications of institutional constructions in Aotearoa/New Zealand for those 
young people seen as criminally- or potentially criminally-deviant.  However, I did not leave 
my methodology at the exploration and analysis stage; instead, I moved my methodology on 
to a reconstructive stage and attempted to explore alternative constructions.   
Hence, there are two implications of this methodology.  First, there is the questioning of 
taken-for-granted truths, expertise, and commonsense.  Second, there is the reconstruction 
of an alternative construction of criminal deviance in young people.  I hope that my research 
will encourage those who read it to question the knowledges and practices that they have 
taken for granted for so long.  In this way, I hope that my research, alongside other research 
in critical youth studies, will be a catalyst for change, particularly at the institutional level in 
the ways that ‘we’ understand young people and criminal deviance. 
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Adolescents’ status as raw material establishes adults as ‘engineers’ who know how 
to utilize raw materials to the best advantage, who will transform those unfinished 
materials into productions in their own image.  Development means becoming like the 
developer.   
(Lesko, 1996a, p.469) 
In contemporary industrial and liberal societies, most adults define young people as those 
individuals in the process of becoming adult.  These adults construct an understanding of 
young people with references to ‘development’ and ‘adolescence’, and developmental-
psychological knowledge and theory permeate this commonsense notion (Besley, n.d., 2002; 
Wyn & White, 1997).  In this chapter, I explore this developmental knowledge – both how it 
has been constructed in theory and literature, and how, in more recent times, it has been 
critiqued by researchers and authors in critical youth studies.  I will show that many adults 
tend to use developmental-psychology to confine and locate youth in biological and social 
dimensions defined through age, and, using critical youth studies research, I will argue that a 
more contextualised understanding of young people is needed, which locates youth and 
adolescence in contexts of time, location, and knowledge.   


-
Developmental-psychology re-emerged in the 1980s, from a period of stagnation, as the 
science, truth, and commonsense of adolescence and youth (Besley, 2002; Farrington, 
2000; Wyn & White, 1997).  Now theorists, researchers, practitioners and other adults use 
developmental-psychology to construct young people as developing, or changing, into 
adults, and they describe the developmental time of adolescence as a liminal space of 
becomingness (Lesko, 1996a, 1996b, 2001).  In this state of becoming, youth experience 
change as they move away from childhood.   
Developmental researchers typically use longitudinal research and empirical data to 
construct the becomingness of adolescence as a time of turmoil and vulnerability (c.f. 
Dodge, 2001).  This construction is not a new construction; indeed, researchers in critical 
youth studies and human development (e.g. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; Furstenberg, 2000; Griffin, 
1993, 1996; Lesko, 2001; Santrock, 2001) argue that contemporary representations of youth 
reflect, and are influenced by, the early theories of Granville Stanley Hall (1905).  G.S. Hall 
argued that adolescence was a time of “storm and stress” (pp.xiii, xvi), which he verified 
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through a detailed statistical and literal measurement of young people’s anatomies.  G.S. 
Hall, like contemporary theorists of adolescence, attempted to prove a difference between 
adolescents and adults (Besley, 2002; Wyn & White, 1997).  The setting of age parameters 
around the phenomenon called ‘adolescence’ was one of the steps G.S. Hall took in this 
differentiation. 
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Like G.S. Hall’s theory, contemporary constructions of youth are dependent upon 
constructions of adulthood (Wyn & White, 1997).  Many contemporary developmental 
researchers and theorists construct differences between youth and adults through 
references to age, the developing body, differing rights, and differing abilities (Furstenberg, 
2000; Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; White, 1994).  They apply this idea of youth 
as becoming to show adolescence as a series of biological and social ‘stages’ or movements 
into adulthood within aged-defined parameters of maturation (Lesko, 2001).  In 
developmental stage-based theories (e.g. Elkind, 1979; Erikson, 1968; G. S. Hall, 1905; 
Piaget, 1973), the young person, or adolescent, gradually matures into an adult.  As the 
young person matures, they are given more responsibilities.   
Consequently, adults in authority restrict and dictate the rights and choices of youth through 
policies and practices based upon a developmental-psychological concept of age (Dwyer & 
Wyn, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997).  As such, adults in institutional settings control young 
people through ideas of age.  In Aotearoa/New Zealand, policy defines young people as 
those between 12 and 25 years-of-age inclusive (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002).  However, 
different age limitations based on theories of biological and social maturation also exist, each 
with its own definitions of when a young person is and is not an adult.  For example, young 
people at the age of 16, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, no longer come under the responsibility 
of their guardians, can have sex, own a gun, and leave school.  However, it is not until the 
age of 18, that young people can drink, gamble, and enter into contracts.  Furthermore, 
policy also assumes that young people are financially dependent upon their guardians until 
the age of 25 (Ministry of Youth Affairs, n.d.) despite many young people seeing themselves 
as adults.  The following series of young people’s comments, cited by Jane and James 
Ritchie in the 1980s, clearly shows this contradictory space: 
‘When I was still at high school, I was old enough to vote, to marry, to drive a car, but I 
was still required to bring a note from Mummy to explain my absence from school.’  
 
‘At my school, the teachers started telling us we were ‘responsible adults’ as soon as 
we reached the sixth form.  It wasn’t our age, it was our academic qualifications that 
made us into adults.’   
 
‘At fourteen years I was charged full price at the pictures but not allowed to see adult 
films’    
(Ritchie & Ritchie, 1984, p.13) 
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Hence, there are many blurred boundaries between youth and adult, even when people use 
age as a definite defining mechanism.  In adult understandings of youth, concepts of age 
and difference combine with biological and social understandings of youth to give a very 
complex picture (Besley, n.d.; Lesko, 1996a; Ritchie & Ritchie, 1984).  However, adults 
applying ideas of age cannot define young people through references to age alone – there 
must be a biological and social dimension to that definition. 
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A biological dimension to youth development is first apparent in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory.  
G.S. Hall ‘created’ a psychological-biological theory of adolescence in which he combined 
recapitulation theory23 and evolutionary theory to explain ‘biological’ degeneracy in young 
people (Lesko, 2001; Muuss, 1988).  G.S. Hall constructed young people as biological 
adolescents experiencing a progressive staged development into adulthood. 
The biological dimension of developmental-psychological constructions, such as G.S. Hall’s, 
attempts to explain what is biologically natural and universal for adolescents.  In the 20th 
century, theorists have focused on the biological through emphasising puberty and abstract 
thought (c.f. Steinberg, 2000).  In their theories, the biological dimension of adolescent 
development represents an inherent essence of all youth (Griffin, 1993).  Hence, theorists 
and authors have constructed the pubescent and thinking adolescent as a young person in 
the process of physically becoming an adult.  As Mary Bucholtz argues this can be both 
useful (as a theoretical concept to look at the differences between adults and adolescents) 
and problematic:  
The emphasis on adolescence as a universal stage in the biological and psychological 
development of the individual usefully highlights selfhood as a process rather than a 
state, but it also inevitably frames young people primarily as not-yet finished human 
beings.   
(Bucholtz, 2002, p.529) 
Biological dimensions emphasize the incompleteness of adolescents as well as the lack of 
control adolescents have over their biological development.  They are captive to their body, 
which is out of control because of raging hormones (G. S. Hall, 1905; Lesko, 1996a, 2001), 
and to their newly developed rational thought (Elkind, 1979). 
Because many assume the biological dimension as universal, references to the biological 
dimension tend to be devoid of context and structural, material, and ideological conditions 
(Lesko, 1996b).  Biological dimensions of development are also difficult to determine and are 
often marked more by social transitions rather than biological changes (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001; 
Griffin, 1993). 
                                                    
23
 In recapitulation theory, the development of humankind is theorised in terms of race.  Recapitulation theorists see 
humankind as developing from the savage races to the civilised Arian race. 
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When theorists apply a social dimension to development, they continue to concentrate on 
the ‘becomingness’ of youth.  These theorists tend to focus on two key points: adult 
role/identity development and, associated to this, social transition.  Many developmental 
theorists consider role/identity development as a socially universal and essential 
psychological feature of adolescence (c.f. Steinberg, 2000).  Furthermore, in theories such 
as Erikson’s (1968), the psychosocial construction of identity development depicts an aged 
and staged progression to adulthood, whilst also assuming that young people are irrational, 
lacking individuality, and autonomy.   
Theorists using role/identity development ideas construct the youth as lacking the skills to 
move fully into the adult role (White, 1994).  Due to this ‘lack’, youth experiment with different 
roles and attempt to fill the void with peers (Wyn & White, 1997).  Peers also provide a 
context for role experimentation (Erikson, 1968).  Part of this role experimentation is the 
engagement of young people in risk behaviours (Irwin & Millstein, 1990).  In effect, what 
young people experience is an “identity crisis” (Erikson, 1968, p.15) in which they are 
subjected to an individuation that ‘turns’ them from a socially-orientated child and youth into 
an autonomous individual (Wyn & White, 1997).  Some theorists from a sociological 
standpoint (Emler & Reicher, 1995) also describe it as a time of turmoil when the adolescent 
experiences strain moving between the two differing roles. 
Developmental theorists also construct the social dimension of adolescence as a time of 
transition where young people move into new social roles and take on new tasks and 
responsibilities (Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997).  Transition is an extension to identity/role 
development; however, it differs through its focus on external social outcomes indicating 
adulthood (such as finishing secondary education) (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001) – whereas, 
identity/role development tends to focus on the internal ‘biological’ movement to adult 
autonomy.  However, both identity/role development and transition focus on a single 
transition – the movement from childhood to adulthood. 
Identity/role development and transition have ruminations in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory 
through his depiction of adolescence as the movement between animality (childhood) and 
humanity (adulthood) (Lesko, 1996b).  Since G.S. Hall’s theory, developmental theorists 
have shown identity/role development and transition as natural and essential (Besley, 2002) 
and both are often shown through metaphors of “pathways” (Wyn & White, 1997, p.99) or 
developmental trajectories.  Such a conception validates the application of longitudinal 
research by researchers (e.g. Farrington, 1997; Fergusson & Horwood, 2002; Fergusson, 
Horwood, & Nagin, 2000) as they follow, measure, and quantify the trajectories of young 
people. 
Johanna Wyn and Rob White (1997) question the naturalness of the social dimension to 
developmental constructions.  They argue that the focus on the movement to adulthood is 
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too restrictive.  In particular, Wyn and White claim that there are many transitions between 
institutional contexts and statuses, and each, individually, define the adult role in often 
complex and contradictory ways: 
The use of a concept of transitions which assumes that the process is simply from 
‘youth’ to ‘adulthood’ does not take sufficient account of these complexities – of the 
multiple transitions involved, their synchrony, and the circularity (or more accurately, 
the spiraling nature) of the processes of ‘arrival’ and ‘departure’ at different statuses 
throughout life – leaving and reentering education or moving from employment to 
unemployment.  
(Wyn & White, 1997, p.97) 
Because of this, White (1994) argues that there is a need to separate biological transitions 
from socially-determined transitions.  When this occurs, the relationship between youth and 
adult can be articulated and youth can be seen as a contextually-constructed social process 
(White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997).  An exploration of the complexities of choice and 
transition within contemporary contexts surrounding young people is also important to any 
conceptualisation of youth (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001). 
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In contrast to biological and social constructions of adolescence, we can use contextual 
understandings of youth to locate, not define, youth, in contexts of location, time, and 
knowledge.  Theorists using a contextual understanding see ‘youth’ as a “flexible social 
category” (Pearson, 1994, p.1192) dependent upon society and the changing definitions of 
child and adult.  In other words, youth is a fluid and “elastic concept … [meaning] different 
things at different times, and in different places” (Newburn, 1997, p.613).  Consequently, a 
contextual understanding of youth attempts to show that the way that adult society 
understands and conceptualises ‘youth’ is dependent upon context.  Whereas the word 
‘adolescence’ implies a psychological and biological definition, the word ‘youth’ implies a 
sociological construction (Besley, n.d.). 
Theorists using a contextual understanding of youth embed constructions of youth in 
contexts of time, location, and knowledge.  These contexts interact with material and 
structural conditions to provide boundaries to, and possibilities for, the positions inhabited by 
youth (Emler & Reicher, 1995; Wyn & White, 1997).  For this reason, a critique based on a 
contextual understanding of youth allows for the exploration of the implications for youth of 
constructions, particularly the structural, material, and ideological implications.  It also allows 
for the critique of knowledge, where the analyst looks at how others have used knowledge to 
construct, not discover, the ‘Truth’ of youth.  Often this can show a variety of contradictions 
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and complexities in a once assumed stable and coherent knowledge (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 
2001; Wyn & White, 2000)24. 
Rather than providing an alternative construction to youth, contextual understandings allow 
the analyst to explore youth and the knowledge that constructs youth in context.  It also 
allows the analyst to explore the complexity of ‘youth’ where the analyst sees youth as more 
than just passive objects of knowledge.  A contextual understanding of youth is central to 
critical youth studies research (e.g. Griffin, 1993; Lesko, 2001; Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 
2002; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997) and underpins my own research.  Part of this 
contextually-based exploration involves identifying how others have constructed the deviant 
youth in theory and knowledge. 
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Wyn and White (2000) argue that contemporary society bases ‘commonsense’ ideas about 
youth and criminal deviance in developmental psychology.  Hence, contemporary society 
tends to explain deviance with ideas about the individual rather than structural factors such 
as social strain, structural inequalities, and stigmatisation.  Following developmental-
psychological theories of adolescence, researchers into youth deviance see the time of 
adolescence as a time of risk and vulnerability to societal influences (Dahlberg & Potter, 
2001; G. S. Hall, 1905; Irwin & Millstein, 1990) and limited self-control (Emler & Reicher, 
1995; Wyn & White, 2000). 
These researchers tend to construct the deviant youth through developmental research (e.g. 
Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 2000; Furstenberg, 2000), developmental-psychological theory, 
and the consistent use of empirical and statistical data (e.g. Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 2000).  
This is evident in the Christchurch and Dunedin development studies (which I will later 
discuss in Chapter 5), where the researchers combine longitudinal research and empirical 
data to construct the deviant youth25.   
$1  #0(
-"2
Theorists constructing ideas of normal deviance tend to use developmental-psychological 
understandings of general adolescent development.  These theorists often draw upon ideas 
in G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory of storm and stress, Eric Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity 
development, and David Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development to describe the 
                                                    
24
 For Wyn & White (2000), contradictions create even more limitations for young people.  However, in contrast to 
this position, I want to later argue in Chapter 10 that contradictions open moments of possibility. 
25
 Empirical and statistical data also encompass much of what the adult public see and read about youth offending 
in media publications.  Often the focus of authors in the media on statistical and empirical data creates a bias and 
distorted picture of youth through the focus on specific, often violent, crimes or status offences (age-related offences 
such as under-age drinking) (Cohen, 2002; Pearson, 1994).  Media publications also distort youth offending through 
constructing the problem as new and out-of-control (Cohen, 2002; Glassner, 1999; Wyn & White, 1998).   
26
 The normally-deviant is a contradiction in terms because adult society tends to associate deviance as 
abnormality.  In contrast, the normally deviant is both normal and deviant.  I look at this contradiction further in 
Chapter 6. 
 40 
normally-deviant as the ‘naughty’ youth going through a passing phase of deviance in 
adolescence (e.g. Moffitt, 1993).  This young person is in the process of individualisation and 
is vulnerable to external influences (Wyn & White, 1997) whilst experimenting with their 
newly found individuality.  As shown in the following quote, this experimentation is termed 
“risk taking” or the engagement in risk behaviours: 
The behaviours associated with the major mortalities and morbidities of adolescents 
share a common theme: risk taking.  Young people with limited or no experience 
engage in potentially destructive behaviours with or without knowing the 
consequences of their actions.  Although some risk taking is necessary in the normal 
developmental process, too often the results of risk taking are disastrous.   
(Irwin & Millstein, 1990, p.339) 
Wyn and White (1997) are critical of the connection between risk-taking and adolescence.  
They argue that the connection is too simplistic as it limits risk-taking to the time of 
adolescence: 
… it is far too simplistic to characterise 'risky behaviour' as an inevitable part of 
growing up.  Behaviours that are described as risky from the youth development 
perspective may be understood as the result of young people's negotiation of the 
complexities of gender, class, race and age relations.  The results may appear to be 
risky, but for the young people themselves they are simply a conventional response to 
a complex situation.   
(Wyn & White, 1997, p.70) 
Furthermore, in their 1997 text, Wyn and White argue that risk-taking assumes that the 
young person is rationally able to choose between two alternatives.  Although they are 
critical of psychological constructions, Wyn and White question whether this sort of rationality 
is possible during adolescence. 
Constructions of youth through developmental-psychological theory also position youth as a 
social problem (Apple, 2001; Lesko, 2001; Santrock, 2001).  Hence, the normally-deviant 
young person is vulnerable to societal influences whilst also being a potential threat to 
society – they are both the source and the victim of social problems and risk (Griffin, 1993, 
1996; Newburn, 1997).  Lesko (2001) argues that the construction of young people as a 
problem and, therefore, risk is evident throughout developmental-psychological theory. 
For example, G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory of storm and stress depicts the youth as breaking 
away from a savage past (Griffin, 1993).  This breakaway is psychologically and physically 
turbulent which affects the adolescent’s position of vulnerability; the adolescent becomes 
vulnerable to their ‘savage’ body and to the economic and social pressures of society.  Any 
negative influence from society can potentially cause degeneracy in the adolescent creating 
a propensity to deviant behaviour (G. S. Hall, 1905).  This leads to the adolescent becoming 
a problem for adult society.   
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This double risk is also evident in Erikson’s theory.  Erikson’s (1968) theory of identity 
development associates adolescence with a time of crisis.  The young person is in a state of 
struggle between developing an autonomous identity or being trapped in identity confusion.  
This youth strives to develop an autonomous identity and, because of this, engages in risk-
taking behaviours.  This leads to a social risk of the young person forming a deviant identity.  
Hence, identity development means vulnerability, problematic behaviour and potentially 
problematic outcomes.  The same scenario can be found in Elkind. 
Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development builds upon the work of Jean Piaget (1973).  
Elkind’s theory conceptualises adolescence as a time of out-of-control abstract thought.  The 
troubling behaviour of adolescents reflects their lack of mastery over a developing abstract 
cognition.  For normal adolescents, problem behaviour is normal because of an increased 
self-consciousness (the “imaginary audience” (p.93)), egocentricism, and self-delusion 
(“personal fable” (p.95)) (c.f. Irwin & Millstein, 1990). 
Although these theories appear to argue for a universal construction of youth based on 
developmental-psychology they are contextual because they arose through time, location, 
and knowledge.  Furthermore, each of these theorists has tended to base their theories on 
the white middle-class male youth.  Hence, the adolescent they describe is a gendered, 
ethnic, socio-economic adolescent.  Erikson (1968) even cautions about the applicability of 
his theory to other contexts; despite this caution, contemporary developmental writers (e.g. 
Kroger, 1989; Papalia & Olds, 1992; Santrock, 2001, 2002; Sigelman & Shaffer, 1991; 
Steinberg, 2000) continue to apply his theory and his concept of adolescent identity crisis.  
Now it is hard for adults to conceptualise adolescence without any reference to identity, 
egocentrism, storm and stress, and ideas of ‘normal’ deviance. 
In Aotearoa/New Zealand, neoliberal policies such as the Youth Development Strategy 
Aotearoa (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families (CYPF) Act 1989 focus on the normally-deviant youth.  Policy makers and 
practitioners, using the justice penology, design interventions with the youth’s vulnerability in 
mind as they ‘gently’ guide the youth into rational thought and the adult role.  This youth will 
potentially be a productive member of adult society and interventions aim to foster this 
potentiality.  However, this is not the case for all youth, and researchers and practitioners 
also use developmental psychology to divide youth. 
When we apply theories of adolescent development, we run the ‘risk’ of dividing youth 
(Dwyer & Wyn, 2001).  This particularly happens when individuals take theories out of 
context and generalise the ideas through to all youth.  First, those applying developmental 
knowledge run a risk of dividing youth on a level of gender, ethnicity and so forth where they 
apply theories constructed on a normality of a particular group of male youth onto all youth.  
Second, those applying developmental knowledge also tend to divide ‘normal’ youth from 
‘abnormal’ youth.   
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Youth justice policies in Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as the Youth Offending Strategy 
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) focus on the abnormally-deviant 
youth.  This young person is extremely vulnerable from a very young age and has a 
potentiality of pathology.  Whereas, the normally-deviant youth engages in risk behaviours, 
the abnormally-deviant is commonly called the ‘youth-at-risk’.  Like the normally-deviant, the 
youth-at-risk is both vulnerable and a potential threat to society (Poynting & White, 2004).   
However, the youth’s pathology or the pathology of the youth’s family raises this dual risk.  
Unlike the normally-deviant, this youth is abnormal and pathological, and through a 
developmental logic, there is a tendency for many policy makers and developmental 
researchers to describe their deviance as lifelong (Wyn & White, 1997).  They are at risk of 
abnormal development and problematic pathways and transition/s into adulthood (Dahlberg 
& Potter, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997).  The ‘story’ of pathology is evident in developmental 
theories of deviance. 
Early developmental theories into abnormal deviance use medical knowledge alongside 
developmental psychology and criminology to construct the abnormally-deviant youth 
(Farrington, 2000; Lundman, 2001).  Through combining each of these knowledges, theorists 
are able to construct a ‘simple’ explanation of youth deviance, which connects deviance to 
other pathologies.  Contemporary explanations of the youth-at-risk continue to combine the 
medical, psychological, and social.  The “biopsychosocial” model of deviance created by 
Charles Irwin and Susan Millstein (1990, p.339) is an example of such a model.  Now, 
combination of theory, research, and statistics has meant that a “science” (Dodge, 2001, 
p.63), or expertise, has developed around the abnormally-deviant youth.  
Unlike the normally-deviant youth, who only offends in adolescence, the abnormally-deviant 
displays problem behaviours early in their childhood.  Results from the Sommerville-
Cambridge intervention found that abnormally-deviant youth could be identified as early as 
10 years-of-age (cited in Farrington, 1997).  More recently, the Australian Temperament 
Project (Dussuyer, 2002) found that problem behaviours leading to at-risk behaviours in 
adolescence manifested as early as five years-of-age.  In these studies, potentially 
‘pathological’ children are those who exhibit “risk factors” in their lives (Dahlberg & Potter, 
2001; Dodge, 2001; Farrington, 1997; McLaren, 2000, 2002; Wasserman et al., 2003).   
Risk factors exist across two domains: the individual and the social environment (the family, 
peer group, and community) (Farrington, 1997; Fergusson & Horwood, 1996; Fergusson, 
Horwood, & Lynskey, 1993; McLaren, 2000, 2002; Moffitt, 1993, 1994; Wasserman, et al., 
2003).  Often risk factors reflect structural and material inequalities (Poynting & White, 2004; 
White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004).  Practitioners can use the presence of one or more risk 
factors to predict a child’s potentiality for offending (Farrington, 2000; McLaren, 2000, 2002; 
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Ministry of Justice, 2002b; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002; 
Vassallo, Smart, Sanson, & Dussuyer, 2004).   
Closely connected to risk factors are “protective factors” (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001; 
Farrington, 2000; McLaren, 2002).  Protective factors moderate and mediate the potential 
effects of risk factors and promote the development of resilience within the young person 
(Dahlberg & Potter, 2001).  Risk and protective factors change throughout the youth’s life 
and have different effects at different times (Abbott, 1997; Dodge, 2001; Maxwell & Morris, 
2002b).  This does not stop practitioners and researchers using risk factors to divide and 
define youth. 
When adults use risk factors to separate abnormal youth from normal youth there is a risk of 
marginalizing groups of youth.  This is particularly so for youth in minority societal groups 
(Poynting & White, 2004; White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004; Wyn & White, 1997).  
Furthermore, although context can be identified as a risk factor (e.g. family and community) 
many developmental thinkers apply a generalised construction of youth-at-risk to different 
groups of marginalised youth (White, 2002; White & Wyn, 2004).  Poynting and White (2004) 
argue that this can potentially ‘create’ deviant youth.  Even in New Zealand policy (e.g. 
Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002), it is contended that risk 
identification could possibly stigmatise young people and encourage them into deviance. 
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In contrast, some researchers have used sociological theory to construct the deviant youth in 
relation to social processes such as stigmatisation (labelling theory (Becker, 1963)), 
modernisation, and subcultural resistance.  Stigmatisation occurs when a ‘society’ or 
community ‘labels’ an individual’s behaviour as deviant (Becker, 1963, 1985; Lemert, 1985; 
Schur, 1984).  In this context, ‘society’ ascribes the label ‘deviant’ onto the individual 
(Mankoff, 1985).  In criminal deviance, labelling results from a combination of individual 
behaviour, or identified potential risk, and societal reaction.  Deviance is … 
not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the 
application of others’ rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’.  The deviant is one to whom 
that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so 
label.  
(Becker, 1963, p.9, author’s emphasis) 
We can use labelling theory to describe what happens to the abnormally-deviant youth when 
practitioners use risk factors to identify and intervene into deviant behaviour (societal 
reactions) but, despite good intentions, the youth continues to offend (c.f. McCord, 2002).  In 
this way, labelling theory allows researchers to give a context to youth deviance – the 
reaction of a ‘society’.  However, others (Mankoff, 1985; Pearson, 1994) have criticised 
labelling theory because it does not explain the motivations of deviant individuals.  Nor does 
it explore the meanings that deviant individuals give to deviant behaviour and the processes 
 44 
by which ‘society’ sanctions a particular type of behaviour as ‘deviant’ (Mankoff, 1985; 
Pearson, 1994).   
Labelling theory attempts to explain the stigmatisation of any individual or group in society.  
In contrast, some thinkers have focused on the effects of modernisation to explain youth 
deviance.  Like G.S. Hall (1905), these thinkers see youth deviance as reflecting the 
instability of contemporary society (Glassner, 1999; Pearson, 1994) and they describe it in 
three differing ways – consequence, problem, and metaphor.  In the first, the deviance of 
youth is seen as a consequence of an unstable society (c.f. Wyn & White, 2000).  
Consequently, thinkers (e.g. Dekker, 2002) looking at youth deviance romanticise past 
conceptions of society and see these as idealistic.  Second, youth crime is conceptualised as 
a problem, which only occurs in societies that have been through modernisation.  As a 
problem, thinkers looking at youth deviance romanticise past conceptions of youth and 
adolescence and see these as idealistic (Pearson, 1994).  Third, the deviance of youth is 
seen as a metaphor for wider social problems associated with modernisation (Griffin, 1993; 
Pearson, 1994).  Reflecting G. S. Hall’s (1905) theory, thinkers looking at youth deviance 
associate the period of adolescence with the development of civilisation.  In this association, 
the period of adolescence is a time of turmoil and rupture observable in youth and in society.  
Those applying sociological understanding may also use subcultural resistance to 
conceptualise youth deviance.  Subcultural theories stem from the work of the Chicago 
School (Muncie, 1999). The Chicago School conceptualised subcultures as a form of fashion 
and style in which young people engaged.  Later, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (the Birmingham School) in Britain developed subcultural theory further to explain 
youth deviance in terms of struggle and resistance (Clarke, S. Hall, Jefferson, & Roberts, 
1993; S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993a; Muncie, 1999; Rock, 1997).  To some extent, subcultural 
theory, as developed from the Birmingham School, expands on the idea that modernisation 
and youth deviance are connected.  This is because these subcultural theorists explicitly 
concentrate on youth cultures in post-war contemporary industrial society and the 
development of these cultures within technological environments (fordism, consumerism, 
music, style, and so forth) in which they reside (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b).   
A subcultural theory of youth deviance concentrates on the class struggles that exist within 
post-war contemporary industrial societies (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Muncie, 1999; Rock, 
1997)27.  Subcultural theorists from the Birmingham tradition (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b) 
examine and explore the deviant behaviours of working-class young people and theorise 
                                                    
27
 This view is very much from the Birmingham School tradition.  Over the last twenty years, various subcultural 
researchers (e.g. Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Thornton, 1995) have questioned the Birmingham focus on class and on 
resistance.  These researchers argue that subcultures can now be seen as classless and centred more on 
conceptions of style and space.  However, this view is not without opposition.  Tracy Shildrick & Robert MacDonald 
(2006) argue that we should continue to use the Birmingham School’s analysis of class and subculture as it allows 
for the recognition of resistance, difference, and inequality.  In my research, I chose to focus on the Birmingham 
tradition of subcultural theory because of the strong articulation of resistance – a concept in which I go on to develop 
in Chapter 9. 
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these behaviours as a form of class resistance (Besley, n.d.; Clarke, et al., 1993; Muncie, 
1999).  However, there is an explicit hopelessness within subcultural explanations as the 
resistance exercised by working-class youth does not lead to change; instead, subcultural 
resistance reconstitutes and reproduces the working-class position which these young 
people occupy (Muncie, 1999).  Indeed, even the attachment of the word ‘sub’ to culture by 
subcultural theorists implies that these young people are subordinate and inferior to the 
middle-class position and, as such, can never attain the position that they are resisting – 
even their resistance is hopeless as it is powerless (see Clarke, et al., 1993).   
In contrast, subcultural theorists (e.g. Clarke, et al., 1993) construct the resistance exercised 
by middle-class youth as a “counter culture” in which middle-class young people change and 
influence the society in which they live.  As such, subcultural thinkers and theories construct 
two groups of young people – the middle-class (with power) and the working-class (without 
power who exercise this ‘lack’ in resistance).  Because of this, these theorists (Besley, n.d.; 
Muncie, 1999) have criticised subcultural theories for a disempowering focus on resistance.  
Instead, some critical youth studies theorists (e.g. Besley, n.d.) argue that researchers 
should look at deviance differently to avoid oppositional explanations between power and 
resistance.  However, it is possible that the problem with subcultural theories of resistance is 
not the focus on resistance but the predetermined theories and assumptions about class on 
which they are based (Muncie, 1999) and a theorisation of oppositional power and 
resistance.  The focus on class in traditional subcultural theories does not recognise other 
structural marginalisations, such as gender and ethnicity (McRobbie & Garber, 1993; 
Muncie, 1999), and the possible complexities that exist within conceptions of power and 
resistance.  In other words, resistance may not be an oppositional reaction related only to 
reproduction of social conditions.  Resistance may also be conceptualised as a productive 
force (Foucault, 1980e). 
Like references to developmental-psychology, references to stigmatisation, modernisation, 
and subcultural resistance give us an answer and a reasoning to the phenomenon of youth 
crime.  Each of these ‘knowledges’ has its own construction of youth and of youth crime and 
comes with particular implications for youth and adult society.  With its reference to 
contextual understandings of youth, critical youth studies research allows for the exploration 
and critique of these knowledges and their implications. 
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Wyn and White (1997) argue that developmental-psychological understandings of youth 
objectify, categorise, and judge young people.  When adults apply developmental-
psychological understanding of youth, they position youth as powerless and ignore any 
power and agency that young people may have (Wyn & White, 1997).  Theoretical 
constructions of youth are also ‘youthless’ because they do not include the perspectives and 
opinions of young people.  Indeed, the way that adults see young people in theory is often 
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contradictory to the way that young people see themselves (Tupuola, 2004; Wyn & White, 
1997). 
Wyn and White (1997) also argue in particular that many adult institutions in society 
marginalise young people in their application of developmental knowledge.  In effect, adults 
in these institutions enforce an unequal power relationship between young people and 
themselves in which they render young people powerless (c.f. Apple, 2001; Furstenberg, 
2000).  Griffin (1993) describes this power relationship as ‘hegemonic’ where adults force an 
ideology of difference upon young people – subsequently, dividing youth from themselves 
(see also Dwyer & Wyn, 2001).  To do this, these adults use, in particular, differences of age 
and developmental ability which allow them to define who has access to, whilst marginalising 
young people from, activities of mainstream adult life (e.g. driving, voting, and drinking) 
(White, 1994).   
Adult-based institutional control of youth deviance is another technique of hegemonic 
marginalisation.  Through developmental-psychological knowledge, many adults in authority 
construct young people as lacking the self-control of adults and, consequently, engaging in 
deviance.  This leads to the development of interventions aimed at developing self-control 
(Wyn & White, 2000) or providing institutional control (Panelli, et al., 2002; White, 1996; Wyn 
& White, 1997).  Further, adults in authority use developmental-psychological knowledge to 
enforce, and argue for, age-based interventions (Fitzgerald, 2003; Panelli, et al., 2002) in 
two adult-controlled environments – the family and the school (Fitzgerald, 2003; White & 
Wyn, 2004). 
Theories on the socially-created deviant also have elements of marginalisation and 
dependence.  Whether theorists describe the socially-created deviant in terms of 
stigmatisation, modernisation, or subcultural resistance, the young person is seen as 
‘lacking’ power.  This reinforces a dependence between adults and young people where 
young people are dependent on adults.  Hence, in these explanations, the young person is 
devoid of power or exercising their lack of power in resistance. 
Consequently, researchers from a critical youth studies perspective (e.g. Griffin, 1993; 
Lesko, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997) argue that popular constructions of youth position young 
people as powerless and marginal.  By positioning youth as powerless, adults are then able 
to control young people.  Some researchers (e.g. Nairn, 2001; White, 1996, 1998; Wyn & 
White, 1998), have posed a counter-argument to this where they encourage adults to 
empower youth and to give youth opportunities to participate.  However, there is a need to 
recognise that these adults tend to define what ‘participation’ is and how young people can 
participate (Bessant & Hil, 2003; White & Wyn, 2004).   
In effect, there are differing levels of participation (White & Wyn, 2004) in which adults in 
authority determine the extent of youth participation.  In this context, real participation would 
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involve adult society involving young people “meaningfully” (Nairn, 2001, p.25) in decisions 
about their own lives.  However, even in this ‘real’ participation, there is a level of definition 
and control.  Furthermore, even when adults in authority create opportunities for meaningful 
participation, they tend to define and separate youth into those who can participate and 
those who cannot (White & Wyn, 2004). 
So, we do need to find ways of involving youth in society.  However, these solutions may not 
be in developmental knowledge.  Instead, we need to explore alternative conceptions of 
youth deviance in an attempt to devise alterative solutions which move away from 
positioning adults as powerful and youth as dependent.  This movement would involve a 
return back to knowledge, where researchers critique and deconstruct knowledge whilst 
acknowledging the interplay between knowledge and power.   
Furthermore, we need to recognise that the resolution of marginalisation is more complex 
than those who are doing the marginalising (adults) providing opportunities to the 
marginalised (youth) to move out of their marginalisation.  To do this, we need to recognise 
that power has an opposing force – resistance (Foucault, 1980e).  This resistance is not a 
subcultural lack but a productive force.  Through exploring resistance, we are able to see 
that marginalisation is not a final effect; marginalisation, itself, has structural, material, and 
ideological implications.  Resistance can be productive and reproductive.  It may not lead to 
a direct change but provides a point of agency for the young person. 
I did not find this account of resistance in the reviewed literature.  Theorists looking at 
resistance showed it reinforcing marginal positionings.  Furthermore, although some 
researchers (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Hil & Bessant, 1999) have explored the 
relationship between adult society and youth resistance, these researchers have yet to 
explore the productive potential of resistance, particularly concerning the social construction 
of understandings or knowledge.  Instead, these researchers have explored the reactive 
deviance of young people to adults, institutional practices of control, and class structures as 
it is demonstrated in the ‘lack’ of power – or reactive resistance.  In this thesis, I argue that 
resistance is central to understanding deviance and that this resistance is more complex 
than a reaction to a position of hopelessness.  Instead, resistance is productive and implies a 
form of agency on the part of the young person. 
Critical youth studies research establishes some of the ways in which researchers can 
undertake an analysis of knowledge, power, and resistance.  First, researchers should move 
beyond constructing youth to focusing on the established relationships between adult society 
and young people (Wyn & White, 1997).  Second, researchers should investigate and 
include context in their research (Lesko, 1996b; White, 2003).  These contexts should 
include time, location, and knowledge.  Finally, researchers should see youth as active 
participants and the ‘development’ (or growth) of young people as contingent and embedded 
in context (Lesko, 2001; White, 2003).   
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Most writers looking at young people and youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand focus on 
constructing youth through developmental-psychological knowledge; very few seek to 
question or critique these constructions28.  In contrast, critical youth studies researchers (e.g. 
Griffin, 1993; White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1997, 2000) attempt to expose the structural 
and material effects of constructions for youth.  However, this can also have a deterministic 
effect due to the overemphasis of structural constructs and hegemonic marginalisation (Hil & 
Bessant, 1999).  So, when researchers focus on structural or material implications and 
hegemonic marginalisation they risk ignoring any conception of productive resistance.  
However, this does not mean that researchers should omit structural and material 
implications.  Instead, researchers should explore resistance in the context of structural and 
material conditions.  This is because resistance is embedded in context. 
Furthermore, some critical youth studies researchers (such as Griffin, 1993; Wyn & White, 
1997) neglect, or present in an abstract manner, implications connected to power, 
knowledge, and resistance.  These researchers bury these implications within the structural 
or material effects or describe them as an effect of structural conditions.  However, it is 
possible that the application of knowledge as ‘Truth’ produces and reproduces these 
implications (c.f. Beals, 2004).  For this reason, there is a need for researchers to explore the 
knowledge in the contexts in which it occurs, that of institutions.  Additionally, researchers 
should avoid the possible deterministic implications of critical youth studies research through 
directly looking at power and at possible sites of resistance.  It is this direction in which I wish 
to take my research.  In the following chapter, I start to present the findings of my research in 
order to examine these theoretical ideas and gaps. 
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 In 2002, there were two New Zealand publications that attempted to apply a critical analysis to constructions of 
youth (i.e. L. T. Smith, et al., 2002) and youth deviance (i.e. Panelli, et al., 2002). 
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‘You’re stealing from yourself, no one else,’ he tells Robert.  ‘You’re stealing your own 
future.  If you keep on the way you’re headed, you can only end up in one of two 
places, the cemetery, or the penitentiary’.  
(Humes, 1996, pp.38) 
I established in Chapter 3 that adults tend to use a knowledge of adolescence and/or youth 
to establish differences.  This is indicative of the ways in which people, in general, use, and 
apply, knowledge.  Taking this further, individuals and groups use knowledge as a dividing 
tool to define and separate members in a society into those who can participate and those 
who cannot participate (Foucault, 1972b; Rabinow, 1984).  Foucault (1983) argues that 
contemporary society tends to use a knowledge of abnormality and normality in “dividing 
practices” (p.208) to govern and control different groups.  In this context, societal groups 
apply dividing practices to prohibit and exclude the voice of particular groups in the social 
construction of truth and in societal participation.   
In the context of youth and young people, many adults apply a knowledge of difference and 
adolescence to divide young people across two dimensions.  The first dimension concerns 
the age of young people.  In this dimension, all young people are defined as different to 
adults and as having an immaturity.  Young people’s status as immature youth excludes 
them, momentarily, from full participation in meaning-making and adult society.  The 
momentary ‘nature’ of this exclusion means that at adult-defined times (such as an age 
specified in policy or transition into the workplace) the young person can take on the position 
of an adult.   
The second dimension centres on a knowledge of abnormality and normality.  This 
dimension does not contain a momentary point.  Instead, those applying this knowledge in 
adult society define some young people as different and abnormal even before, and beyond, 
the biological beginning of adolescence.  Hence, young people are positioned, or even 
trapped, in an abnormality or pathology.  Using this knowledge, adults in authority are able to 
exclude particular groups of young people, even as adults, from full societal participation. 
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Across the texts I analysed, authors and writers29 attempted to define the differences in, and 
between, children and young people.  As they attempted to come to terms with the series of 
extraordinary crimes, there was a tendency to focus on abnormality in order to shift the 
causes, or blame, from general social structures to abnormal ‘factors’ of development.  
Authors tended to describe and define two different groups of deviant youth – the 
abnormally-deviant and the normally-deviant.  Through this definition, within institutional 
writings, they reinforced an idea and ‘Truth’ that deviance was abnormal in society.  As such, 
authors were able to go further to argue that some young people (the ones that start deviant 
behaviour early on in life and continue outside of the limits of adolescence) were more 
abnormal than others.  For these authors, ‘society’ needed to define and control these young 
people in order to maintain stability.  An illustration of this comes in a headline from a feature 
article published in the media context in 2002.  Here, Phil Taylor focuses on locating the 
cause/s of abnormality in young people (nature or nurture).  However, he implies that 
abnormality is not the ‘fault’ of normal families who have normal children – rather it is a 
combination of abnormal genes and abnormal upbringing: 
Born bad or brought up to be bad?   
(P. Taylor, 2002a) 
In the following two chapters, I present the findings of my research on institutional 
publications in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2002.  I focus on the constructions of abnormality 
and normality because authors and commentators used this division to communicate and 
apply a knowledge of deviance.  In particular, writers used a knowledge of deviance and 
development in institutional texts to focus on abnormally-deviant youth.  In a way, they used 
this construction as a clearly defined and visible maker to construct both the normal and the 
abnormal deviant (c.f. Jones, 1999).  So, in this chapter, I explore constructions of abnormal 
deviant youth.  These constructions were located in discussions of developmental 
psychology, risk, and education. 
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Those writing about abnormal deviance in 2002 used a language of trajectories, pathways, 
and growth to construct the abnormally-deviant youth.  As such, they constructed criminality 
as an effect of pathological developmental outcomes.  In this construction, developmental 
conditions influence and affect the young person and the young person’s susceptibility to 
criminality.  However, the language they used to construct these young people did not 
explicitly focus on pathology.  Instead, examining outcomes coincided with a language of risk 
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 I have used the words to ‘author’ and ‘writer’ to generally refer to the producers of texts (both written and 
recorded).  Included within the words ‘author’ and ‘writer’ are the other commentators, experts, and young people 
cited by authors. 
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where writers focused on the potential risk of criminality to construct the deviant youth as the 
‘youth-at-risk’.  Furthermore, as the following quote from a media feature article 
demonstrates, when those writing constructed the young person as ‘at risk’, they linked it to 
a variety of pathological outcomes or societal problems – not just crime: 
Police and youth aid agencies identify at-risk kids using 12 indicators collated from 
research … Much of it is common sense.  As Mr O’Connor [police youth officer] says: 
‘At risk of what?  Mental health problems, suicide, teenage pregnancy, drink or drug 
problems?  It’s not only crime’.   
(Mirams, 2002, p.B5, my emphasis) 
Through focusing on “indicators” found in “research”, opinions of practitioners in youth 
justice, and a “common sense” of youth crime, writers fused together notions of development 
and growth with ideas of pathology and becomingness.  In this construction, the young 
person developed into (rather than being born into) pathology and abnormality.  Through 
focusing on pathology as an outcome, writers implied that all young people could, in some 
way, have the ‘same’ outcomes in life and that the deviance of some young people (whether 
it be crime or any other pathological behaviour) was due to factors inhibiting them from 
reaching these ‘same’ outcomes.  It was due to pathological development. 
Many authors explicitly acknowledged the ‘development’ of abnormal criminal deviance in 
young people through using the word ‘risk’ in constructions of youth as abnormally-deviant.  
In the literal sense, when authors applied the word ‘risk’, they focused on the past and the 
present to identify the future.  They associated risk with pathology through implying that risk 
was a negative construct that unpredictably threatened New Zealand society.  Hence, the 
term ‘youth-at-risk’ made apparent two dimensions to risk – the youth’s own vulnerability to 
pathological outcomes and the threat that the youth (and their potential pathology) posed to 
society.  This double risk is explicitly evident in the following quote from a local government 
programme evaluation.  Within this quote, the Social Policy Team of Christchurch City 
Council and Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services refer to this double risk 
as, first, the “safety” of young people (their personal risk) and, second, the “threatening” 
behaviour of young people to the “public” (the social risk): 
This pilot was initiated due to increased concerns regarding the safety of unsupervised 
young people in the city late at night.  It was also a response to concerns regarding 
the rising number of young people who were threatening public safety, causing 
property damage and committing other offences.  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.5) 
By focusing on risk, those writing about abnormal deviance described the abnormality of the 
youth-at-risk in terms of cause and effect.  In this construction, risk factors caused adverse 
deviant outcomes.  The following quote from an academic journal article is evidence of this.  
David Ferguson, Nicola Swain-Campbell, and John Horwood attempt to argue here that 
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negative peer affiliations cause criminality and they imply that crime is a clear pathological 
outcome of pathological development: 
This analysis strongly suggested that the overwhelming direction of causation was for 
peer affiliations to influence crime rather than crime influencing peer affiliations.   
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.429, my emphasis) 
Authors developed persuasive arguments through focusing on risk and development.  In this 
way, they avoided any negative connotations evident through a direct focus on pathology.  
Instead, by focusing on risk and development, they were able to ‘empower’ adults with 
knowledge – through developmental knowledge adults could intervene and control 
development.  That is, the combination of risk and development led to a logical argument by 
authors – because young people are growing, because they are born with the same 
potential, and because deviant behaviour has causes, then adults can identify these young 
people and counter risk factors.  Adults could control the potentiality of development.  The 
following quote from a governmental ministerial report shows the power in risk factors 
knowledge.  Although the Ministry of Justice is retrospectively reflecting on the development 
of criminal pathology, it clearly implies that, if practitioners had a knowledge of “static” 
(unchangable) “risk factors”, they could have “predicted” this young person’s outcomes: 
However, as xxxxxxxxxxx was the only offender to exhibit two of the static risk factors, 
he was the only young person who was at high-risk of offending and for whom 
agencies could have predicted that he would continue to offend.  
(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, pp.6-7, my emphasis) 
Although those writing about abnormal deviance grouped risk factors differently30, they 
generally used risk factors to refer to individual attributes (those psychological and biological 
factors found within the young person) and social environmental attributes (those factors 
found outside the young person within the family, peer group, school, and community).  The 
following quote from an academic conference paper discusses some of these risk factors.  
Philip Kilmister and Brenda Baxter use international research to validate their argument that 
the social environment (the family and the school) is a source of risk for the development of 
pathological (“antisocial and criminal”) behaviours: 
Risk factors (National Crime Prevention, 1999) associated with antisocial and criminal 
behaviours highlight a range of family factors – such as family violence and 
disharmony, father absence, negative interaction, poor supervision, child rejection and 
neglect – as well as some negative school factors which are instrumental in limiting 
the child’s ability to feel a sense of belonging or to succeed.  
(Kilmister & Baxter, 2002b, p.7) 
Although some authors used these two sets of risk factors to discuss the differing roles of 
nature and nurture (e.g. Caspi et al., 2002; P. Taylor, 2002a), many authors argued that the 
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 Across texts authors grouped similar risk factors together.  However, they tended to give these groups different 
names depending on the audience or on the expertise referenced. 
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social environment nurtured any individual predisposition to criminal deviance.  Conversely, 
many authors would also argue that practitioners could use the social environment as a tool 
of intervention into any individual predispositions.  For example, in the following media 
feature article, Taylor examines psychological research (expertise) to ascertain whether it is 
the genes or nurturing of a young person that leads to criminal deviance.  He concludes that 
the environment asserts more power over the development of criminal deviance in the young 
person – even when there appears to be some genetic influence: 
But don’t rush to proclaim nature the victor over nurture.  The gene seemed to have 
no bearing on a propensity for violence in those who were not maltreated as children. 
(P. Taylor, 2002a, p.C5) 
The next quote gives an idea of the intertextuality of texts and institutions.  Published in an 
academic journal, Avshalom Caspi and colleagues present research findings shown in the 
above citation.  Although they ascertain a link between genetic predisposition and crime, 
they focus their findings on the opposite – the genetic ‘resilience’ in young people: 
Maltreated children with a genotype conferring high levels of MAOA [genetic] 
expression were less likely to develop antisocial problems.  These findings may partly 
explain why not all victims of maltreatment grow up to victimise others, and they 
provide epidemiological evidence that genotypes can moderate children’s sensitivity to 
environmental insults.  
(Caspi et al., 2002, p.851) 
When writers argued that the environment ‘nurtured’ any predisposition to criminal deviance, 
they endorsed the trajectory idea central to developmental theory in which criminal deviance 
was the consequence of time (development) and factors (risk).  In this way, they implied that 
no-one was born a criminal; instead, they implied that children were born innocent and 
deviance was a consequence of pathological socialisation over time.  Any ‘resilience’ to 
pathological socialisation was located within the individual or other mechanisms of 
socialisation (such as the school).  In this way, whether a young person became deviant or 
not was out of the young person’s control – they were a product of nature and nurture and an 
effect of risk factors.  In this way, writers positioned young people as objects upon which risk 
factors and the environment worked.  Consequently, they argued that the family and the 
community were central environmental risk factors. 
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Across institutional contexts, authors constructed the family as a source of risk and a cause 
of pathological outcomes.  They described families (particularly one-parent, or two-parent 
Mori families31) living in lower socio-economic conditions as environments of risk negatively 
influencing the development of young people.  In the following extract, written in a policy 
document in 2002, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development locate the 
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 To a lesser extent, authors associated Pacific families with youth offending. 
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family as a key source of dysfunction and pathology.  They explicitly mention “healthy 
development and socialisation” as well as “life outcomes” as key functions of the family and 
describe dysfunctional families as environments of “inappropriate parenting”, “abuse”, 
“neglect”, and “poverty”:   
Promoting and facilitating the health and well-being of children is not only critical to 
their healthy development and socialisation, but fundamental to the prevention of poor 
life outcomes, including youth offending.  Among the strongest predictors of youth 
offending are inadequate or inappropriate parenting, child abuse and neglect, early 
childhood cognitive or behaviour problems, and family poverty.  (Brown, 1999).   
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.26) 
As the previous quotation shows, many authors connected socio-economic factors to 
families and the communities in which the family resided.  Rather than being dysfunctional, 
they would convey these families as being disadvantaged due to their economic position.  In 
turn, this disadvantage led to dysfunction and pathological outcomes in the family and in the 
children.  Using this context, authors described crime as an outcome of desire and want.  
The following quotation from a media feature article explicitly shows this when the 
interviewed lawyer argues that crime is a “lower socio-economic” activity of “people who 
have little and … want more”:  
[Former youth court lawyer:] ‘But for the most part, most crime comes from the lower 
socio-economic groups - people who have little and, of course, they want more’.   
(M. Tait, 2002a, p.A7) 
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Authors also attributed socio-economic conditions to the disproportionate number of young 
Mori offenders in the youth justice system.  Hence, they did not explicitly construct ethnic 
crime as an effect of ethnicity; rather, they connected ethnic crime to socio-economic 
disadvantage.  In rare instances, authors would imply a link to ethnicity through locating a 
loss of cultural identity as a risk factor.  This risk factor was only evident in discussions on 
Mori and Pacific crime.  In this way, these authors implied that ethnicity was only a 
‘problem’ for non-European youth.  In the following example from an academic book chapter, 
Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris make an intertextual reference to a longitudinal study to 
describe how “social deprivation” and the police focus on ethnic groups leads to “higher 
official crime figures” for ethnic groups:  
Fergusson, Horwood, and Lynskey (1993) attribute the higher official crime figures for 
Mori  to both social deprivation and to a greater probability of being reported to the 
police and dealt with ‘officially’ by them.   
(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.204) 
Those writing about ethnicity and crime implied that Mori young people and their families 
were pathological sites of risk.  In doing this, they used statistics, about the ethnic 
composition of deviant youth, and focused on ‘culturally-inclusive’ intervention programmes.  
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In this way, they implied a direct association between ethnicity and risk.  This argument 
justified practitioners, such as the police, identifying young Mori as offenders and formally 
processing them through the youth justice system (as shown in the previous extract)32.  The 
following example from a local government evaluation shows the use of statistics to 
emphasize ethnic crime rates: 
The majority (54.3%) of referrals were Mori.  This is disproportionate to the 
proportion of Mori  in the Christchurch population (7.1%).  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.6) 
In contrast to ethnicity, authors directly associated gender with risk.  However, their 
connections between gender and risk also had covert or implied implications – particularly 
for young women.  For example, in the following extract from a government policy document, 
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development directly associate gender with 
crime by arguing that “being female” is a “protective factor” (a factor that reduces the 
likelihood of pathological outcomes).  However, within this argument, they also imply that 
female offending is “more” pathological and of deeper concern for adult society:   
Being female is a significant protective factor … Notwithstanding this, concern has 
been expressed, particularly by practitioners such as the Police, that offending by 
young females is becoming more serious and violent.  
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.12) 
Generalising the offending ‘nature’ of males to all young people was a second way that 
authors implied an abnormality to the offending, and even non-offending, by females.  The 
following extract from a media feature article shows this generalisation.  Through describing 
the dysfunctional family, the interviewed expert uses the masculine pronoun, thus implying 
that deviant young men tend to offend: 
People have to take responsibility but it’s a matter of how you get them to do it,’ says 
Detective Sergeant Steve O’Connor, youth coordinator for the Hutt district.  ‘You can’t 
make someone do something they don’t have the skills to do.  It’s the same with 
(parenting) kids.  I` want you to look after that kid, bring him up correctly, otherwise 
you will be punished’ -- it doesn’t work.  If they don’t have the skills, energy or 
motivation, then how do they do it?  That’s what we’re working with’  
(Mirams, 2002, p.B5, my emphasis). 
In any construction of youth offending, readers could be forgiven if they automatically 
assumed that female offending showed an abnormality with the young woman’s gendered 
character.  Readers could even be forgiven if they assumed that the offending young person 
was ‘naturally’ a male.  However, authors needed to give readers more information so that 
readers could ascertain whether the offending male was normal or abnormal.  To do this, 
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 Furthermore, in 2004, Maxwell and colleagues found that New Zealand police, without evidence of any criminal 
activity, were more likely to identify young Mori as criminally-deviant than any other ethnic group. 
 56 
authors would identify the presence of other risk factors in a young male’s life (including 
ethnicity). 
For young males, risk factors led to deviance.  However, the presence of risk factors in a 
young woman meant something different.  Those writing about gender and crime 
constructed the at-risk female as being a risk and threat to society because she could 
nurture future criminals.  They identified young women as the teen mothers of young 
criminals and the future victims of domestic violence.  In the following excerpt from a radio 
commentary, Steven Price refers to a government report in which at-risk girls (“girls from 
disadvantaged families”) are seen as being “likely” to parent the “criminals of the future”: 
And the Herald’s Brian Rudman seems to be the only journalist to mention Matt 
Robson’s ‘About Time’ report from last year that advocates targeting help at young ill-
educated girls from disadvantaged families who are on alcohol or drugs.  It’s their 
children who are likely to be the criminals of the future.  
(Price, 2002, para.17) 
Hence, through using risk factors, authors constructed the abnormally-deviant young person 
as a young male from a dysfunctional and/or disadvantaged family living in a disadvantaged 
community.  Additionally, they assumed, or implied, that this young person would most likely 
be Mori – indeed, with the exception of the extraordinary death of Kenneth Pigott (which 
involved young Mori women); these traits were present in most of the youth crimes of 
2001/2.  The following extract from a current affairs article provides an example of this type 
of description.  In this extract, Hamish Carnachan combines the family environment with 
individual risk factors to position the young person as a pathological consequence of 
negative development.  The trajectory metaphor is evident through the references to the 
young person going “off the rails”:   
Over the course of his 13 years he [a young Mori male] has experienced such 
neglect and such a hostile upbringing that it wasn’t simply a matter of if he was going 
to go off the rails but when.  He is the son of a violent father, an abused and battered 
mother, and a product of a wholly dysfunctional family unit.   
(Carnachan, 2002, p.54, author’s emphasis) 
Consequently, those producing texts about youth crime in 2002 constructed the abnormally-
deviant young person as an object lacking power.  This young person was dependent upon 
adult society for healthy development and any necessary intervention into risk factors.  
Writers tended to explicitly construct this lack of power as a risk factor – lack of self-control. 
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Across the institutional contexts, writers discussing abnormal deviance described a lack of 
self-control as an explicit risk factor present in abnormally-deviant youth which manifested in 
childhood and in institutions such as the school (institutions that require some self-
discipline).  The following extract taken from an academic conference paper shows this.  
Paul Kennedy describes abnormally-deviant young people as “failing at … school” because 
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of deficits in their brains.  He argues that this lack can be tracked back to the functioning of 
the brain and implies that the young person is at fault because he or she is “using the 
executive functions of the brain for things other than schoolwork”:  
Teachers will recognise, in one form or another, behaviours exhibited by students who 
are failing at their school.  
Hollin and Howells (1996, pp.31,32) state ‘the ‘executive functions’ of the brain, 
located in the frontal lobes, include sustaining attention and concentration, abstract 
reasoning and concept formation, anticipation and planning, self monitoring of 
behaviour and inhibition of inappropriate or impulsive behaviour ... Deficits in these 
executive functions are conducive to low measured intelligence and to offending.’  
Youth who are caught up in the offending cycle are often using the executive functions 
of the brain for things other than schoolwork.  This seriously detracts from their ability 
to do well at school.  
(Kennedy, 2002, p.3) 
Authors describing the youth-at-risk also described how, by adolescence, the lack of self-
control evident in the youth-at-risk solidified into an outcome – the youth lacking self-control 
became out-of-control.  The deviant youth became a problem for their family, community, 
and, ultimately, society.  From the perspective of authors, this young person experienced risk 
factors in their life to such an extent that their impulsive behaviour became evident in risk 
behaviours or criminal activities.  The following extract from a current affairs television 
programme illustrates the problematic nature of out-of-control behaviour.  Janet McIntyre 
attempts to analyse the reasons for Alex Peihopa’s involvement in the death of Michael Choy 
and identifies Alex’s out-of-control drug use as a possible risk factor or behaviour.  She 
explicitly notes that the parents of Alex Peihopa could not “control” his behaviour and, as 
such, his behaviour resulted in negative outcomes for him (unconsciousness) and society 
(Michael Choy’s death): 
[Home video of Alex Peihopa playing guitar]  Richard and Rose tried to control Alex by 
allowing him to drink and smoke in a backyard shed …   
But one day Richard [father] found his son unconscious.  With a group of mates, Alex 
had taken a cocktail of drugs.  
(McIntyre, 2002a, 4.45-5.25min) 
Consequently, authors described how a young person’s inability to control their own 
behaviours combined with environmental risk factors to produce negative outcomes such as 
deviance.  To counter the effect of risk factors (individual and social), they argued for 
intrusive institution-based interventions.  These interventions would override, or counter, the 
effects of risk factors and socialisation, re-socialise the youth and move the youth onto a 
trajectory of normality before adulthood.  Authors described identification, particularly within 
education, as a key function of interventions. 
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Those writing about interventions into abnormal deviance used a knowledge of development 
and risk to inform the types of interventions aimed at the abnormally-deviant youth.  They 
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described how interventions, based in the present, focused on addressing changeable risk 
factors (such as current pathological behaviours, family conditions, and educational 
experience) whilst trying to reduce the effects of unchangeable factors (such as individual 
attributes like gender, genetic predispositions to violence, and historical experiences).  
Writers based interventions on a logic of development and risk (the young person ‘becoming’ 
a criminal) and focused interventions on the socialisation and re-socialisation of the young 
person.  This involved practitioners identifying abnormally-deviant youth through risk factors 
early in life.  At this point, practitioners would establish and promote environmental protective 
factors in order to build resilience within the young person.   
The following extract from an academic conference paper illustrates the logic around 
intervention.  David Carruthers argues that effective interventions involve practitioners 
identifying and controlling risk and risk factors.  To this end, he points out that the family 
presents a key risk to the development of the child.  He also uses a metaphor of a 
“developmental pathway” on which the child is travelling.  Further to this, he constructs the 
youth-at-risk as a “child” or “problem” rather than an adolescent or youth.  Hence, the 
language used by Carruthers refers subtly to a notion of developmental becomingness.  To 
counter this, Carruthers emphasises the control of the future by asserting that “long-term 
outcomes” are the goals of early intervention (or intervention in the present).  To this end, he 
presents youth offending as a pathological outcome of child development: 
One of the strongest suggestions to come from research is that to effectively intervene 
to prevent youth offending the risk factors associated with offending must be targeted 
and removed.  Successful strategies to address poor long-term outcomes for children 
and young people are those that: (Ministry of Social Policy, 2002) 
- Identifying at risk and high risk families;  
- Ameliorate risk factors and build resilience in the child and their family;    
- Are responsive and flexible in their delivery and not limited by agency or sector 
boundaries; 
- Are provided as early as possible in the developmental pathway of the child or 
presenting problem.  
Initiatives that adopt these strategies can be expected to have a positive impact on 
youth offending.  
(Carruthers, 2002, p.7) 
Authors emphasised the school as a key social institution in interventions and early 
intervention.  They argued that education, particularly in the public school, had a role in risk 
identification and social control.  The following extract, from a media feature article, 
illustrates the argument that education has a role in identification.  Reflecting the previous 
extract, Diana Dekker argues that “early intervention” is the answer for youth crime.  Again, 
using a logic of development and becomingness, she suggests that at some point 
pathological behaviour becomes “habitual”.  To counter this, she argues that early 
intervention would ‘save’ “most … if not all” potential criminals.  Dekker implies that this, at 
least, should occur in “primary school” (between the ages of 5 and 12) where “children with 
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the potential for criminal behaviour can … be spotted” before any ‘naughty’ behaviour 
became “habitual”: 
Forensic psychiatrist Sandy Simpson, of Auckland’s Mason Centre, says it’s obvious 
that broad-based early intervention is necessary ... Mr Moore [Police community 
services coordinator] agrees.  He believes that ‘if you get in early enough, before it’s 
habitual, most can be saved, if not all.’  Mr Moore, like other people in the youth field, 
agrees that children with the potential for criminal behaviour can usually be spotted at 
primary school.  
(Dekker, 2002, p.F1) 
In the analysed texts referring to education, when authors used ideas of becomingness, they 
did not just refer to ‘developmental outcomes’ but also to ‘educational opportunities’.  As 
such, they constructed the abnormally-deviant youth as failing to take up the opportunity of 
education.  In this construction, authors assumed schooling empowered young people and 
enabled young people to become subjects or ‘agents’ of their own future.  They 
conceptualised having an education as a valuable experience, which transformed young 
people into participating adults.  Having an education inevitably led to good outcomes; 
conversely, not having an education led to adverse outcomes.  The following extract from an 
academic journal article illustrates this form of reasoning about educational opportunities.  
Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, and Horwood focus on the ‘vulnerability’ of young people 
surrounding the effects of school failure and conceptualise school failure as leading to 
adverse outcomes directly affecting the young person.  The tone in which they write this 
segment suggests that adult society should be concerned about the hopelessness that 
results for the young person when they cannot fully participate in society as adults.  As such, 
the failure of the young person to take up educational opportunities (in the form of 
“qualifications”) restricts and inhibits their future opportunities: 
In recent years there has been increasing research and interest in the issue of young 
people leaving school without qualifications … There is a growing literature on this 
group, who are seen as being vulnerable in a number of ways, and it has centred 
around two major themes. 
The first and dominant line of research has examined the individual, social, family and 
school factors that place young people at risk of leaving school without qualifications.  
This literature has reported that those at most risk of school dropout are those from 
socially disadvantaged backgrounds, who show early educational delays and 
associated behavioural or adjustment problems (Achenbach et al., 1998; Cairns et al., 
1989; Campbell & Duffy, 1998; French & Conrad, 2001; Vitaro, Larocue, Janosz & 
Tremblay, 2001).   
Second, interest has focussed on the extent to which leaving school without 
qualifications may place young people at increased psychosocial risk.  Specifically, 
leaving school without qualifications has been associated with increased future risk of 
alcohol abuse and dependence (Crum, Ensminger, Ro & McCord, 1998; Silbereisen, 
Robins & Rutter, 1995), drug use (Mensch & Kandel, Savage & Marchington, 1977), 
crime (Farrington, Gallagher, Morley, St. Ledger, & West, 1986; Hency, Caspi, Moffitt, 
Harrington & Silva, 1999), unemployment (Lamb, 1994), and delinquency (Jarjoura, 
1993).  There is little doubt that, as a population, those who leave school without 
qualifications are an at-risk group for later psychosocial adversity.  
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002b, p.39-40) 
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Those authors writing about abnormal deviance in 2002 also suggested that education works 
as an equaliser in a society in that it provides all children and young people an equal starting 
point.  They conceptualised education as providing an equal opportunity to all children and 
young people despite any structural differences.  The following quote taken from a media 
focus article shows this.  The interviewed principal describes education as a “passport” 
allowing anybody who takes up the opportunity of education to change the future.  However, 
Kelly Andrew also implies the use of education as a form of control and socialisation.  That 
is, education is a powerful force that can ‘make’ “young offenders better citizens”.  
Consequently, Andrew constructs education as a social panacea resolving problems in 
society: 
She [a teaching principal at a residential centre] believes education is the key to 
making these young offenders better citizens, and she has an inspirational quote from 
Malcolm X written on the board in her classroom: ‘Education is the passport to the 
future, for tomorrow belongs to the people who prepare for it today’.  
(Andrew, 2002, p.D5) 
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Authors saw the school as more than just an identification mechanism, they also saw the 
school as a site of socialisation and control.  In particular, they argued that schools could do 
this through promoting protective factors in the young child’s life.  Across institutional 
contexts, authors argued that practitioners could establish or identify what protective factors 
a young child had and then foster and promote the development of protective factors in order 
to control deviance.  In particular, they argued that adult society could control environmental 
factors in institutions of socialisation (such as the school).  Through focusing on protective 
factors, schools could counter the influence of the pathological family and socialise or 
redirect the youth into a position of normality.  The following extract from an academic 
conference paper illustrates this argument.  Across the extract, Carruthers emphasizes that 
society should develop interventions focusing on the development of protective factors, 
particularly within the school.  He, reflecting the above examples, implies that an emphasis 
on educational opportunity is a key intervention goal.  Carruthers also associates protective, 
and risk, factors with other socialising environments outside the school such as the peer 
group, the community, and the family.  Through this, he suggests that something is 
‘inherently’ wrong with the young person and the environments with which they interact: 
As children grow older, factors outside the family/whnau, such as peers and 
community, begin to have a greater impact on their lives.  The associated risk factors 
must therefore be addressed and protective factors such as ensuring success at 
school and developing friendships with pro-social peers also need to be supported 
and reinforced...    
Programmes in this area focus on addressing risk factors such as poor attendance or 
underachievement at school, anti-social behaviour, lack of parental support or lack of 
pro-social peers.  Programmes include Social Workers in Schools, anti-bullying 
programmes, specialist education services, drug and alcohol abuse education and 
treatment, alternative education, community-based recreational/leisure activities, life 
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skills development, counselling, and mentoring.  
(Carruthers, 2002, p.8)33 
Alongside protective factors, writers also argued for cognitive behaviour therapy to address 
the abnormally-deviant young person’s lack of self-control.  This was particularly evident 
when they talked about the abnormally-deviant youth who had actually offended.  For 
example, in the following extract from a government official publication, Ashley Seaford and 
Shirley Johnson stress that within residential programmes addressing problem youth: 
… ongoing work has led to the development of anti-offending programmes based on 
cognitive-behavioural methods.  
(Seaford & Johnson, 2002, p.11) 
Across institutional contexts, those advocating cognitive behavioural interventions focused 
on the development of ‘self-control’ as a form of re-socialisation.  Through developing self-
control, the young person could control their own behaviours and urges (i.e. individual risk 
factors) and/or resist the influences of social risk factors.  In effect, the young person would 
conform to the behaviour patterns deemed acceptable by dominant adult society and 
become a self-controlling and governing subject through an internalisation of psychological 
power.  In cognitive behavioural therapy, practitioners could re-programme the young 
person’s mind and thinking patterns through an adaptation of behavioural therapy.  
Authors based cognitive behavioural interventions upon an intensive thinking-based re-
socialisation where the young person analysed risk in their own life and developed ‘positive’ 
or ‘normal’ ways of thinking.  Such interventions specifically addressed individual risk factors 
(such as lack of self-control and predispositions to deviant behaviour), whilst also directing 
the youth away from any pathological influences in their social environment/s.  Cognitive 
behavioural interventions also allowed practitioners to introduce and develop alternative and 
‘normal’ ways of reacting to challenges in the young person.  The next extract continues from 
the previous to describe a cognitive behavioural intervention.  Seaford and Johnson describe 
a programme focused on the development of ‘normal’ thinking and reacting.  They imply that 
the abnormally-deviant youth cannot function in a group, cannot communicate or think 
correctly, cannot control their own reactions, and has unhealthy values:  
What follows is an outline of the present format of the programme … Group 
Development … Communication Skills … Thinking Skills … Participants are taught 
techniques to help them think of the consequences of their actions on themselves and 
others, to think before they take action, and to think critically and logically.  Problem 
Solving ... Mood Management ... Conflict Resolution ... Understanding Offending: 
Group members are asked to recollect their offending histories and to identify triggers 
to their offending ... Values: The final module looks at values and moral development 
and attempts to instil an empathic attitude to others, especially victims.  
(Seaford & Johnson, 2002, p.13) 
                                                    
33
 ‘Whnau’ is used to refer to family groupings including immediate and extended family. 
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Writers emphasised structure, alongside cognitive behavioural interventions, as aiding in the 
development of self-control.  Through a structured programme or routine in an institutional 
setting (such as, the school, army, boot camp, or residential home), practitioners could 
influence the thinking and behaviour of young people.  It was within social institutions that a 
practitioner could create an environment in which the young person could engage in 
‘positive’ and ‘normal’ thinking and acting.  In effect, institutions provided spaces where 
adults could establish an environment of re/socialisation and could exercise cognitive 
behavioural approaches without the intrusion of other social risk factors.  The following 
extract from a media focus article illustrates a described relationship between structure and 
offending.  Eugene Bingham describes explicitly the link between a strong “external 
structure” (that is, structured routines) and self-control.  He implies that abnormally-deviant 
young people are internally ‘out-of-control’ or lacking self-control:   
Above all, the centres try to impose structure.  
‘Each day in the residential centre will be structured around a set of routines,’ says a 
CYF paper on its residential services.  
‘Routines provide children and young people with a sense of external structure and 
order that will contribute to their being more calm and settled within themselves’. 
(Bingham, 2002, p.B5) 
Consequently, described interventions aimed at the abnormally-deviant youth continued to 
focus on a developmental-psychological knowledge of risk.  Interventions focused on 
identification, education, socialisation, and self-control.  This construction of youth and the 
associated interventions had particular implications for youth. 
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When authors used knowledge to construct and position the abnormally-deviant youth, their 
family, and other adults working with the youth and their family, they also applied power.  
Because authors positioned the abnormally-deviant young person as an object or a target of 
risk (i.e. the youth-at-risk), they implied that this young person was without power and 
dependent upon adults (within the family and other social institutions).  Authors reinforced 
this conception through the notion of socialisation and re-socialisation where they implied 
that families and other socialising institutions in society, such as the school, held the power 
to direct and influence a young person’s development.  These environments enabled 
practitioners, in a controlled fashion, to ‘give’ the young person power through psychological 
interventions, which would reposition the young person as a subject.  The young person’s 
dependence on adult society for ‘positive’ or ‘normal’ socialisation reinforced a conception 
that young people, in general, have vulnerabilities due to their age and subsequent 
relationship to adults.  The following extract from an academic conference paper illustrates 
this form of reasoning where Carruthers associates vulnerability directly to age.  Carruthers 
also emphasises the idea of education as an opportunity and intervention into negative 
outcomes.  In particular, he notes literacy and numeracy skills as key requirements to 
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positive and healthy development.  Consequently, he implies that healthy development is not 
necessarily a personal or individual outcome but, instead, is directly associated with societal 
outcomes: 
To a certain extent, all children and young people are at risk of poor outcomes in their 
lives.  This fact is recognised in many of the policies governments adopt.  For 
example, the New Zealand policy of providing free health care to all under six year old 
children is aimed at reducing the risks associated with poor health during those crucial 
formative years.  Similarly, the provision of free education to all children is a vital part 
of reducing the risk of poor outcomes for children and young people.  Failure to give 
children basic skills such as numeracy and literacy has a serious impact on their 
potential outcome.  
(Carruthers, 2002, p.4) 
In comparison to general childhood and adolescence vulnerabilities, authors constructed the 
abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as a consequence of multiple and intensive risk factors.  
This youth was not only vulnerable because of their age, but also because of other individual 
and social risk factors present in their life.  In particular, authors described how a ‘vulnerable’ 
age intensified the presence of other risk factors and a likelihood of deviance, and argued 
that the pathological influence of the dysfunctional and/or disadvantaged family was a key 
risk factor, which could affect development.   
Additionally, those writing about abnormal deviance positioned the family of the abnormally 
deviant youth-at-risk as an effect of risk – socio-economic risk.  This disadvantaged and/or 
dysfunctional family was without power and an object of socio-economic disadvantage, 
dependent on ‘normal’ society for the outcomes of its children.  The following extract shows 
this construction of the family as an effect and object of disadvantage.  The referenced 
quotation describes these families as being on a “cycle of entrenched disadvantage”, 
experiencing poverty and poor health, and failing in educational outcomes.  It further 
describes how risk (as in the unpredictable future) for these families is particularly negative 
due to “unforeseen events” – as such, future risk is future “disadvantage”: 
Research suggests that approximately 25,000 families (5 per cent) are at high risk of 
being caught in a cycle of entrenched disadvantage.  These families experience a 
range of adverse circumstances, which may include persistent low income, family 
disruption, poor parental health and educational achievement and poor housing ... A 
further 45 per cent of families are in situations where some of these risk factors are 
present.  For these families the experience of unforeseen events such as serious 
illness, separation, or unemployment may be enough to push them into a position of 
entrenched disadvantage.   
(Ministry of Social Policy cited in Carruthers, 2002, p.5) 
In contrast, authors constructed adult practitioners working with youth-at-risk and their 
families as ‘holding’ power (which came through a knowledge of developmental-psychology) 
and, consequently, having the power to intrude and intervene upon the effects of risk factors.  
The following extract illustrates this type of reasoning.  Within this extract, the interviewed 
practitioner identifies adults in social institutions surrounding the family as agents or subjects 
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who are “able to turn things around”; conversely, the interviewee positions the family as an 
object needing the intervention and help of those holding power: 
[CYF manager]: ‘We need to work together with the family to get that young person 
through so they can get on with their lives. We may be able to turn things around or 
make things better for them’.  
(Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article) 
Consequently, in constructions of abnormal deviance, authors reinforced a position of 
dependence between the youth-at-risk (and their family) and ‘normal’ society.  In this, they 
implied that these young people and their families desired and/or needed the normality seen 
within other families.  Hence, authors constructed abnormal deviance as a measurable effect 
of disadvantage in which practitioners could determine through risk factor identification tools.  
They also constructed abnormal deviance as a condition of powerlessness with adults 
working in societal institutions having the power to change the direction of a young person’s 
life.  In such a way, society could ‘empower’ (or give power to) young people and their 
families and then turn them into subjects through the application of developmental-
psychological expertise.  In effect, authors constructed abnormally-deviant youth as objects 
to be controlled.  I look at the alternative construction of normal deviance in the next chapter. 
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[Police officer]: ‘Generally speaking, I think our youth justice system is really good for 
most kids.  Most of them do stupid things once or twice.  But we deal with only a really 
small percentage of children.    
‘People think kids are out of control and that’s just not true.  There are difficult kids, but 
for the vast majority, most kids don’t offend’.  
(Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article) 
In Chapter 4, I presented the construction of abnormal-deviance as portrayed in the 
analysed texts.  In this chapter, I present the findings on three constructions of normal 
deviance: the vulnerable youth, the threatening adolescent, and the socially-created deviant.  
In these constructions, authors continued to use a knowledge of abnormality.  In particular, 
they referred to abnormalities (or risk factors) to imply what normality was and who ‘normal’ 
children were.  However, the manifestation of deviance in ‘normal’ children presented a 
contradiction to a construction of abnormal deviance – if deviant youth had a variety of risk 
factors, why were normal youth deviant?   
Developmental ideas of youth and adolescence mitigate any apparent contradiction because 
the adult-defined period of adolescence, in itself, is a period of difference and abnormality.  
In this way, a knowledge of adolescence (and childhood) is a knowledge of the ‘other’ in 
human development.  Taking this further, we use dividing practices to define and divide 
normal from abnormal.  When we use a knowledge of developmental-psychology we are, 
first, assuming that all adolescents are abnormal because they are not quite, and different to, 
adults.  This reasoning makes it possible for adolescents to be developing normally but 
(because of an age-based abnormality) to be deviant.  However, ‘normal’ deviance stops 
when the adolescent becomes an adult (or normal).  Using this reasoning, it is also possible 
for a young person to be developing abnormally and, as such, to be ‘at-risk’ of criminal 
deviance in adulthood (the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk).  In this sense, we might use 
developmental-psychology to construct the normally-deviant adolescent as developing into 
an adult, not developing into a criminal.  When we apply this sort of reasoning, we see the 
‘normal’ youth as presenting deviant behaviour because we assume it a ‘natural’ part of 
development.   
Additionally, when we bring the words ‘normal’ and ‘deviance’ together we draw attention to 
the problematic nature of language and knowledge.  Developmental theorists construct 
deviance as an expected manifestation of adolescence.  They have very few words to draw 
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upon which imply both normality and deviance and this was evident across the analysed 
texts.  As I will show in later extracts in this chapter, authors attempted to bring together 
normality and deviance by placing one of the associated terms under question in scare 
marks.  In this way, they acknowledged the contradictory relationship between normality and 
deviance and, as such, constructed the majority of young people as normally-deviant. 
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Those writing about deviance in 2002 constructed the abnormally-deviant youth through 
references to time and the future; in contrast, they constructed the normally-deviant youth 
through references to age and the present.  To achieve this, they used a concept of 
adolescence and an understanding of adult expectations.  The following extract from an 
academic journal article shows this.  In this extract, Ferguson and Horwood examine the 
association between deviance and adolescence.  They directly associate the onset of 
offending with the developmental stage of adolescence and note that adults can use age-
groups to further divide this group (“early, intermediate, and late onset”).  By examining the 
differences between male and female offending, they suggest “the onset of puberty and 
social maturity may play a role in [the] timing” of offending.  Ferguson and Horwood imply, in 
this suggestion, that females start puberty earlier than males, hence offend at an earlier age: 
What this finding suggests is that those who have been described in previous 
research as ‘adolescent-limited’ offenders are unlikely to be a single homogeneous 
group and may vary in the age of onset of offending and the duration of offending, with 
the result that it is possible to identify early, intermediate, and late onset patterns of 
adolescent-limited offending.  The developmental significance and correlates of the 
age of onset of adolescent-limited trajectories remain to be explored.  However, the 
fact that females tend to predominate in the early onset group, whereas males 
predominate in the later onset groups, may suggest that factors such as the onset of 
puberty and social maturity may play a role in this timing.   
(Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.174) 
Consequently, writers constructed deviance as a normal part of development – something 
that adults could expect.  The following quotation from an academic book illustrates this 
emphasis on the normality of youth deviance.  Within this quotation, Maxwell and Morris 
directly compare and divide deviant young people into age-groups: “younger children”, “older 
… children” or “young people”, and “adults”.  They imply an association between adolescents 
(“older … children”) and offending and describe this as a normal “phase that they [young 
people] go and grow through”.  Confirming the contradictory relationship between normality 
and deviance in young people (and insinuating a difference between adults and youth), 
Maxwell and Morris place the word ‘normality’ in scare marks to confirm that deviance is not 
a ‘normal’ behaviour in adult society but is a ‘normal’ expectation of human development.  
However, they further associate this expectation to older male youth and, as such, imply an 
association between abnormal deviance and female youth.  Finally, they list a series of 
deviant behaviours: “fighting”, “smoking marijuana”, and “stealing”. 
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Self-report information comes from the Dunedin longitudinal study (Moffitt & Silva, 
1986) on offending behaviour by the same cohort of children at different points in their 
lives.  The percentages of young people admitting to delinquent acts increased with 
age and a greater proportion of older than younger children admitted engaging in the 
more serious offences.  The study also confirms the ‘normality’ of much offending 
behaviour.  For example, almost a quarter of young people admitted to fighting over 
the last year.  More than two-fifths admitted smoking marijuana over the past year, 
and almost 10% admitted stealing in the past year.  
Despite concern about juvenile offending increasing rapidly over recent years, it is 
apparent that this increase is not out of line with increases in adult offending.  Though 
there are increases in offending by younger children and by females, the vast majority 
of juvenile offenders remain older males.  Overall, the proportion of crime attributed to 
juveniles has remained remarkably consistent over the past 10 years.  Self-report data 
are broadly consistent with official data in terms of the characteristics of juvenile 
offenders, though they do indicate that, for most children and young people, offending 
is a phase that they go and grow through.  
(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.205) 
In representations of normally-deviant youth, authors constructed adolescence as a time 
when the young person gradually became an autonomous self-governing adult.  They 
described adolescence as a biological process in which the young person struggled with a 
changing body, hormonal urges, and illusions about themselves.  Instead of manifesting risk 
factors, this youth engaged in ‘risk behaviours’ such as sex and drug/alcohol use.  Without 
the word ‘risk’, these behaviours tended to be ‘rights’ of adulthood and maturity – rights into 
which young people and children matured.  However, when authors associated the word 
‘risk’ with these behaviours they portrayed young people as being in two developmental 
processes.  First, they described these behaviours in young people as showing a type of 
experimentation by a young person as they gradually learnt the rules and limits of adulthood.  
Second, they described these behaviours in young people as indicating a dangerousness or 
inherent vulnerability in the youth due to a young person’s lack of maturity and knowledge of 
self.   
The following quotation from a local government evaluation report illustrates this dualism of 
risk and behaviours.  Reflecting the above extract, the Social Policy Team of Christchurch 
City Council and the Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services engage with the 
contradiction of attaching a degree of normality to deviance by placing the word “problems” 
within scare marks.  Following this, they associate these “problems” with a “part of the 
normal maturation process”.  They particularly focus on the risk behaviours of drug and 
alcohol use.  Engaging in this behaviour allowed adolescents to learn “how to behave and 
think like adults”.  However, because of its problematic nature, engaging in this behaviour 
was also dangerous particularly at a “much younger age”.  At this point, the authors 
construct alcohol and drug use as a risk factor.  However, they emphasise that, for normal 
young people who are going through adolescence, alcohol and drug use is normal.  For this 
reason, they quote a respondent’s argument that society should not criminalise youth for 
engaging in risk behaviours or even see these youth as abnormally-deviant.  Even when the 
authors note a concern with alcohol and drug use, they follow with the findings that alcohol 
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and drug use was not a “problem” amongst the young people participating in their 
programme: 
Most respondents commented that there had always been youth “problems” and that 
this was part of the normal maturation process.  Some noted that it reflects the 
difficulties some groups of adolescents experience in learning how to behave and 
think as adults.  One respondent noted:   
‘We must not criminalise being young’.   
However, respondents noted that youth problems were becoming apparent at a much 
younger age, particularly alcohol and drug abuse:   
‘Young people have always been attracted to lights and alcohol … now the lights are 
simply on longer and the alcohol is available to them from an earlier age’  
Significant drug and alcohol problems were not reflected in the admission forms.  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, pp.32-33) 
Consequently, authors constructed the normally-deviant youth passing through a 
developmental phase as naïve youth.  These young people did not know the rules of adult 
society and their deviance showed their naiveté.  The following extract from a media feature 
article illustrates this.  In this article, Maggie Tait refers to a lawyer to argue that young 
offenders are not all bad.  The lawyer explicitly constructs the abnormally-deviant youth as 
“‘real little buggers’ [who know] … what they were doing”.  The interviewed lawyer implies 
that for other ‘normal’ young people, offending is an incident that has “spiralled out of control” 
and, as such, these young people have not been fully aware of their actions or the 
consequences.  The lawyer emphasises the child-like and masculine nature of this naiveté 
by referring to a Family Group Conference (FGC) where the victim sees the young person 
and expresses an opinion – “‘They would ask ‘is that the person who did it?  Why doesn’t 
someone take him home and knit him a cardigan?’” (my emphasis): 
Scott [former youth lawyer] said victims at family group conferences were often 
surprised to come face-to-face with the offender.  ‘They would ask i`s that the person 
who did it?  Why doesn’t someone take him home and knit him a cardigan?’.’ 
While some youth offenders were ‘real little buggers’ and knew what they were doing, 
often incidents spiralled out of control for those involved.   
(M. Tait, 2002b. p.23) 
In addition to using naiveté, writers also constructed normally-deviant youth as ignorant of 
their behaviour or the consequences that would follow, not only for them, but also for the 
victims of their crimes.  The following extract from an academic book chapter shows this.  
Allison Morris describes the functions of FGCs in this chapter and explicitly mentions two key 
aims of FGCs – giving “offenders a sense of the consequences of their actions and an 
understanding of how victims feel”.  She verifies these aims by giving personal experiences 
of FGCs and how these FGCs “‘touched’” the young offenders.  In such a way, she positions 
youth as ‘normal’ because they are not in the control of risk factors and out-of-control minds.  
Instead, these youth are malleable to the effects of their crimes and have the ability to 
experience empathy:   
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One of the aims of family group conferences is to give offenders a sense of the 
consequences of their actions and an understanding of how victims feel.  This is done 
not by a process which emphasises disapproval (shaming), but by a process which 
emphasises the effects of the crime on the victim.  
For example, I observed a victim at a family group conference telling the offender who 
had trashed her house as part of a burglary what it felt like to vacuum from the floor 
the spilled ashes of her dead parent.  And I observed another victim speaking of her 
sadness at the theft of tapes which included a farewell from a dying sister.  I have no 
doubt that these stories ‘touched’ the young offenders concerned in ways that judges 
never can and, importantly, victims see this and may feel better as a result.    
(Morris, 2002, p.171) 
As shown in the above quote, those writers discussing normal deviance in 2002 recognised 
that normally-deviant youth were also vulnerable, or malleable, particularly to “shaming”.  
This construction of vulnerability and malleability did not imply or represent them as youth-at-
risk, but, rather, as being susceptible to societal influences and pressures.  In particular, 
authors emphasised the vulnerability and malleability of the youth to processes of labelling.  
In the following extract from the same academic book, Allison Morris describes a crime 
intervention technique called “reintegrative shaming”34.  In this form of shaming or 
punishment, practitioners focus on the “offence” so that the “offender” can be “reintegrated 
rather than rejected by society”.  In this way, the offender is not the focus of the punishment 
‘ceremony’ and as such avoids any labelling or stigmatisation.  Instead, practitioners focus 
on reintegration and forgiveness in the ceremony.  Hence, practitioners are able to 
encourage the young offender to develop disapproval for offending whilst recognising the 
vulnerability of young people to stigmatic processes: 
Reintegrative shaming means that the offence rather than the offender is condemned 
and the offender is reintegrated with rather than rejected by society,  It is said (Makkai 
& Braithwaite, 1994, cited in Harris & Burton, 1998, p.231) to be achieved through 
certain steps: disapproval of the offence while sustaining a relationship of respect for 
the offender and without labelling the offender as ‘bad’ or ‘evil’; ceremonies to certify 
the offending followed by ceremonies to decertify it; and not allowing the offending to 
become a master status trait ... Thus the shaming must be followed by efforts to 
reintegrate the offender back into the community through ‘words or gestures of 
forgiveness’ (Braithwaite, 1989, p.100).   
(Morris, 2002, p.163) 
Across the institutional texts, those writing about normal deviance also constructed normally-
deviant youth as vulnerable to influences from their peer group.  In this way, they implied that 
the peer group could turn the normally-deviant youth into an abnormally-deviant youth by 
encouraging the youth into a life-course of deviance.  In the following extract (a sub-section 
of a media feature article), Chris Mirams uses knowledge to define and divide young people 
into different risk groups.  As expected, Mirams represents the abnormally-deviant youth in 
the “HIGH RISK” group.  She then places the normally-deviant youth into the “LOW RISK” 
and “MEDIUM RISK” groups.  She describes their offending as representing their age – it is 
                                                    
34
 Morris (2002) then goes on to describe FGCs.  She argues that FGCs avoid shaming altogether and, as such, are 
more beneficial to the young person. 
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either “part of the maturation process” or something to “grow out of … by mid 20s”.  Mirams 
shows how the presence of risk behaviours, such as “substance abuse” and “anti-social 
peers” increases the vulnerability of this group to adverse outcomes.  However, in 
comparison to abnormally-deviant youth, these youth are experiencing some normality in 
their lives, as their deviance does not occur in all “environments” and may “end … abruptly”: 
What constitutes an at-risk youth  
LOW RISK  
Will commit many offences, their offending is part of the maturation process.  
MEDIUM RISK  
Tend to start offending after 13 years of age and grow out of it by mid 20s.  Some may 
begin and end their offending abruptly.  They may behave badly in some 
environments (such as with friends) and not in others (such as school).  Tends to 
exhibit two particular risk factors - substance abuse and anti-social peers.   
HIGH RISK  
May comprise less than five per cent of under 17-year-olds but account for a large 
proportion of offences committed by children and young people.  They begin offending 
early - some at 10 years old - offend at higher rates and often seriously.  Continues 
into adulthood.  Characterised by major personal, social and family disorder.   
(Mirams, 2002, p.B5) 
Consequently, writers also relied on ideas of difference in constructions and representations 
of normal deviance.  They constructed the normally-deviant youth as different to adults 
through ideas of immaturity, naiveté, ignorance, malleability, and vulnerability.  Texts 
referring to normal deviance clearly showed these constructions.  Writers also constructed 
this youth as different to abnormally-deviant youth.  One way they did this was through 
general references to the normality of deviant behaviour in youth.  Another way they did this 
was by referring to risk and protective factors.  The family is a good example of this implied 
construction.  Writers argued that abnormally-deviant youth came from dysfunctional and/or 
disadvantaged families.  These families tended to be single-parent, Mori (or Pacific) 
families, and were possibly environments of abuse and risk.  This had implications for the 
types of families writers constructed.  They connected abnormal families to risk factors; 
whilst, normal families had the opposite – protective factors. 
Furthermore, in the texts analysed, many authors never discussed protective factors outside 
of the context of risk factors; rather, they used protective factors to supplement and offer an 
alternative to risk factors.  This placement of risk factors directly alongside protective factors 
allowed for them to construct and separate the normal and the abnormal, the effect of which 
was the implying, and privileging of, middle-class Pakeha35 two-parent families.  Whereas, 
these authors saw the family as a site of risk in constructions of abnormally-deviant youth, 
they saw the family as the site of positive nurturing power in constructions of normally-
deviant youth. 
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 ‘Pakeha’ is a complex term which originally referred to the Euopean settlers in New Zealand.  In the context of this 
thesis, I have used ‘pakeha’ to refer to non-Maori Caucasian New Zealanders.  
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In contrast to ‘targeting’ the abnormally-deviant youth’s family, authors described 
interventions into the passing phase of normal deviance as being based in the family.  In 
these interventions, practitioners recognised the age of the young person and the need to be 
gently ‘nurtured’ into adult maturity.  The following extract from the Youth Offending Strategy 
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) illustrates the reasoning 
concerning interventions for normally-deviant youth whilst also highlighting the need for early 
intervention for abnormally-deviant youth.  The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social 
Development recognise the construction of deviance as a normal developmental 
expectation.  One reason for this is the link these principles have with Children, Young 
Persons and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989 and the underlying justice penology of this 
legislation.  Within this extract, the authors construct the young person as vulnerable and, 
consequently, needing “protection” and the “least restrictive” intervention.  To achieve this, 
they emphasise “age”, “developmental level” and “developmental appropriateness”.  In 
recognising vulnerability, they argue for the separation of youth and offending so that 
interventions focus on the offending – “Criminal proceedings should not be brought if there is 
an alternative way of dealing with the offending” and “…determine the most appropriate 
response to their offending” (my emphasis).   
The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development also stress the importance of 
interventions with the family.  In such a way, they encourage practitioners to ‘share’ power 
with the family and to only remove the young person when they were a risk to the community 
(symptomatic of abnormal deviance).  Hence, these authors are emphasising the positive 
socialising role of the family where practitioners do not target the family but support the 
family – enabling the family to take up this socialising role.   
Another factor the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Development emphasise is 
the encouragement of young people to develop into responsible and accountable adults.  In 
this way, they reinforce an idea that young people ‘naturally’ offend and are, therefore, guilty 
before proven.  The authors here support interventions, which encourage young people “to 
take responsibility for their behaviour.  There, adults give the “opportunity” to young people 
to participate in the justice process so that young people can learn the consequences of their 
actions and have their offending addressed.  In this extract, young people do not necessarily 
choose to offend but rather must be taught that offending is a choice.  In contrast to 
constructions of abnormal deviance, the authors stress that practitioners should allow the 
normally-deviant to become a subject of the process (rather than a target or object of the 
process that is turned into a subject): 
Principles to guide activity in the youth justice environment are based on the youth 
justice provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, as 
well as recent research on what works to prevent and reduce offending by children 
and young people.   
It is proposed that all activity in the youth justice sector should be consistent with the 
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following set of principles:   
1. Accountability  
Children and young people who offend are to be held accountable for any offences 
they commit and encouraged to take responsibility for their behaviour.  
2. Recognising the Interests of Victims  
Measures for dealing with offending should consider the interests of any victims of the 
offending.  
3. Early Intervention  
Effective intervention should be directed at the earliest recognised point of a child or 
young person’s development toward possible offending, wherever this is cost-effective 
and practicable.  Early interventions should also be directed at key points in the youth 
justice process.  
4. Protection  
The vulnerability of children and young people entitles them to special protection 
during any investigation relating to the possible commission of an offence.  
5. Age and Developmental Appropriateness  
Interventions should be age-appropriate and recognise the child or young person’s 
developmental level.  Age is a mitigating factor in determining whether or not 
sanctions should be imposed on a child or young person.  
6. Best Practice  
Interventions should be based on research about what works, for whom and where, 
and on what doesn’t work.  
7. Consistency with the Treaty of Waitangi  
Responses to offending by Mori children and young people should be consistent with 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and support the aims and aspirations of Mori. 
8. Cultural Responsiveness  
Responses to offending by children and young people should reflect the values, 
perspectives and cultures of the children and young people concerned and strengthen 
the relationship between the Government and the different communities it serves.   
9. Youth Participation [footnote and link to Youth Development Strategy 
Aotearoa]  
Young people should be provided with every opportunity to fully participate in the 
youth justice system.  This will enable them to identify ways to provide redress to 
victims, as well as determine the most appropriate response to their offending. 
10. Holistic Approach: Strengthening Families and Community Connections 
Measures for dealing with offending by children and young people should involve and 
aim to strengthen the family/whnau.  A child or young person who offends should be 
kept in the community where practicable, unless there is a need to ensure the safety 
of the public.  
11. Limiting Involvement in the Formal Youth Justice System  
Sanctions should take the least restrictive form appropriate in the circumstances.  
Criminal proceedings should not be brought if there is an alternative way of dealing 
with the offending (unless the public interest requires otherwise), or solely to provide 
assistance or services to advance the welfare of the child or young person, or their 
family/whnau.  
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.5-6) 
Consequently, where authors constructed the normally-deviant youth within texts as going 
through a passing developmental phase there tended to be a congruence between the 
construction that these youth were immature, naïve, ignorant, malleable, and vulnerable, and 
the construction of less-intrusive and diversionary intervention.  Congruence was also 
evident between constructions of normal deviance as a social threat and coercive 
surveillance-based interventions. 
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Although less evident, a small number of writers did construct some normally-deviant youth 
as a threat to society due to the youth being an adolescent.  This construction was unique 
when compared to other constructions because writers tended to validate their argument 
with young people’s voices.  This showed that constructions of youth deviance also involved 
young people in taking up a construction; adults did not just create this construction of youth, 
both youth and adults played a part (c.f. Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002).  As I have 
shown so far, this is a complicated relationship where writers positioned different groups of 
youth differently in an attempt to define them.  To achieve this, they positioned young people 
in a variety of ways in constructions of normally-deviant, but threatening, youth. 
In constructions of youth as a threat to society, authors emphasised the potential danger 
youth posed to the safety of adults, and other societal members, particularly in public places 
such as malls, shopping centres, and carparks.  The following extract from a media focus 
article illustrates this form of reasoning.  Sheriee Smith attempts to arouse ‘public’ fear 
through associating places of safety (“playgrounds”) with places of danger.  The word 
“playground” is usually associated with children and harmless exploratory play.  In a 
playground, a child is able to explore, develop, and grow.  However, in the context of this 
text, she associates a playground with “serious assaults, disorder and damage”.  Rather than 
being a place adults take their children to, it is a place “feared by many [adults] in the 
community”: 
Buxton Square carpark, a playground for serious assaults, disorder and damage and a 
place feared by many in the community.  But now the Nelson City Council and the 
police want to work together to make it a safer place for the public.  Sheriee Smith 
looks at the problems.   
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13) 
Writers constructed and differentiated normally-deviant youth through a knowledge of 
adolescence.  Within texts applying this construction, writers described these young people 
as subordinate to adults.  The following extract, which comes from the same article as in the 
above extract, shows this.  In this extract, Sheriee Smith quotes a young woman’s 
description of the behaviour of the offending young people.  The young woman provides a 
metaphoric description of these young people as animals ‘marking’ their “territory”.  Through 
this metaphor, she implies that there is a masculinity about these young people:    
[A young woman]: ‘The kids sitting around there feel it is their turf and when people 
come into it they feel it is important to mark their territory’.   
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13) 
Authors often depicted the threatening, but normally-deviant, youth in a contradictory way in 
which the youth was both threatening but vulnerable.  This tended to occur when authors 
implied that the threatening behaviour of young people was a manifestation of hormonal and 
adolescent development.  In a way, authors implied that these young people (despite the 
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‘power’ that they seemed to exercise) were vulnerable to their own adolescent development.  
To authors, this vulnerability meant the young person posed a threat and unpredictable risk 
to adult society.  Like the young person of G.S. Hall (1905), the New Zealand youth of 2002 
were going through a time of storm and stress.  In such a way, the youth’s own development 
made them subordinate to adults because of their inability to control their own development.  
Within this construction, authors represented adolescence as a time of turmoil where the 
body became subject to hormonal changes.  This turmoil intensified when the young person 
engaged in risk behaviours.  An example of this is in the following extract from an academic 
conference paper.  Alison Greenaway and Kim Conway open this paper with a quotation 
from a young person.  In this quote, the youth describes the effects of alcohol on their peer 
group and suggests that alcohol inhibits the behaviours and reactions of young people.  The 
youth makes a hidden reference to psychological theories of youth development.  As in 
Elkind’s (1979) theory of cognitive development, these young people have a personal fable 
about themselves when they drink – “they get freaked out superman”36.  The interviewed 
youth connects this “superman” attitude to the period of adolescence and to policy – “Nah 
you know what started it – was when they lowered the drinking age”.  However, the youth 
also describes adolescence as being more ‘child’ than ‘adult’, because adolescents are “little 
kids” and “young kids at 18”:  
[Quoting youth]  ‘I don’t start the trouble.  It’s just my mates are arguing and people 
are scared of them.  Nah they just drink, and when they drink they get freaked out 
superman – nothing will beat them up.  Nah you know what started it – was when they 
lowered the drinking age.  Man, too many little kids thinking they’re fucking superman.  
There are a lot of young kids at 18 that get drunk and come on the street and think 
they’re mister man’.   
(Greenaway & Conway, 2002, p.1) 
As shown in the above quote, authors continued to use risk behaviours in their constructions 
of threatening, but normal, deviance.  However, they emphasised the risk and threat these 
behaviours posed to others.  Authors did acknowledge some vulnerability within the youth; 
but this was to a lesser extent.  The following extract from a local government evaluation 
provides an example of this.  The Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council and the 
Contracting Group of Child, Youth and Family Services imply that young people are 
problems and engage in problematic behaviour.  The authors list behaviours with each 
referring to inappropriate action occurring in a public context.  They have explicitly given 
behaviours, such as “loitering”, and “‘cruising’”, a problematic identity through their choice of 
words.  In other contexts, it is possible to describe these behaviours in a more positive and 
socially acceptable way (such as ‘enjoying the company of friends’).  Furthermore, the 
authors imply that “known to the police”, means that these young people have engaged, or 
will engage, in criminal behaviour.  In this way, they ignore any possibility that the police may 
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 It could be assumed that this is not a conscious reference to Elkind’s theory but instead a reference to a 
psychological commonsense of adolescence and drinking. 
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know a young person for their own vulnerability.  In this extract, “out late considering their 
age” is the only identified factor that could hint, or imply, vulnerability within the young 
person.  However, the authors’ placement of this factor in the list (last) and the implied adult 
position (that is someone has considered their age to be inappropriate) suggests that being 
out late at night poses both a vulnerability and a public danger as it is at this time these 
youth can engage in the other behaviours listed:   
Most young people were described as being:  
- abusive towards members of the public;   
- committing a criminal offence;  
- intoxicated or with intoxicated people in town;  
- arrested for disorderly behaviour;  
- known to the police or with people “known to the Police”;  
- interfering with vehicles;    
- loitering;  
- gate crashing a party;  
- “cruising”;  
- driving or a passenger in a stolen car;   
- thought to be tagging; or  
- out late considering their age.  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.20) 
As shown in the above quote, writers used the role of the peer group as a central point of 
discussion in constructions of normal deviance.  They saw peer groups as sites of 
encouragement influencing the young person’s conduct.  This next extract from an academic 
conference paper illustrates this.  Starting with a quotation from a young person describing 
the effects of congregating young people in “town”, Greenaway and Conway present their 
own findings.  They describe young people congregating in groups as looking for fights 
(“sizing them up”), fighting, and drinking.  They use the young people’s age-range, being “16-
17”, to differentiate this group from children and adults.  Greenaway and Conway finally 
verify the quotation from the young person by describing the youth involved in the fights as 
wearing “gang type identification” clothing and carrying weapons.  They come to this 
conclusion even when they only observed fights on five nights over a two-month period: 
[Quoting youth]  ‘There’s a lot of troubles happening downtown.  Like far out people, 
like gangsters.  Like spoiling it for the rest of us.  Trying to dominate town.’  
Just under half of all interviewees had been involved in some sort of trouble in town.  
This trouble ranged from people sizing them up to minor scuffles, violent fights 
confiscation of alcohol and apprehension by the police.  Notably a higher proportion of 
16-17 year olds had been involved in trouble than other age groups.  On four 
weekends in November and December our observers witnessed mainly minor 
incidents.  Where there was physical fighting police were very quickly on the scene.  
Fights were observed on 5 occasions.  On one occasion the people involved were 
wearing bandanas, a symbol of gang type identification.  On four occasions our 
observers noted young people carrying baseball bats and/or knives.   
(Greenaway & Conway, 2002, pp.2-3) 
Although authors generalised a construction of normal threatening youth deviance to all 
young people, they also implied deviance was gendered and ethnic.  That is, authors argued 
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that all youth posed a threat but that some youth posed a stronger threat.  In particular, 
authors constructed males as a social threat whereas they constructed females as 
vulnerable to the behaviours of males (adolescent and adult).  The next extract from a media 
feature article indicates the masculinity of this deviance.  David Clarkson explicitly points out 
that the offenders are “belligerent young men” who make a public space, “inner 
Christchurch”, a place of danger and threat.  Clarkson appeals to adult witnesses asking 
them not to intervene by implying that there may be a danger and threat to their own safety: 
Witnessed any casual violence lately?  It pays to keep your mouth shut and walk right 
on by.  
It is the dead of night, when groups of belligerent young men can make inner 
Christchurch a dangerous place.  
(Clarkson, 2002, p.7) 
The following extract from a media focus article shows a construction of young women as 
vulnerable to the actions of males in public spaces.  In this article, a young woman, 
interviewed by Sheriee Smith, describes rape and pregnancy as a key effect of risk 
behaviour engagement for young women.  The young woman appeals to constructions of 
abnormal deviance to argue that these girls “were not bad girls from rough families”.  
However, she cautions that early pregnancy may result in abnormal deviance and a “cycle” 
of disadvantage:   
Chisnall [a young woman] says she knows of girls who believe they have been raped 
in the toilets and others who became pregnant after sex in the carpark to nameless 
men.  
They were not bad girls from rough families, she says.  The people who hang out in 
the carpark are from all walks of life.  
‘It is a vicious cycle’.   
(S. Smith, 2002) 
Writers also implied that these threatening youth were Mori.  To do this, they referred to the 
disproportionate representation of Mori youth involved in deviant activities in public places 
(e.g. Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002) or the need to involve Mori wardens in crime intervention (e.g. 
S. Smith, 2002).  Furthermore, writers also interviewed youth to discuss the deviance of 
‘other’ youth.  By doing this, these writers implied that not all youth were deviant and that 
those interviewed represented the ‘mainstream’ group of ‘good’ youth.   
Hence, even though authors generalised deviant behaviour to all youth, they implied that the 
abnormally-deviant youth was the greatest threat.  However, the public nature of this youth’s 
behaviour and the engagement of mainstream youth in general risk behaviours, such as 
drinking, driving, and sex, meant that authors used developmental theory to generalise this 
risk to all youth.  This validated coercive interventions targeted at all youth. 
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Authors discussing the threatening youth also advocated for intrusive interventions into the 
public threat of youth.  They described these interventions as targeting all youth, not just to 
those offending.  In interventions, practitioners used spatial, technological, and social 
dimensions to counter the uncontrollable nature of adolescence.  Essentially, authors 
described interventions involving forms of visible and invisible power, which would make 
young people suspicious of surveillance and would further promote the development of self-
discipline in the individual37 or remove the individual altogether from the public place.  The 
following extract from a media focus article provides an example of this dualistic and 
intrusive power in crime interventions.  Sheriee Smith describes interventions reducing the 
opportunities available to youth to hide themselves from the eyes of the adult public and 
police.  She depicts these interventions as a form of surveillance promoting self-discipline 
and outlines two main aims in these interventions: removing youth altogether from the 
carpark or controlling the behaviour of youth at the carpark through self-control: 
Nelson Bays area controller inspector Jim Wilson and a group of community 
representatives have looked at ways to curb the number of problems in the carpark. 
They have made several recommendations, including closing the toilets, cutting back 
vegetation and increasing video surveillance and lighting.  
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13) 
Authors also described interventions operating through public (e.g. the council and police) 
and private (e.g. the family) institutions of governance38 and authority.  In this context, public 
institutions of governance, or authority, worked in a dual role of information gathering and 
crime control.  This occurred in a reciprocal manner where the information gathered 
(knowledge) about youth crime verified and provided reasoning for coercive and/or intrusive 
interventions.  The following extract from an academic conference paper shows this, where 
Robin Moore describes, or gives, a contradictory role to the youth advocate.  The given 
name of the role implies that they are advocating for the needs and rights of young people, 
but, in the context of this extract, Moore constructs them as information gatherers who 
identify trouble spots for youth workers and police officers.  Other information gatherers are 
council “park officers” and council “noise control” officers.  As such, Moore implies that the 
problems youth pose are of, and stem from, congregation (at homes or in parks):   
On Friday nights the three Youth Workers and the Police Youth Liaison Officer 
undertake patrols in the Central City, focusing on areas where young people tend to 
congregate.  They will also travel to suburban areas if things are quiet in town.  
Sometimes during the week the Council’s Youth Advocate gets to hear of a particular 
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 Foucault (1977, esp. pp.195-228), labeled this form of power ‘panoptic power’.  This concept brings together 
ideas of surveillance and self-discipline.  It shows that there is a complex relationship between power and the self, 
where power is invisible and capillary-like and the subject is self-conscious of being surveyed under the ‘gaze’ of 
power and, therefore, engages in self discipline.   
38
 I use the word ‘governance’ in its simplest sense to refer to the institutional practices in society that enable that 
society to function with minimal disorder.  In effect, I use governance to refer to practices of authority that enable 
social stability.  Often these practices incorporate ideology and are not overtly authoritarian although there can be 
elements of authoritarianism such as law enforcement. 
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suburban location that is causing concern.  This information is passed to the team to 
check out on Friday night should time and circumstances permit.  The information 
received by the Youth Advocate tends to come via Council channels – parks officers, 
and noise control being two examples.  Sometimes elected members contact the 
Youth Advocate directly when constituents complain about behaviour in a particular 
area.  
(Moore, 2002, p.4) 
In constructions of normal but threatening deviance, writers constructed the institution of the 
family as a site of blame and intervention.  They argued that families were sites of 
governance in which parents took responsibility for the surveillance of their children.  The 
following extract from a media magazine article illustrates this argument for the governance 
role of families.  The interviewed subject argues that the causes of crime in society are 
associated with parents not “controlling their children”.  Additionally, and connected to this, 
he also associates youth deviance with general changes in society, particularly a lowering in 
“supervision” which, he argues, has reduced the development of self-discipline and ‘respect’ 
for those in positions of governance and control, such as the police.  The interviewee 
suggests that the “Armed Forces” might be a way to re-instil self-discipline: 
Dennis Sprague (82), retired: ‘Parents are not controlling their children as much as 
they should.  You get good families and bad families.  It doesn’t matter how rich or 
poor they are but I don’t think there’s enough supervision these days.  We used to be 
more afraid of the policeman in my day.  I think maybe young people should go into 
something like the Armed Forces to teach them a bit of discipline’.    
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25) 
Hence, through arguing for interventions into the deviance of the threatening adolescent, 
authors positioned the youth as a ‘target’ and object of power.  As such, the necessary 
authorities in a society (including parents) ‘dealt’ with young people.  However, as the above 
extract shows there were times when authors did not directly associate the deviant 
behaviour of youth with young people themselves, or even their environment; instead, 
authors questioned the changes in society and linked deviance to such changes. 
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In a very small number of media articles (two articles (Dekker, 2002; M. Tait, 2002a; M.Tait, 
2002b39) looked directly at social changes whilst others included some reference to social 
change), writers explored changes in the family, education, and society as possible reasons 
for youth crime.  When this happened, writers attempted to explore and investigate whether 
society or youth in general was corrupted.  The opening quote to a feature article from a 
newspaper provides an example of this type of questioning.  Dekker gives a romanticised 
construction to young people through references to innocence and experimentation within 
the activity of play – “kids who skateboard and learn their maths and play on computers” and 
                                                    
39
 The two articles from Maggie Tait are, essentially, the same articles in two different newspapers. 
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children of “trick or treat age”.  However, this childhood has been corrupted which has, in 
turn, led to violent young people.  She further suggests that the causes of this corruption 
could be in society – some “playback for some creeping national deficiency” and “a society 
rotten at birth”.  Dekker goes on to suggest that this problem is far worse than could be 
imagined – the innocence displayed in the faces of Bailey Kurariki Junior and Kararaina 
Makere Te Rauna can be also seen in the faces of the “kids next door” and no adult is 
immune from the effects of child violence: 
Peach-skinned Bailey Junior Kurariki killed at 12, Kararaina Makere Te Rauna at 14. 
Their faces are too young to be giveaways for the violence that festered and flared 
and struck out.  
They look disturbingly like the kids next door, like kids who skateboard and learn their 
maths and play on computers.  
Are our children worse than they used to be?  Is this the onset of a wave of hideous 
child crime, payback for some creeping national deficiency?  Who will be the next 
person going happily about their business to be belted over the head and murdered 
for nothing?  Kurariki and Te Rauna were not alone.  Other kids were there at the kill.   
Are we becoming a society rotten at birth where doors need to be locked not just  
against ingrained criminals but children of trick-or-treat age?.     
(Dekker, 2002, p.F1) 
Within texts highlighting that youth deviance may be a social creation, authors focused on 
young people being children and within the stage of childhood.  As such, they discussed the 
assumed innocence (or as shown in the above extract, a corrupted innocence) and the 
malleability and vulnerability of children to the environments around them.  Hence, although 
these young people posed a threat to society, authors positioned them as an effect of 
malleability and vulnerability.  The following extract from a media feature article shows this.  
In this example, Maggie Tait uses quotes from a sociology lecturer to locate the causes of 
youth offending in technological-social developments and the young person’s own 
vulnerability and malleability.  Rather than being adolescents or youth, she describes these 
young people as “very young”, “kids” and “young teenagers”.  She further positions them as 
objects or effects of technology and argues that exposure to violent video games promotes 
self identification with violent “heroes” and then mimicry.  This process builds on the 
malleability of young children and “takes a large portion of the blame”.  This extract finishes 
with the dismissal of the expert’s argument by a former practitioner who suggests that some 
people have attributed too much blame to society and technology: 
Canterbury University senior sociology lecturer Greg Newbold said there was no 
significant increase in violent crime but, while up-to-date police figures are 
unavailable, he thought there seemed to be a greater number of youth involved.  
‘There appears to have been an increase in the incidence of very young people 
committing very serious offences.’   
He blamed exposure to violence in computer games, videos, and other media.  ‘I think 
kids are growing up a lot quicker now and becoming a lot more sophisticated.’  
He said children and young teenagers listen to hip hop music with extremely violent 
lyrics.  
‘They begin to identify with these violent images and then some kids start acting them 
out and I think that takes a large portion of the blame.’  
Some music and videos presented people behaving violently as heroes, which 
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encouraged bad behaviour, he said.  
‘There’s vivid violent and sexual images transmitted through those (media) that are 
easily accessible to kids and it becomes mundane to them and some kids are acting it 
out.’  
However, Mr Scott [former youth lawyer] disagreed.  ‘I think it’s rubbish.  It’s easy to 
blame -- let’s blame television this week.  It’ll be the music next week and gracious me 
it’ll be the funny clothes they wear after that’.  
(M. Tait, 2002a, p.A7) 
In general, authors using societal conditions in their argument tended to describe the 
normally-deviant young person as an effect of societal development.  In a way, this mimicked 
the theories of G.S. Hall (1905) who associated the period of adolescence with the storm 
and stress experienced in the development of modern society.   
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Authors constructed abnormal deviance on ideas of normal developmental outcomes.  In 
effect, they did not construct abnormal deviance on developmental theories or ideas of 
adolescence.  This was apparent even when an author used a knowledge of developmental-
psychology.  In contrast, in constructions of normal deviance in young people authors drew 
upon ideas of adolescent development and childhood.  By doing this, they were able to 
differentiate the behaviour of adolescents apart from adults.  In this context, they constructed 
young people with references to childhood and the traits assumed universal in children, such 
as, vulnerability and malleability. 
This meant that authors did not construct young people as autonomous individuals – a 
position limited to fully developed adults – instead, they constructed young people as 
vulnerable and malleable to the influences of society, communities, and peer groups.  
Authors argued that practitioners could use this vulnerability in interventions to encourage 
positive development and responsibility.  Hence, even though these young people appeared 
to exercise more ‘agency’ over their actions than their counterparts (the abnormally-deviant 
youth), their development was still a process in effect (like that for the abnormally-deviant), a 
process over which authors constructed them as having no control. 
Consequently, like the abnormally-deviant youth, normally-deviant youth were dependent on 
adults and adult-based institutions for their development.  Even though their behaviour was 
symptomatic of a ‘healthy’ developmental stage, these young people still needed adults and 
adult society and depending on the threat they posed to society, authors described intrusive 
(high threat), such as surveillance and curfews, or non-intrusive (high vulnerability) 
interventions, such as FGCs, designed to promote responsibility and autonomy.  In these 
interventions, adults could exercise power over the young person. 
Finally, authors did not construct young people as being able to exercise power or resistance 
properly or in an adult-like manner.  Like the construction of abnormal deviance, they used 
ideas of development and risk to position the normally-deviant young person as ‘powerless’ 
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to the influences on their physical, emotional, and psychological development.  Authors even 
implied that the threatening youth, who appeared to be exercising power, was reacting 
against the uncontrollable changes in his/her developing body.  As such, as in constructions 
of abnormal deviance, authors did not locate any motivation for deviance within the young 
person and, further, did not fully acknowledge the complex power relationship between youth 
and adults/adult society.  In the following chapters, I explore this further by examining the 
associations between developmental knowledge, risk knowledge, and youth deviance.  In 
effect, I present the analysis to the findings of these last two chapters. 
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The New Zealand Herald can reveal that BJ had been running riot for years before the 
killing - terrorising, beating and robbing other children, encouraging friends to wag 
school, shoplifting, tagging, sniffing glue and smoking cannabis.  
It seemed there was nothing his family, education and welfare agencies or police 
could do to stop his out-of-control behaviour.  Until now, he was never charged with a 
crime because children under 14 can be charged only with murder and manslaughter.  
Police have scotched defence suggestions that BJ was just following along with his 
older friends.  They say he would often be the ringleader, encouraging older boys to 
follow him, and that he was easily the most experienced criminal of those on trial for 
the Choy murder.    
'He wasn't scared of anything,' says Senior Constable Len Johnson of Papakura, who 
dealt regularly with BJ over a two-year period from 1999.  'He was just so gung-ho, he 
would go in first with no fear and without thinking.  Once he loses his rag he's just 
overcome, he's overwhelmed, he just can't control himself.'  
Mr Johnson says he could hardly believe it when he took the boy to do community 
work one Saturday last year and he began picking a fight with a 16-year-old over a 
pie.  'He was just causing havoc'.  
(Wall, 2002, p.A8, media context, focus article) 
So far, I have discussed developmental knowledge as one of the key discourses surrounding 
youth development.  However, developmental knowledge is a contextual knowledge – it is 
not devoid of context and is not fully objective.  Indeed, developmental knowledge is an adult 
knowledge constructed, in the main, by middle-class adult experts (often men) to explain the 
phenomenon of youth and adolescence.  Developmental knowledge is also a knowledge of 
division and social control.  It allows adult society to divide and define the normal and the 
abnormal in order to dissipate and control any threat young people may pose to a society’s 
stability. 
In this analysis, I take as a starting point Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (2002) argument about 
‘western’ knowledge.  Smith argues that academics and writers often present ‘western’ 
history (a knowledge developed through European-Anglo-American traditions and in 
European-Anglo-American institutions) as the accurate and true history of development.  
Often academics refer to particular knowledges as, not only ‘Truth’, but universal and 
applicable to all people.  Developmental knowledge is one of those knowledges.  Often, as 
teachers of development, we are encouraged to present developmental psychology as 
truthful and universal and we are encouraged to see development in stages from childhood 
to adulthood.  Hence, I would like to use the following chapters as an opportunity to critique 
this knowledge by looking at its roots and the events that led to its conception in industrial 
countries and in contemporary industrial countries – those countries we tend to call 
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‘western’.  In doing this, I may miss out the stories and perspectives of the ‘others’ in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand and other countries.  However, missing out these voices is not an 
effect of my analysis – instead, it is a reflection of the texts I analysed and the types of 
knowledges the authors drew upon.  In 2002, authors did not draw upon diverse voices, 
knowledges, and opinions in constructing an argument about youth deviance. 
In this chapter, I provide a contextual analysis of the use of developmental knowledge in 
industrial societies and in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  Using the texts as a starting point, I 
explore the relationship between contemporary industrial historical developments and the 
rise of particular knowledges about childhood and adolescence.  I discuss how early 
applications of developmental knowledge allowed for the control of young people’s activities 
and opportunities.  I also look at the local application of developmental knowledge in the 
political and social contexts of Aotearoa/New Zealand.  However, before I start this 
discussion, I will return to an examination of context and knowledge.   
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Provide appropriate interventions as early as possible  
Early intervention in offending behaviour has the potential to be much more effective 
over the long term.  In youth justice terms this means both a focus on the youngest 
offenders and the earliest/first interactions with the youth justice system.  It also 
implies some assessment and targeting to ensure that the appropriate level and type 
of intervention is available ‘the first time round’.   
(Child, Youth and Family, 2002, p.7, government context, strategy document) 
To understand the relationship between knowledge and context, it is necessary to return to 
some of the theoretical and methodological ideas I presented in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 2, I 
described how we apply knowledge within a social context to develop a social understanding 
or ‘truth’.  I explained how we use this understanding to position different social groups.  In 
effect, when we use knowledge, we apply power.  
When we apply knowledge in dividing practices, we do not position all individuals as the 
‘same’; rather, we tend to apply an ‘us’ and ‘them’ division.  In effect, individuals and groups 
tend to apply knowledge in a struggle to control the other.  This struggle for control occurs in 
social and ideological contexts and it often becomes apparent in moments of social and/or 
ideological instability.  This necessarily may not be a causal relationship as traces of a social 
truth may preclude any instability.  However, it is possible that, at moments of instability, 
those in social institutions attempt to explain, examine, and control any instability through 
specific knowledges aimed at positioning and controlling deviant groups.  Figure 2 on the 
following page illustrates this relationship between knowledge, context, and control. 
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Figure 2:  Social Understanding in Contexts 
In one sense, it is possible to describe the relationship between knowledge and social 
control as ‘hegemonic’ (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977) as it involves one group applying 
knowledge through ideology to control another group.  To verify this further, there can also 
be moments in which the controlled group accepts the dominant ideology as ‘Truth’.  
However, as I will show later, there are moments in which ‘subordinate’ groups do not, or 
may not, fully accept a dominant ideology – they resist.  In this sense, a group can never 
fully apply a knowledge to assume total control because, in knowledge, there are always 
moments of contradiction where the ‘other’ cannot be totally defined or determined (Laclau, 
1994).  It is not a relationship of pure hegemony between the dominant and subordinate, 
rather it is a relationship of struggle.  Control and struggle are evident in relationships 
between adult society and young people.  
In an understanding of youth deviance, adults often apply development and risk knowledge 
to control youth.  As I will show in these next two chapters, adults have applied these 
knowledges over the past two-hundred years.  Even in this, the reality is, they have not fully 
controlled and stopped youth deviance through applying these knowledges.  Instead, at 
some point, youth have, and still are, resisting and struggling against these knowledges of 
control.  Despite this struggle, many adults (especially in authority) still attempt to define and 
control youth through knowledge.  Central to this is the development of a knowledge-specific 
language. 
A knowledge-specific language is central to any knowledge and practice of social control.  
When we use a knowledge it tends to make ‘sense’ when we use a language, which embeds 
the knowledge in the present and connects the knowledge to the past (Foucault, 1972a).  In 
this way, we can use a knowledge to present a ‘new’ or ‘developed’ truth without making it 
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too ‘new’ or too ‘different’.  When we use developmental knowledge, we tend to apply a 
language focused on current scientific knowledges as well as popular metaphors and 
proverbs. 
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Which gets us back to the quotation at the beginning of this article [To plan for a year, 
plant a rice paddy field; to plan for a decade, plant a forest; but to plan for a 
generation, nurture youth - Indian proverb].  The role of social workers is a pivotal and 
responsible one.  Yours is the chance to help fire ‘the best shot’ on behalf of the 
community.  There is no more challenging yet rewarding task than to nurture youth, 
especially youth at risk of offending.  
(Becroft, 2002, p.3, government context, official publication) 
Developmental knowledge is a blend of both expertise and commonsense.  Many of the 
commonsense ideas presented by New Zealand authors in 2002 about youth crime came 
from theories of expertise.  However, the ‘original’ developmental theorists also drew upon 
other expertise and commonsense knowledge evident in their period of history.  As such, we 
should not assume developmental knowledge as the ‘Truth’ of youth deviance bestowed 
upon us through scientific truth.  Rather, we should understand that the power of 
developmental knowledge comes through the blending of commonsense logic and scientific 
claims.  When we use developmental knowledge, we use expertise and commonsense in a 
language of liminality where we describe the young person as being in a moment of 
becomingness and development. 
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… babies don’t commit crime, so what makes an originally-good kid turn bad? 
(Carnachan, 2002, p.51, media context, current affairs article) 
Delinquent youths have long been the target of intervention programmes, not least 
because of the negative outcomes they likely face (Borduin, 1999).   
(Milne, Chalmers, Waldie, Darling, & Poulton, 2002, p.191, academic context, journal 
article) 
Key Focus Area 3: Early Intervention  
Objective: To pro-actively create well being in families and whnau through the 
provision and support of appropriate interventions  
Outcomes: Desired outcomes include the healthy development and socialisation of 
young children, preventing risk-factors from accumulating and interactively 
cumulatively strengthening protective factors, preventing youth offending, and cost 
efficiencies.   
(Ministry of Justice, 2002c, p.7, government context, action plan) 
Reflecting the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, when adults construct texts, that use 
developmental knowledge, they focus on the liminality of youth.  That is, they see 
adolescence as a time of in-betweeness where the young person becomes an adult.  These 
adults use ideas of childhood vulnerability and adolescent in-betweeness to reinforce a 
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position of dependence between young people and adults.  Through focusing on 
developmental outcomes, many adults tend to see young people as lacking adult abilities 
and responsibilities.  This was evident in 2002 when New Zealand authors constructed 
abnormally-deviant youth as never reaching adulthood or as lacking any experience of 
adolescence.  These youth were trapped in a liminal childhood.  In contrast, authors 
constructed normally-deviant youth as engaging in their adolescent liminality and developing 
progressively towards adulthood.   
What we see here is that developmental outcomes are adult-defined outcomes.  Often these 
outcomes are connected with productivity and whether or not the young person becomes an 
adult contributing to society (i.e. a taxpayer) (White & Wyn, 2004).  This explains why many 
commentators connect any abnormal or pathological ‘developmental’ outcome to lower 
socio-economic levels.  In this sense, they construct and connect deviance and pathology to 
developmental outcomes in marginal, often lower socio-economic, groups.  However, in 
2002, authors did not explicitly mention higher socio-economic levels as desired ‘healthy’ 
outcomes.  Instead, they associated unhealthy and pathological developmental outcomes, 
and deviance, with poverty.  They focused on these outcomes with a scientific language of 
development and a popular language of metaphoric pathways. 
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… recently there have been attempts made to devise statistical methods for 
classifying subjects into groups based on their developmental trajectories.   
(Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.161, academic context, journal article) 
Specifically, the model assumes that the offending trajectory of each group is 
described by a series of T parameters atj where atj denotes the probability that a 
member of the group j will be observed to offend at time t.   
(Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, p.161, academic context, journal article) 
Key Focus Area 2: Information  
Objective: To develop consistent and comprehensive information about youth 
offending by children and young people to support effective interventions, policy and 
practice  
Outcomes: Desired outcomes include the ability to track a child or young person’s 
progress through the youth justice system, compatibility of data between agencies and 
between the youth and adult justice systems, and regular and high quality evaluation 
of the response to youth offenders to inform youth justice practice.   
(Ministry of Justice, 2002c, p.4, academic context, action plan, my emphasis) 
Statistics and references to research inform a scientific language of development.  Through 
using a statistical language, developmental researchers reinforce an idea of becomingness 
in a young person’s development by focusing on ‘cause and effect’ or the scientifically 
discovered consequences of abnormal risk factors.  In such a way, these researchers can 
develop an objective expert truth around youth deviance, which they validate through a 
commonsense logic of what makes “developmental sense” (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & 
Horwood, 2002a, p.428).  In Aotearoa/New Zealand, researchers and others have used 
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statistical analysis about youth development in censuses (e.g. Statistics New Zealand, 2002; 
Statistics New Zealand & Ministry of Youth Affairs, 1998), cross-sectional research (e.g. 
Adolescent Health Research Group, 2003; L. T. Smith et al., 2002), and longitudinal 
research (e.g. Fergusson & Horwood, 2002; Fergusson, Horwood, & Nagin, 2000; Moffitt, 
1993, 1994).  Furthermore, New Zealand developmental researchers have extensively used 
longitudinal research to inform ideas of youth deviance. 
In particular, the Christchurch (Fergusson, 1998) and Dunedin (Silva & Stanton, 1996) 
longitudinal studies have followed, recorded, and measured the lives of young people from 
birth to adulthood.  Researchers in both of these developmental studies have focused on 
pathological outcomes for young people.  These studies have been internationally 
recognised, particularly, in their discussion of developmental factors associated with 
abnormal and normal offending.  Both pieces of research continued to inform policy and 
research in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2002 (e.g. Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social 
Development, 2002; Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and reflected many of the ideas of 
normal and pathological youth development evident in contemporary industrial societies.  In 
2002, New Zealand writers used ideas of developmental trajectories along with popular 
notions of youth development found in metaphors and popular proverbs. 
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There are a number of programmes in New Zealand that attempt to rehabilitate adult 
offenders back into the community.  Few try to address the root of the problem – how 
can we stop young offenders going down the slippery slope that leads to a life of 
crime?   
(Woolf, 2002, p.41, media context, journal article) 
We tend to use metaphors and references to popular proverbs to embed an idea into a 
commonsense logic or truth.  In 2002, New Zealand authors used metaphors in an attempt 
to illustrate the naturalness and normality of developmental becomingness.  Those writing 
about youth deviance described young people as ‘moving’ into adulthood where they were 
on a “journey” (Bingham, 2002, p.B5), “road” (P. Taylor, 2002b; Welham, 2002, p.4), 
‘pathway’ (Carruthers, 2002; Kilmister & Baxter, 2002a, 2002b; Welham, 2002), or 
“trajectory” (Fergusson & Horwood, 2002, throughout).  Authors described deviance, through 
the use of metaphors, as a divergence from a normal pathway where the young abnormally-
deviant person was “wayward” (Humphreys, 2002b, p.17; Mirams, 2002, p.B5; Mulu & 
Nealon, 2002, p.25; Wellwood, 2002, p.A1) “off-track” (Humphreys, 2002b, p.17), “off the 
rails” (Dekker, 2002, p.F1; Humphreys, 2002a, p.17, 2002b, p.17; Mulu & Nealon, 2002, 
p.25; P. Taylor, 2002b, p.C2), the “product” (McIntyre, 2002a, 15.00min) of a pathological 
family nurturing, or on a family “cycle” of deviance (Carruthers, 2002, pp.2,5; S. Smith, 2002, 
p.13).   
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Additionally, writers used proverbs or references to other historical eras to reinforce a 
commonsense conception of the developing young person within a nurturing environment.  
In doing this, they produced, reproduced, and reinforced the developmental-psychological 
conception of youth becomingness and vulnerability.  In such a way, they presented 
developmental-psychology as a natural, universal, and timeless knowledge inherent to 
humankind – a logical knowledge of commonsense.  In 2002, this knowledge appeared in 
the analysed texts as objective and devoid of context.  However, contemporary industrial 
societies have developed developmental ideas over time and in response to moments of 
social instability. 
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The existence of a separate court for young offenders is relatively recent in Western 
legal systems.  Historically, young offenders were convicted and punished as adults in 
adult courts, and age offered no exoneration.  The justice system was characterised 
by the ‘Classical’ approach where crime was seen as a rational act of free-will.  
Punishment consequently focused on deterrence rather than reform and was applied 
equally to adults and children.    
However, in the latter part of the 19th century there was an acknowledgement that 
children are uniquely vulnerable and a subsequent move towards child-centred, 
welfare-based treatment ...  The existing court practice of granting pardons to young 
offenders was soon formalised in English Common Law through the doli incapax rule, 
(inability to do wrong).  Children under seven were given immunity, and those between 
the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of doing wrong unless there 
was evidence to the contrary.  Children over the age of fourteen continued to be tried 
and convicted as adults.   
Many countries also established reformatories in recognition of the need to keep 
young offenders separate from adult criminals.   
(Watt, 2002, para. 1-2. part 1, government context, web page) 
The youth justice system, in contemporary industrial society, is relatively new in a historical 
sense.  In countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, it was not until the late 1800s that a separate and independent youth 
justice system appeared (S. Brown, 1998; Jensen & Rojek, 1998; Watt, 2002).  However, I 
am not going to focus on this history in this chapter; rather, I am going to look at a parallel 
history that has informed the social control of young people across the family, school, social 
welfare system, and youth justice system – that of developmental knowledge.  As I have 
shown so far, we use developmental knowledge to understand the types of deviance 
considered normal and abnormal in young people.  We also use this knowledge to inform 
interventions into deviance. 
Philippe Aries’ (1962) examination of the history of childhood and adolescence provides a 
good analysis on the expansion of developmental psychology as a social truth.  According to 
Aries, children have always been a physical reality of adult society.  However, before the 
1600s, philosophers saw children as little adults.  During the 1600s (the time of the 
Enlightenment), philosophers and other adults became interested in childhood as a discrete 
separate period of life, separate to adulthood.  They saw adults (particularly men) as being 
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connected to culture and the intellectual development of society.  In contrast, they 
associated children with nature, naiveté, ignorance, and innocence (Hendrick, 1990). 
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Self-report studies tell us that most children and young people do something illegal at 
least once while they are growing up.  A number of New Zealand studies would 
certainly support this (Moffitt & Silva, 1986; Fergusson, Horwood & Lynskey, 1993; 
MRL Research Group, 1993; Moffitt et al., 1994; Maxwell & Carroll-Lind, 1996).  For 
example, the study for the New Zealand police by the MRL Research Group (1993) 
found that more than half (56%) of the children aged 10-14 knew someone who had 
broken the law in the past 12 months - mainly this was shoplifting.  They were also 
asked if they had committed offences.  Just under half (46%) said that they 
themselves had, though only 6% admitted to shoplifting and 11% admitted to drinking 
alcohol without their parents’ permission.   
(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a p.204, academic context, book chapter) 
The European romantic conception of childhood was problematic, as adults could not clearly 
explain childhood deviance through this conception.  To counter this, adult thinkers applied 
an idea of childhood ignorance to argue that, although children were essentially innocent, 
they were also ignorant of cultured society (Aries, 1962).  Hence, they did not conceptualise 
deviance in childhood as purposeful and decisive behaviour; instead, they constructed 
deviance as ‘naughty’ and experimental behaviour in which children engaged in order to 
learn the rules of adult society.  In 2002, authors in Aotearoa/New Zealand continued to use 
these ideas to explain normal deviance. 
However, through applying an idea of ignorance these authors could not completely resolve 
the contradiction between a perceived innocence and an observed deviance.  At some point, 
they attempted to explain deviance through discussing the predisposition children could have 
to evilness (c.f. Hendrick, 1990).  Often this was evident when they engaged within the 
psychological debate of nature verses nurture.  However even in this, when authors 
discussed the differing influences, they expressed caution about associating childhood with 
essential evilness.  Instead, they tended to refer to the essential vulnerability and malleability 
of all children to social influences rather than the genetic makeup of the child.   
Hence, those writing about youth deviance assumed that children were not born evil … but 
that they became evil.  This was particularly evident in constructions of abnormal deviance.  
Using an argument of the malleability of the child and overtly positioning the child as 
vulnerable, writers were able to disguise and hide the social need for the control of an 
explicit risk or threat posed by a child.  They were then able to show institutional 
interventions as being in the child’s interest rather than a social interest.  Furthermore, in the 
texts analysed, writers applied an understanding of childhood malleability and abnormal 
deviance to describe the young person as either a child or an adult.  They did not connect 
adolescence to malleability and abnormal deviance; instead, they saw malleability being 
limited to childhood with deviant adult status being determined at the end of childhood, not in 
the liminal stage of adolescence.   
 90 
/ 
,$ # 	
0
He [a former principal youth court judge] says many factors contribute to youth crime, 
among them a child’s experiences at home as well as alcohol and mental disorders.  
‘Often these people have already been robbed of their childhood,’ laments Mick.  ‘I 
think by the time they come before the court, it is too late’.   
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.24, media context, magazine article) 
Philippe Aries (1962) associates the 1800s with the cementation of a romantic construction 
of childhood.  He argues the middle classes applied this construction as a form of social 
control as they struggled for social stability in a time of change.  As industrial societies 
changed during the industrial revolution so did the family, the school, and the ways adults 
defined and understood children and young people.  During this time, as the demand for 
urban mass labour increased, families gradually moved from farms to cities.  As this 
occurred, the family was reconceptualised.   
Governing groups in industrial society connected this new concept of family to childhood and 
saw the family as the place in which children were nurtured and socialised into productive 
adults (Hultqvist, 1998).  That is, families became places of governance with governing 
groups establishing the concept of the self-governing family as the desired norm (Donzelot, 
1979).  However, this concept was a class concept where the governing middle-class 
depicted and represented the middle-class family as desired and normal and other ‘poorer’ 
families as pathological (Aries, 1962). 
The governing middle-class constructed the children of working-class families as a social 
problem and threat.  Whereas the middle-classes saw their own families nurturing and 
socialising children, they saw poorer families failing to achieve this.  In reality, poorer 
children were not ‘children’ because, during the industrial revolution, they continued to be 
small adults working in industries.  If these ‘children’ were not working for money, they were 
engaging in acts of criminal deviance in order to get money.  Rather than seeing this as a 
possible implication of social change, the middle-classes applied psychological knowledge to 
locate this problem within the poor family.  They further implemented practices to control 
development and deviance through a nurturing socialisation occurring in compulsory and 
mass schooling (Walkerdine, 1992). 
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Hodgson [a teaching principal at a residential centre] is well aware of public perception 
of her students -- reaction to her role ranges from, ‘that must be a challenging job’ to 
‘they should just take those kids outside and shoot them’ – and she does not want to 
give an impression that the students’ offending is ignored.   
‘We are ever mindful of their crimes.  I know what they’ve done, but our job is to 
educate them.  In the end they are children and I couldn’t do my job if I thought they 
were all bad.’.   
(Andrew, 2002, p.D5, media context, focus article) 
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During the early 1800s, middle-class women attempted to address child labour through 
protesting and philanthropic services (Donzelot, 1979).  These women argued that industries 
exploited children and that society needed to remove these children in order to allow them to 
develop into productive citizens.  To effectively argue for change, these women stressed, 
and assumed, a developmental difference between children and adults evident through 
universal ideas of childhood vulnerability, malleability, naiveté, and innocence (Burman, 
1994; Hendrick, 1990).  In this way, all children were constructed as dependent upon adults 
and lacking the adult traits needed to participate in society.  Children depended upon adults 
for the protection of their innocence and for the ‘positive’ nurturing of their malleability.  This 
positioning of difference between children and adults paralleled the introduction of child 
labour protection laws in contemporary industrial societies (Aries, 1962; Burman, 1994; 
Hendrick, 1990). 
However, these early child protection and welfare laws exacerbated the problem and threat 
of poor children in society (Donzelot, 1979).  Removing children from the workplace made 
working-class families poorer.  Consequently, incidences of child abuse and neglect 
alongside child crime rates increased.  Working-class children became an object that 
‘society’ needed to control.  In particular, their malleability and vulnerability posed a 
developmental risk to society. 
Mass schooling was introduced and enforced in industrial societies as an answer to this 
problem (Aries, 1962).  Mass schooling provided a space for the education and socialisation 
of masses into productive individuals.  Educationalists and other thinkers began to 
conceptualise mass schooling as a countering influence of the pathologically poor family and 
taking advantage of the developmental position of the child.  In effect, the governing middle-
class introduced the education system as a substitute parent where teachers ‘nurtured’ the 
developing naïve and innocent child and ‘moulded’ them into adults.  Educational thinkers 
used psychological concepts to inform this ‘new’ pedagogy.  It made ‘sense’ to these 
thinkers as it reflected and drew upon the romantic ideas of childhood from the earlier 
Enlightenment. 
In 2002, New Zealand authors continued to use education and schooling as ‘solutions’ to 
youth deviance.  However, because deviance existed beyond schooling and continued to 
exist since industrial societies introduced mass schooling in the 1800s, they also argued for 
interventions that would occur earlier in the problematic youth’s life.  According to these 
authors ‘early interventions’ would assist the role of mass education in nurturing and 
fostering the ‘positive’ or, rather, productive development of young people.  Education and 
early intervention would address the problems posed by the abnormally-deviant child.  Not 
only would education address the problem of the deviant child, but as it started to do in the 
late 19th century, education would also address the problem of adolescent deviance. 
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… an important issue in developmental psychopathology concerns the ways in which 
the effects of peer influence vary with age.  It is clear from the available developmental 
evidence that as youth people enter adolescence they undergo a period of heightened 
susceptibility to peer influence.  However, as young people enter young adulthood and 
establish greater personal autonomy it is likely that the influence of peer groups 
declines (Costanzo & Shaw, 1966).   
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.421, academic context, journal 
article) 
Near the end of the 19th century, many industrial societies went into economic depression.  
Again, the governing groups in these societies struggled to maintain control and ensure 
social stability.  It was during this time that a new problem and ‘underclass’ was discovered – 
the deviant and poor adolescent (Aries, 1962).  Before this, thinkers in industrial societies 
saw the transition between childhood and adulthood as a pure and sudden biological 
change.  However, near the beginning of the 20th century, they added a social dimension to 
this transition as they used psychology to explain the new problem and phenomenon of 
adolescence.  So, like childhood, adolescence did, and does, have a biological dimension 
(Griffin, 1993).  Also reflecting childhood, adolescence did, and does, have a historical 
context surrounding its conceptualisation in psychology and its application in education and 
other social control practices (Baken, 1971; Griffin, 1993).   
At the end of the 19th century, the emergence of adolescence did reflect the emergence of a 
group of people in-between childhood and adulthood.  Compulsory schooling in the 1800s 
meant that many, particularly male working-class, young people left school between 10- and 
12-years-of-age.  During the depression of the late 1800s, these young people found 
themselves in competition with experienced adult workers and, consequently, could not find 
employment.  The increased ‘youth’ crime rate in industrial countries was a possible effect of 
this condition (Aries, 1962; Shuker, 1987b).  Post-primary education was enforced in many 
industrial countries as a social control response to youth crime (Harker, 1990; Murphy, 1998; 
Shuker, 1987a, 1987b; Shuker, Openshaw, with Soler, 1990; Sturt, 1967; Walkerdine, 1992, 
1998).   
Alongside these events, psychological theorists, such as G.S. Hall (1905) developed a 
conception of adolescence as a developmental ‘in-betweeness’ and time of transition where 
young people ‘became’ adults by ‘shaking off’ their childhood traits.  The post-primary school 
was conceptualised as the site where this transformation would occur.  However, schools 
bringing young people together en masse created another problem where young people 
could affect and influence each other.  In this way, many adults began to see the peer group 
as a threat intensified by young people’s developmental closeness to adults (they were 
physically bigger and stronger than children).  In the texts analysed, authors still reflected on 
this threat by discussing the effects of ‘peer pressure’ and ‘anti-social’ peer groups on a 
young person’s development.  
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In the 1800s, adults in authority did not just focus on the peer group but also the male youth 
and the deviance of male youth.  In a way, this reflected the reality of the late 1800s as 
deviant young people did tend to be male (e.g. Shuker, 1987b).  During this time, 
psychological theorists also focused on the development of male adolescents.  Indeed, even 
as a history of adolescence continued to develop throughout the 20th century, research, 
theories, and discussions focused on ‘normal’ outcomes, behaviours, and traits of male 
adolescents.  By 2002, writers in Aotearoa/New Zealand tended to assume that the youth 
they wrote about were essentially male.  They used this gendered concept to discuss the 
deviance of abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant youth. 
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Nelson Mayor Paul Matheson has already dismissed the idea of chaining off the 
carpark.  As far as he is concerned, no public area will be blocked off because of the 
actions of a small minority.   
He says he has been aware of the problems in the carpark since his election as mayor 
in 1998 but believes it is not a major issue.  
‘You are always going to have a bunch of highly strung young men playing territory 
games,’ he says.  ‘I think the problems are minor and it is something the police can 
handle.  We are going through a bad patch.’  
‘A group intent on causing trouble is going to do it no matter where they are.  We are 
talking about pea-brains who carry on and in the end they get caught and convicted’. 
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article) 
Although a knowledge about adolescence gained dominance at a time when there was a 
focus on working-class deviance, those using a knowledge of adolescence did not use it to 
focus necessarily on working-class youth.  Many of the developmental ideas that arose 
during the 20th century to explain the youth phenomenon tended to focus on ‘normal’ middle-
class youth whilst positioning ‘other’ young people as abnormal.  Theorists focused on 
developing theories, which gave a normalcy to an idea of adolescence.  
Aries (1962) describes the 20th century as the time of the adolescent where adults became 
obsessed with understanding the different and universal ‘nature’ of adolescents.  Aries 
shows this by focusing on the early developments of the 20th century where the ideas of G.S. 
Hall (1905) described adolescence as a time of uncontrollable development.  His ideas of 
storm and stress and the unpredictability of adolescent development reflected the instability 
of industrial societies as they moved into the 20th century.   
However, G.S. Hall (1905) based his theory on recapitulation theory.  This, in turn, posed an 
ethnicity dilemma (Lesko, 2001).  Industrial society used recapitulation theory to position 
Caucasians as civilised.  Other groups, in turn, would aspire to this position but would never 
really achieve it – they possessed a lack.  G.S. Hall replaced this Caucasian position with the 
position of adult.  This was a logical move at the time as it reflected the romantic ideas of 
children moving from nature to culture (or savage to civilised).  However, G.S. Hall implied in 
his theory that only the Caucasian child could become civilised; by applying recapitulation 
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theory, he trapped all other groups in uncivilised positions (Lesko, 2001).  Hence, young 
people from other ethnicities could never really become an autonomous civilised adult – 
human development knowledge would confine them in development as either a child or 
adolescent.  Although this was not explicitly evident in the 2002 texts analysed, it was 
evident on a covert level in discussions of ethnicity where writers associated young Mori 
and Pacific youth with abnormal and pathological outcomes (uncivilised).  In contrast, they 
described Pakeha children in a position of normalcy where they would outgrow deviance (to 
become civilised).  This is a highly problematic association and it gives evidence to the 
academic critique of Hall (Lesko, 2001) in which, the use of ‘western’ developmental 
knowledge continues to displace young indigenous and ethnic minority youth (c.f. L. T. 
Smith, 2002).  
Reflecting the events surrounding G.S. Hall’s (1905) theory, there were other moments of 
societal instability in the 20th century.  Further reflecting the time of G.S. Hall, youth deviance 
increased, and changes in youth behaviours occurred, in these times.  These changes, 
again, challenged the stability of adult society; and, theorists used developmental knowledge 
to incorporate these events into an idea of adolescent becomingness (Pearson, 1994).  In 
these theories, theorists continued to construct young people as lacking control over their 
own development and, therefore, needing and depending upon adults for ‘healthy’ 
development. 
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Youth Self Report (YSR).  This included 149 items which were subjected to a 
standardised summing and scoring protocol to yield three competency scales 
(activities, social and school) and seven problem behaviour scales (depression, 
unpopularity, somatic, identity, through to, delinquency and aggression) ... There was 
no ‘identity’ scale for females as the developers of the YSR found that principal 
component factor analysis yielded seven components for males (as listed) but only six 
for females (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1987).   
(Milne, et al., 2002, p.193, academic context, journal article) 
The depression and two world wars occurred across the first four decades of the 20th 
century.  Ideas of adolescence remained static over this period as governing groups in 
emerging contemporary industrial societies concentrated on maintaining internal stability and 
many young people, particularly men, were required to assist their countries.  The end of 
World War Two heralded a baby boom in many of these societies and a new consumer-
based market economy.  By the mid 1950s, the baby boomer generation had reached 
adolescence and adult thinkers began to use the word ‘youth’ to describe this generation 
(Muncie, 1999).   
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As the market economy developed, industries started to focus their products on the young 
(Stuart, 2004).  Young people took up this ‘opportunity’ and became consumers of the 
market society40.  However, not all young people had access to this new consumer society; 
those from minority groups with limited resources were also limited in their participation in 
society (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b).  Some of these young people engaged in deviant 
activities; and, although sociological thinkers attempted to focus on the contextual factors 
leading to this deviance (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b), psychological thinkers focused on 
the developmental difference of all young people (e.g. Erikson, 1968)41.   
Theories, such as Erikson’s (1968), associated adolescence with a stage of crisis where the 
young person engaged in developing an adult identity.  Developmental theorists, like 
Erikson, re-conceptualised young people’s engagement in consumer activities as 
experimentation with different identities.  In this construction, theorists positioned young 
people again as dependent upon adults for the development of a ‘healthy’ identity.  These 
theorists did not see young people’s behaviours as a reaction to societal change or as a 
purposeful goal-orientated activity; rather, they constructed their behaviours as an 
uncontrollable reaction to their psychological development.  This construction is still apparent 
in developmental constructions of normal youth deviance where researchers continue to see 
identity development as a key concept in adolescent development.  However, like G.S. Hall’s 
(1905) theory, Erikson’s ideas focused on the development of male middle-class white-
American youth.  Subsequently, there was a tendency for some people to assume that other 
young people (from other ethnicities, genders, socio-economic groups) could never fully 
achieve an autonomous identity.  These people associated the behaviour of these youth with 
pathology, not experimentation. 
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He [a youth social worker] is amazed at how long people stay in the carpark – some 
hanging around there for several hours.  
‘They hang out with their friends and let off some steam at the end of the day,’ he says 
‘They think they are bulletproof and they are risk-takers.  You have to understand that 
a lot of the people that hang out there have back-grounds of violence.  It has been a 
part of their lives so it is not such a shock for them as it would be for you or me’.  
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media focus, focus article) 
A further development of the idea of identity arose in the 1970s.  It was at this point a 
knowledge of risk merged with developmental knowledge.  I will provide an overview of these 
changes here but will expand upon this discussion in the next chapter.  In general, the 1970s 
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 Through engaging in consumer activities young people were able to experiment with a variety of identities and 
this had implications in how adults interpreted their engagement in identity construction.  Unfortunately, the ways 
young people took up this opportunity is not a focus of my thesis.  For some recent discussion of this see Tina 
Besley (2002), Jane Kenway & Elizabeth Bullen (2001), Sarah Thornton (1995) and Gill Valentine, Tracy Skelton & 
Deborah Chambers (1998). 
41
 Although the New Zealand context at the time differed to the contexts described by Anglo-American sociologists 
and psychologists, people in New Zealand drew upon this work in an attempt to understand the deviance of young 
people.  Like the United States of America and the United Kingdom, during the 1950s New Zealand went through a 
clear moral panic about the ‘rising’ deviance of young people (Shuker, Openshaw  with Soler, 1990). 
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was another period of economic and social instability in contemporary industrial societies in 
which technological and scientific risks such as a global oil crisis, a threat of nuclear warfare, 
and a collapse of the welfare state in many contemporary industrial countries threatened the 
stability of society (Beck, 1992).  During this time, those in positions of authority began to 
use a concept of ‘risk’ to capture and expand upon these global threats (Beck, 1992, 1999; 
Douglas, 1992).  Developmentalists also began to use the term to describe and define the 
behaviours and pathologies of young people.   
It was during this period that Elkind (1979) developed his theory of cognitive development to 
describe and discuss the reasons for the risk-taking behaviour of normal young people.  In a 
similar fashion to G.S. Hall (1905) and Erikson (1968), Elkind attempted to explain the 
manifesting behaviours of young people as an uncontrollable reaction to immature cognitive 
development.  Again, his theory positioned the male middle-class white-American youth as 
normal, and his theory conceptualised risk-taking behaviours as an adolescent expected 
norm.  In 2002, New Zealand authors continued to use this theory – particularly as a 
commonsense conception of youth.  Reflecting earlier theories, they associated a concept of 
adolescent risk taking with ‘normal’ male youth. 
For the abnormally-deviant youth, authors used a concept of being ‘at-risk’ and ‘a risk’.  
Through using a focus on risk, they used psychological knowledge in a way that mirrored the 
techno-scientific ideas of risk (c.f. Beck, 1992).  That is, through psychological knowledge, 
authors were able to identify human threats to social stability.  The association they made 
between psychology and risk was not new but had surfaced in the political developments of 
the 1980s. 
The idea of human risk emerged in the 1980s at the same time as the rise of neo-liberalism.  
The emergence of risk allowed for governing groups in society to control marginal groups 
within the social contexts of family and school.  By 2002, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, many 
people applied a knowledge of development and risk in policy and research to differentiate 
between normal and abnormal youth in order to control the pathology of the abnormal and to 
‘nurture’ the healthy development of the normal. 
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The youth offending strategy recognises that early intervention to deal with the causes 
of offending is more effective than trying to break entrenched patterns of offending 
later in life.  It also recognises that interventions are more effective when the various 
agencies involved are working well together.  The strategy therefore focuses on 
ensuring that interventions are made as early and as effectively as possible.   
(Dalmer, 2002, p.16, government context, official publication) 
During 2002, the New Zealand Government introduced two policies specifically with youth in 
mind.  Although both these strategies used developmental knowledge and attempted to 
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focus on the needs of youth, they were about two completely different groups of young 
people.  The Ministry of Youth Affairs developed the first strategy (the Youth Development 
Strategy Aotearoa).  This strategy focused on adults and institutions ‘fostering’ the healthy 
development of ‘all’ young people; however, a closer reading of this strategy suggests that 
these young people were generally ‘normal’.  The Ministries of Justice and Social Policy 
developed the second strategy (The Youth Offending Strategy).  This strategy focused on 
adults and institutions ‘controlling’ the development of ‘at-risk’ children and young people. 
The Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa was the more liberal of the two in that it 
attempted to ‘give’ youth freedom and autonomy over their own lives.  In contrast, The Youth 
Offending Strategy attempted to centralise state control over the behaviour of some youth 
and the environments in which they lived.  These strategies provide an interesting context to 
the New Zealand texts on youth crime published in 2002. 
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The aim of the Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa was to drive youth policy through a 
focus on human development knowledge.  The Strategy outlined six key principles of youth 
development, which emphasised the contexts in which development occurred, the factors 
that affected development and the role of academic research in developmental knowledge.  
From these principles, the Strategy encouraged an institutional relationship with youth that 
would support young people through their development.  
McLaren (2002) published a literature review after the Strategy to inform and enforce the 
Strategy’s recommendations.  McLaren investigated both human development theories and 
literature to identity the ways in which “good outcomes” (pp.7, 9, 11, 13) could be achieved 
for young people.  Although she focused on the ways young people could achieve positive 
development, she tended to look at the impact of negative factors on human development.  
For example, in looking at the importance of school success, she argued:  
Being involved in school, attending regularly, learning basic skills and acquiring basic 
qualifications are also important for well-being … Leaving school early without 
qualifications can result in employment difficulties … Young people who drop out 
usually feel rootless, hopeless and estranged from school, home  … there is also 
another group of ‘underachievers’ …   
(McLaren, 2002, p.29) 
Despite it being about positive development, McLaren (2002) had a stronger emphasis on 
risk in her review.  This was apparent in the number of times she talked about risk and 
protective factors.  In the index, she had 64 entries on risk in contrast to 10 entries on 
protective factors.  The language used in the review showed how it is difficult to create a 
positive construction of youth from human development – a knowledge that focuses on risk, 
abnormal development and pathology (c.f. Foucault, 1988; Griffin, 1993, 1996; Lesko, 
1996b, 2001; Wyn & White, 1997).   
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The Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa focused on building supportive relationships with 
youth so that positive development could be encouraged.  Like policies in other countries 
(such as Australia (White & Wyn, 2004)), it was a policy that employed ideas of development 
and participation to focus on the end-product of adolescence – adulthood.  In contrast, the 
Youth Offending Strategy focused on putting effective systems in place to reduce youth 
offending, to control the immediate behaviour of deviant youth, and to control developmental 
outcomes in the youth (Ministry of Justice, 2001). 
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The Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending was established in 2000 to perform two tasks:  
to produce a strategy that would address youth offending by improving practice in the youth 
justice sector and to foster a collaborative approach to address youth offending through 
interagency projects (Carruthers, 2002; Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002).  
These projects were in the areas of youth alcohol and drug abuse, education, mental health, 
recidivist offending, mentoring, and early intervention.   
The Youth Offending Strategy had links with several other developed Government policies 
including Action for Child and Youth Development (which combined Youth Development 
Strategy Aotearoa with the child equivalent Agenda for Children (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2002)) and Children Young People and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989.  
Consequently, like the Youth Development Strategy, psychological and developmental 
research42 extensively informed the Youth Offending Strategy.  Furthermore, the Strategy 
focused on the identification of risk and protective factors for young people, especially in the 
argument for early intervention.   
The Strategy endorsed the “streaming” (p.16), or dividing, of young people into different 
groups based upon risk and protective factors.  In such a way, practitioners could target 
interventions effectively and efficiently at a particular group of children to control their 
development.  This coincided with the development of a national ‘tracking’ database and an 
early intervention assessment tool to intervene in a child’s life at the earliest stage possible 
(Dalmer, 2002; Maxwell et al., 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2002c; Ministry of Justice & Ministry 
of Social Development, 2002). 
In addition to the use of human development knowledge, the Strategy argued for an 
interagency approach to the addressing of youth offending (Dalmer, 2002; Ministerial 
Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 
2002).  On one level, this involved closer links between Child, Youth and Family (CYF) and 
the New Zealand Police (NZ Police), on another level, this involved links between CYF, NZ 
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 Examples include Hema (2000, 2001a, 2001b), Fergusson (1998), McLaren (2000), Singh (2000), M. Brown 
(1999), Gray & Wilde (1999), Maxwell & Morris (1999), Ministry of Social Policy (2001a, 2001b) and Ministry of 
Justice (2001). 
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Police and the other agencies working with youth (including courts, health and education).  
This targeted approach to youth offending allowed for developmental knowledge to be put 
into practice as practitioners could identify and control young people across a number of 
institutional contexts.   
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Since children and youth are in the state of always-becomingness, they do not exist in 
the present, and therefore we can do what we want with them ... Here again is a 
similarity between adolescents and colonized peoples: they are described as wholly 
other, of a different time and a different psychological make-up.  
(Lesko, 1996b, p.469) 
The ways people have used developmental knowledge over the last two hundred years 
shows how they, in some way, have transferred economic and social instability in a society 
onto youth.  This is evident in the history of childhood and in the history of adolescence over 
the last century.  A struggle is evident here where governing groups in adult society have 
attempted to maintain stability and have attempted to do so by defining and controlling 
‘problematic’ groups.  In the case of contemporary industrial societies, this group has been 
youth.  This has particular implications for youth, which we can see through the policies of 
2002. 
The ways in which New Zealand society applied developmental knowledge in the Youth 
Development Strategy Aotearoa (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002) and the Youth Offending 
Strategy (Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002) highlight two key 
implications for young people.  First, governing groups in society tend to marginalise all 
young people through the understanding that they lack the ability to participate fully in 
society.  These people see young people as ignorant children, engaging in deviant or 
‘naughty’ behaviour as they learn the rules of society or as adolescents lacking any control 
over their developing adult body and engaging in risk behaviours as a part of an adolescent 
experience.  In this way, these adults use developmental knowledge to construct all young 
people as problems needing social control.  Consequently, by using this knowledge they 
position young people as powerless and dependent upon them.  So, governing groups use 
developmental knowledge as adequate reasoning for the social control of all young people.  
In strategies like the Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa, adults define and set 
parameters around youth participation.  
However, there is a second division of marginalisation.  In this division, those using 
developmental knowledge position different groups of young people as pathologically 
deviant.  In this positioning, adults do not use developmental knowledge to construct these 
young people as passing through a phase.  Instead, they use developmental knowledge to 
construct these young people as a childhood risk, which transforms into a pathological 
outcome on the onset of puberty.  In explanations of possible reasons for abnormal youth 
 100 
deviance, those using developmental knowledge ignore any social instability coinciding with 
an onset of youth deviance and locate the problem within the youth or the young person’s 
family.  During times of instability, governing groups have applied developmental knowledge 
as a tool of social control to overcome any challenge or problem marginalised groups pose 
to society.  In this way, developmental knowledge allow adults to project a fear of future 
instability onto youth and to regain some perceived control over the future (through focusing 
on the future development of youth). 
In both these constructions of the young person, people have positioned youth as an object 
of development.  These people use developmental knowledge to not only validate a need to 
control some young people but also a need to control all young people with the reasoning 
that deviance does not just occur in pathological populations.  This shows an inherent 
contradiction in the reasoning of developmental knowledge which I have alluded to 
previously.  Through developmental knowledge, adults are able to divide young people into 
the normal and the abnormal; however, this division is not clear and one-way as some, 
supposedly, ‘pathological’ youth may never engage in deviant behaviour and many normal 
youth do engage in deviant behaviour despite their positioning.  Hence, through applying 
developmental knowledge, adults provide normally-deviant youth with an opportunity to 
change and become adult, whereas, when they use developmental knowledge, they position 
abnormally-deviant youth unfairly, albeit unintentionally, as a lost cause if not identified in 
childhood.  In 2002, authors applied a knowledge of risk with developmental knowledge.  I 
investigate this use of risk in the next chapter. 
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The word ‘risk’ could well be dropped from politics.  ‘Danger’ would do the work it does 
just as well.  When ‘risk’ enters as a concept in political debate, it becomes a 
menacing thing, like a flood, an earthquake, or a thrown brick.  But it is not a thing, it is 
a way of thinking.   
(Douglas, 1992, p.46) 
Alongside developmental knowledge, authors used a knowledge of risk to create a shared 
conception of youth.  In the texts analysed, risk could be assumed to be another aspect of 
developmental knowledge because authors appeared to directly associate ‘youth-at-risk’ and 
‘risk behaviours’ with ideas of normal and abnormal development.  However, as I began to 
suggest in the previous chapter, the connection between risk and development is one that 
occurred within a particular social context of risk during the 1970s (Beck, 1992; Douglas, 
1992). 
In this chapter, I explore the concept of risk as it has appeared contextually over the last two 
centuries.  Using the texts as a starting point, I examine how risk emerged in criminal 
psychology in the 19th century and later re-emerged in the 20th century in developmental 
psychology.  Hence, I will also discuss the merging of developmental psychology and risk as 
a method of social control which enabled those in New Zealand institutions to exercise 
power over the development of young people (both those positioned as normal and 
abnormal).  Many adults in authority have used both knowledges in the attempt to maintain 
control in a struggle for social and structural stability.  This has entailed them using a specific 
language – a language of risk. 
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Childhood maltreatment is a universal risk factor for antisocial behaviour.  Boys who 
experience abuse - and, more generally, those exposed to erratic, coercive, and 
punitive parenting - are at risk of developing conduct disorder, antisocial personality 
symptoms, and of becoming violent offenders … The earlier children experience 
maltreatment, the more likely they are to develop these problems … But there are 
large differences between children and their exposure to maltreatment.  Although 
maltreatment increases the risk of later criminality by about 50%, most maltreated 
children do not become delinquents or adult criminals ... The reason for this variability 
in response is largely unknown, but it may be that vulnerability to adversities is 
conditional, depending on genetic susceptibility factors.   
(Caspi et al., 2002, p.851, academic context, journal article) 
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Writers and commentators readily used a language of risk across institutional contexts.  This, 
in itself, gave evidence to a normalisation and popularisation of risk.  Nardini and Antes 
(cited in G. Tait, 1995, p.123) argue that risk has become a “buzz word” in academic 
constructions of youth.  My analysis revealed that risk has become popularised, not just in 
texts published in academic contexts, but also in texts published in government and media 
contexts.  This should be expected as other analyses of risk have shown that risk is a 
dominant concept within political (e.g. Beck, 1992, 1999; Douglas, 1992) and media (e.g. 
Wilkinson, 2001) discussions. 
Consequently, using risk allows for a perceived ‘commonsense’ between the author and the 
consumer of the text.  However, people use risk differently in different constructions – in the 
analysed texts, authors constructed the youth-at-risk very differently to the adolescent 
engaging in risk behaviours.  What they brought together was a concept and a language, not 
a construction.  This meant that constructions had many contradictions even when authors 
used a consistent language of risk. 
Risk theorists (Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988) argue that a language of risk is a 
scientific language based on probability.  However, my own analysis found that the language 
of risk is also political and economical (c.f. Douglas, 1992; Withers & Batten, 1995).  Hence, 
risk is not only scientised, it is politicised.  By using a language of risk, we are able to bring 
the future into the present.  We can attempt to control the unpredictable. 
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Given Kurariki’s offending history and the intensity of the other negative influences in 
his life, he was at high-risk of a range of poor life outcomes, including continuing to 
offend.  
(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.5, government context, ministerial report) 
When we use a language of risk, we usually focus on predicting and controlling the future in 
the present moment (Beck, 1992, 1999; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988).  In this sense, this 
strategy works nicely alongside ideas of human development as both focus on outcomes.  
This was also evident in the texts of 2002. 
In 2002, the public were clearly anxious about the potentially negative developmental 
outcomes of young people.  The public saw a resolution to this anxiety in the identification 
and control of deviant young people.  In the analysed texts, writers merged a knowledge of 
development with a language and knowledge of risk to describe young people.  They 
particularly focused on the abnormal youth-at-risk.  They applied statistics and probability in 
an attempt to predict the future of the youth-at-risk and control the youth-at-risk in the 
present.  Usually these writers applied expertise and a scientific language of risk in this 
prediction. 
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Broadly speaking the risk ratios show the increase in the odds or rate of the outcome 
behavior at a given level of deviant peer affiliations relative to odds or risk of those in 
the lowest quartile.  Table VI reports estimates of the risk ratios and confidence 
intervals for each outcome and each year of observation.  
The table shows:   
1. For violent crime there is an increase in the rate of crime with increasing deviant 
peer affiliations at each age.  However, the strength of the association reduces 
substantially with age: at age 14-15 years those with high deviant peer affiliations are 
estimated to have risks of violent crime that are over 8 times higher than those with 
low deviant peer affiliations.  However, by age 20-21 this difference reduces to 1.6.  
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002a, p.426, academic context, journal 
article) 
When we use a knowledge of risk, we tend to involve an institutional expertise to give a 
scientific language to concepts of danger.  This language of risk is an objective, rational and 
scientific rhetoric looking at what industrial societies once referred to as danger (Castel, 
1991; Douglas, 1992; Foucault, 1988; Rose, 1996a).  Mary Douglas describes the 
scientisation of risk as a “bogus objectivity” in which contemporary society has turned things 
that, at times, have quite human elements (i.e. dangers can be caused by human error) or 
can be described as unpredictable fates of nature into something predictable and 
manageable.  One such way that this occurs is when researchers ‘objectively’ identify risk 
factors or use probability and statistics to draw conclusions. 
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High-risk offenders (or serious young offenders) may comprise less than 5% of under 
17 year olds, but they account for a large proportion of offences committed by children 
and young people … They engage in five to 20 times as much offending as lower-risk 
offenders.  They begin offending early (before age 14 and as early as 10), offend at 
high rates and often very seriously, and are likely to keep offending into adulthood.  
They start their anti-social behaviour with minor problems in early childhood, move 
onto more serious problem behaviours, and then begin serious and/or repeat 
offending.  As they continue offending, they commit serious offences along with 
numerous less serious offences.  These young people are characterised by major 
personal, social and family disorder.   
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.17, government context, 
strategy document) 
Probability is a key element of expertise in risk language (Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992; 
Foucault, 1988).  When researchers and authors apply a language of risk, they tend to refer 
to statistics and use words of probability, such as ‘likely’, ‘probable’ and ‘chance’.  This was 
evident in 2002 when those writing referred to statistics to describe and deconstruct youth 
crime.  By doing this, they were able to divide and separate youth into two groups – the 
abnormally-deviant and normally-deviant youth.   
However, when people use statistics and probability, they do not create an argument devoid 
of commonsense.  Indeed, these people may also use metaphors of probability to validate 
their reasoning through a tautological logic.  This is particularly evident when people 
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combine one knowledge with another to emphasise the ‘natural’ truth of a posed argument.  
In the analysed texts (particularly those published in a media context), writers used ideas of 
development and a language of probability to place abnormally-deviant young people on a 
‘pathway’ to criminal deviance.  This pathway to deviance was a pathway of risk where each 
writer, in their ‘own’ words, placed the youth on a “downward spiral” (Dekker, 2002, p.F1) or 
a “slippery slope” (Woolf, 2002) to deviance.  Alongside this path metaphor, writers 
described risk behaviours as ‘stepping stones’ (Wall, 2002) to deviance.  Once deviant 
developmental outcomes had become finalised, they described the young offender as 
‘graduating’ into deviance (Ministry of Justice, 2002c), becoming a “career” criminal (Ministry 
of Justice, 2002b, p.28; Wall, 2002, p.A8; Welham, 2002, p.4), and being a “lost cause” 
(Welham, 2002).  This reasoning strengthened their arguments for intrusive interventions.  In 
these interventions, adult ‘society’ would put power into the hands of youth justice 
practitioners so that they could ‘point the young person into the right direction’ (Woolf, 2002) 
or ‘put the young person back on track’ (Kilmister & Baxter, 2002a, 2002b; Moore, 2002).  In 
this way, writers not only incorporated risk into developmental reasoning but also 
constructed a political language around risk identification. 
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In a political language of risk, those applying the language of risk debate the worth of 
particular risk interventions (Douglas, 1992).  This occurs on two levels: first, those using the 
language identify the causes of a particular problem (Foucault, 1988); second, they identify 
the fiscal costs and benefits of particular programmes (c.f. Withers & Batten, 1995).   
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But it was Alex Peihopa who hit Mr Choy with a baseball bat.  One brutal swing taking 
a life and potentially ruining his own.  What sort of kid does this and why?  
Well it might surprise you to learn that Alex Peihopa came from a stable loving family 
and as Janet McIntyre reports they are asking the same questions that we are.  
(McIntyre, 2002b, 0.00-0.17min, media context, current affairs article (television)) 
In a language of risk, people attempt to apportion blame (Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992).  Ulrich 
Beck (1992) describes this facet of risk language as an international language of 
accountability.  Beck (1992, 1999) argues that in contemporary society, where risks tend to 
come simultaneously from everywhere and nowhere, people cannot attribute risk, and, 
therefore, accountability, to any one person or institution.  So, in a reading of youth crime 
based on Beck’s (1992) Risk Society, we would expect to see authors attributing blame to 
society or the ‘system’ and no one individual or factor.   
In the texts I analysed, authors publishing in a media context used a language of blame in 
their search for the causes of youth crime.  Reflecting Beck’s (1992, 1999) analysis of 
technological risk, these authors placed blame on the effects of modernisation.  For 
example, they blamed technologies (such as video games), changes in the family unit 
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(particularly solo parent families) and general changes in New Zealand society.  In this 
sense, they blamed a ‘process’ in society – the evolution of modernisation.  When they did 
this, there tended to be an undertone of ‘nothing could be done about this’. 
In contrast to unattributable blame, across the three institutional contexts, writers also 
attempted to find the causes of youth crime (c.f. Foucault, 1988).  Rather than locating 
causes in a process, these writers located causes in societal structures, institutions and 
individuals.  Causes of youth offending existed in society (such as socio-economic level), in 
the family (such as neglect) and in the youth (such as vulnerability).  In this way, these 
writers diffused causes across society and, consequently, appeared to place blame on 
everyone.  However, they attempted to find a solution to these diffused causes by 
concentrating on problems in the individual and their family.  Ultimately, they saw the 
individual as being at-risk, not society.  Furthermore, these writers argued that the family, 
being one key environment in which the individual developed, could increase or decrease an 
individual’s vulnerability.  These writers located risk in the individual and family and, 
therefore, found these two sites as key causes to youth offending. 
In the analysed texts, those writing about youth crime placed the causes of youth offending 
on the family and/or the individual.  However, they placed the responsibility for the offending 
on society and the family.  They assumed that children and young people needed nurturing 
into adult citizens.  Society and the family were responsible for this.  They also argued that, 
because society had a responsibility, society needed to debate the economic costs of crime 
prevention. 
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The costs of failing to halt a young person’s progress into the adult criminal justice 
system are even more considerable.  It costs at least $50,000 per year on average to 
keep one person incarcerated in a New Zealand prison.  The indirect costs of losing a 
young person’s positive participation in society and the impact on future generations 
are much more difficult to quantify but no less significant.   
Resources should be focused towards children and young people who are 
demonstrating a strong risk of becoming, or have become, serious and recidivist 
offenders (the high-risk group).  This will ensure that those youth offenders who have 
greater and more complex needs receive the most intensive and comprehensive 
interventions, while scarce resources are not inappropriately directed at those who 
require only a minimal intervention (although some resources will always need to be 
targeted at the lower-risk groups).   
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.18, government context, 
strategy document) 
Graeme Withers and Margaret Batten (1995) claim that arguments for fiscal costs are a 
central aspect of youth-at-risk interventions.  My analysis showed a further level to Withers 
and Batten’s findings as New Zealand authors in 2002 focused on economic costs in their 
constructions of youth deviance.  In constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, 
authors argued that any money adult society spent now would return a greater profit 
because these young people would be contributing to society (through work and tax), not 
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living in prisons.  In such constructions, these authors allowed a space for recalculation by 
focusing arguments on a distant future probability.  If, for some reason, the intervention did 
not work society would have time to develop an alternative argument about why an 
intervention failed to return benefits.   
Economic arguments were less apparent in the constructions of normal deviance – 
particularly when authors constructed the deviant youth as a social threat.  This could be 
because of the immediacy of risk in the discourse – these young people were engaged in 
immediate risk behaviours and needed immediate intervention.  Hence, these authors could 
not allow room for recalculation as in constructions of youth-at-risk.  However, they used 
statistics and probability to show the effectiveness of immediate interventions.  Furthermore, 
they provided or wrote programme evaluations to justify fiscal spending.  
Across the texts analysed, those writing applied a language and knowledge of risk by 
arguing for the control of developmental potentiality through probability, cause identification, 
and cost-effectiveness calculation.  Risk theorists, such as Beck (1992) and Douglas (1992) 
argue that this conception of risk is very much a condition of contemporary industrial society.  
They argue that this society is more contingent and unpredictable than those in the past.  
However, by looking at the history of risk in crime interventions over the last 200 years, we 
can see that risk knowledge has a longer history, connected to technological developments, 
criminal psychology, developmental psychology, and social control. 
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Nearly every generation has at one time or another been labelled as rebellious.  A 
1954 issue of Newsweek in America made it a front-page issue: ‘Let’s Face It: Our 
Teenagers Are Out of Control’.  
The article went on to quote a sociologist warning darkly of a ‘national teenage 
problem -- a problem that is apparently getting worse.  And why?  There’s too much 
divorce, too few normal homes.’  Others blamed ‘salacious, sadistic comic books’.   
In reality, the young are hardly ever the root cause of youth problems.  Almost without 
fail, there is a direct adult influence.  Because of that, today’s attempts by government 
agencies at controlling the problem are mostly directed at the family unit.  Research 
has shown that family is the number one influence on a child’s decision-making, 
followed by school, peers and the wider community.   
(Mirams, 2002, media context, feature article) 
Unlike a history of developmental knowledge, a history of risk knowledge in contemporary 
industrial societies is not directly connected to a control of childhood and adolescence.  A 
history of risk shows a connection between risk and danger (Douglas, 1992).  Across time, 
societal groups have either associated risk with a feat of adventure or a social threat.  When 
theorists began to apply this concept to ideas of criminality in 19th century industrial 
societies, they focused on dangerous groups in society – groups posing a threat to the 
stability of society (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1988; G. Tait, 1995).  Like the history of 
developmental knowledge, risk knowledge emerged in a time of instability and change. 
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We know from Chapter 6, changes in industrial society in the 19th century coincided with the 
emergence of social classes in these societies.  During this time, in emerging industrial 
countries like the United Kingdom the working-classes emerged as a social problem.  People 
in the governing middle-class began to use population statistics to identify and control this 
group (Foucault, 1994a).  However, rather than being defined as a risk population, they used 
criminological psychology and a concept of dangerousness to describe this group (Castel, 
1991).  By using ideas of dangerousness, governing groups were able to connect explicitly 
particular social groups in society to a potential social threat.  By focusing on danger, they 
were able to focus on risk and apply risk management tools (such as statistics) in practices 
of governance (Pratt, 1997). 
When governing groups in industrial society began to combine psychological thought with 
penological practices in the 19th century, it heralded in a “psychiatrization” (Foucault, 1988, 
p.130) of crime and crime control.  Those governing began to associate danger with 
individuals, not social groups (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1988; Pratt, 1997).  This meant that 
thinkers in industrial society started to analyse and focus on the psychological character of 
the adult individual and the conditions that lead up to the committing of a crime (Castel, 
1991; Foucault, 1988).  Through the individualisation of risk, the adult middle-class struggled 
to maintain control over social uncertainty and unpredictability by transferring structural risk 
to the individual criminal.  These people did not construct these criminals as resisting or 
reacting to social conditions (or being engaged in a struggle themselves); instead, they 
constructed these criminals as having a deficit psychological character which needed to be 
re-conditioned in institutions (Foucault, 1988).  They used the prison and punishment as 
tools for social insurance and designed statistical measures to predict individual risk (Pratt, 
1997). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, when a knowledge of adolescence began to emerge, 
theorists used psychological knowledges of eugenics, medico-psychology, and criminal 
anthropology to inform ideas of criminality and punishment (Pratt, 1997).  By using these 
knowledges, they suggested that the problem of criminality was unchangeable, located in the 
individual, and a genetic condition.  People in authority then began to use these ideas to 
inform practices of division where the pathological criminal was separated from other 
‘normal’ people who had, mistakenly, shown a moral weakness and immaturity in a moment 
of criminal activity.  It was at this point, that criminological psychologists began to associate 
criminality as an outcome of pathological development and an unchangeable end-product of 
childhood.  Through this form of reasoning, those in positions of authority could not change 
adult criminals but could effect change through interventions targeted at young criminals: 
Now the habitual criminals had been subdivided: between the younger ones, for 
whom, it was thought, there was hope, and who would respond to corrective training, 
where psychological knowledge would become part of the programme of government 
for them within such institutions, and the older habituals for whom nothing could be 
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done. 
(Pratt, 1997, p.83) 
Consequently, risk emerged in 19th century industrial societies as the danger posed by 
working-classes to the stability of middle-class society.  The sciences of psychology and 
criminology allowed criminal deviance and risk to be located within the individual.  Hence, 
19th century risk was very much a concept of criminological psychology.  By the mid 20th 
century, risk knowledge had altogether disappeared in discussions of youth crime.  Instead, 
psychologists drew upon ideas of abnormally, pathology, and psychological dysfunction.  It 
was not until the 1970s that risk and psychology came together in descriptions of youth 
deviance.  Ideas of risk and dangerousness re-emerged to describe youth crime and risk 
became a concept of developmental psychology.  However, as risk theorists such as Beck 
(1992, 1999) and Douglas (1992) suggest, contemporary industrial society was also a 
society of scientific technological risk. 
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Addressing Risk Factors in the Lives of Young Offenders  
Child, Youth and Family worked extensively with Bailey Kurariki’s family to address his 
emotional, social and educational needs, and utilised all the appropriate processes 
under the care and protection provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families (CYPF) Act 1989.  However, the plans developed to address his needs were 
not effective.  It is likely that they were not effective because they did not address the 
underlying causes of the behaviours Kurariki exhibited.  When the decision was made 
that Kurariki should remain with his family, a range of support should have been put in 
the home to ensure that his mother was equipped to manage his behaviour.  
Child, Youth and Family worked with Phillip Kaukasi and his family to address his 
offending.  Overall, the plans developed to address P Kaukasi’s offending were not 
effective because they did not address the underlying causes of his offending.  
Practitioners need to have access to risk assessment tools and processes, and 
understand how to use them, in order to develop interventions that target the factors 
that contribute to a young person offending or exhibiting behavioural problems.  Child, 
Youth and Family is eager for all practitioners to be equipped to undertake risk 
assessment for medium and high-risk young offenders, and has already undertaken 
extensive work towards this goal.   
(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.1, government context, ministerial report) 
Douglas (1992) and Beck (1992, 1999) both describe risk as a form of thinking or 
rationalisation dominant in many post 1970 contemporary societies.  For them, risk is 
associated with the modernisation of society and with science and technology.  Beck’s 
(1992) contemporary society is a “risk society”.  This is a global society threatened by 
ecological and biological disasters caused by the technologies of modernisation (e.g. nuclear 
fallout).  Beck argues that it was in the 1970s that this risk society first began to emerge in 
many contemporary industrial countries when people realised that previous technological 
developments posed uncertain, unpredictable, and uncontrollable risks to society (c.f. Lacy, 
2002).  The demise of the welfare state, in countries such as New Zealand, a global oil crisis, 
and the international take-up of risk management tools (such as risk assessments and 
insurance) in the 1970s exacerbated this uncertainty and uncontrollability (Beck, 1992).   
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The changes of the 1970s also affected young people (Dwyer & Wyn, 2001).  According to 
Peter Dwyer and Johanna Wyn (2001), by the 1970s, traditional theories of human 
development could no longer predict developmental outcomes.  This was because the 
unpredictability and uncertainty of contemporary society challenged a determinable linear 
model of development.  However, as shown so far, this has not restricted or hindered people 
applying developmental ideas of outcomes and trajectories in descriptions of youth deviance.  
Perhaps this is because the unpredictability of development, in itself, poses a risk to society 
(c.f. Pratt, 1997). 
As such, anxiety and a desire for control are key conditions of contemporary risk society 
(Beck, 1999; Douglas, 1992).  It is possible to observe this anxiety and desire in the texts 
describing youth deviance in 2002 New Zealand.  Authors focused on ascertaining a cause 
for youth crime.  They were clearly anxious about the unpredictability of crime and desired to 
control it.  On another level, some critical youth studies research also shows this idea of 
anxiety and control, where theorists (e.g. Wyn & White, 2000) express a concern about the 
negative effects of contingency and unpredictability for young people.  In contrast, other 
theorists (e.g. Beck, 1992, 1999; Kelly, 2001) have argued that contingency opens up 
spaces of freedom and possibility (c.f. Dwyer & Wyn, 2001).  It is this argument that I will 
take further when I explore the alternative possibilities that are available for youth in Chapter 
10. 
It is difficult to see how youth (a word not logically connected to technology) can be 
associated with risk in this society.  Laterally, youth may be described as a technological 
hazard – a consequence of modern society (c.f. Lesko, 2001; Newburn, 1997; Pearson, 
1994) as contemporary ideas of youth did arise in times of technological and social change.  
Taking this idea further, young people could be conceptualised as an effect of modernisation 
– a metaphorical time bomb threatening to explode.  Developmental theories constructed 
over the 20th century about adolescence reflected this idea of youth as unpredictable threat.      
In 2002, New Zealand authors did associate youth with risk and societal threat.  Explicitly, 
they constructed this threat, not because of modernisation, but rather as an inherent part of 
these young people’s developmental ‘nature’.  Conversely, they argued that modern 
technology posed a threat to youth.  For example, authors constructed youth-at-risk in the 
texts as being biologically vulnerable to criminality due to environmental influences.  
Although they saw the social environment as posing the greatest risk to these young people, 
they also saw technology (e.g. violent video games and television programmes) as posing a 
risk.  In contrast, authors implied that youth themselves posed a risk to society.  Authors 
seemed quite anxious about this human risk.  This was particularly evident when they talked 
about, and constructed, the youth-at-risk.  In a way, it appeared as if they had transferred 
any risk caused by social instability onto youth people themselves. 
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For Beck (1992, 1999), modern technology posed risks to society; in contrast, in the texts I 
analysed, young people posed risks to society.  In Risk Society, Beck (1992) was very clear 
about the transference of risk from groups of people to technology.  However, I found that 
authors clearly associated risk within a group – youth-at-risk.  Others (Lash & Wynne cited in 
Beck, 1992; Elliott, 2002) have criticised Beck’s risk thesis for reducing all of society down to 
one concept – risk; I found Beck’s initial thesis limiting as it reduced all concepts of risk down 
to one – technological risk – which ignored any complexity of risk.  Beck appeared to ignore 
any relationship technological developments had with the use of expertise and risk 
technologies in the control of human risk. 
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CYF now takes a more extensive assessment of the child and their life so that the 
service does not focus purely on the child’s crime but all the wider issues in their life. 
The fresh approach was developed after research in the late 1990s uncovered high 
rates of self-harm among young people in New Zealand.  
The child’s well-being assessment focused on reducing that self-harm as well as the 
criminal behaviour and looked into the child’s family, their bond with the family, their 
community activity such as sports, emotional wellbeing, delved into their attitudes 
(such as to society and law), peer relationships, spiritual and cultural identity 
(Humphreys, 2002b, p.17, media context, feature article). 
People using a knowledge of risk claim authority by referring to an institutionally-based 
objective and scientific construction of youth (c.f. Douglas, 1992).  By using this expertise, 
they are able to validate any surveillance or ‘diagnostic gaze’ used in a society to identify 
and control a problem (Castel, 1991; Rose, 1996a; G. Tait, 1995; Kelly, 2000).  Castel 
(1991) and G. Tait (1995) argue that in a risk society this form of surveillance involves 
complex techniques of risk knowledge production, in which a society looks within its 
population to identify those individuals posing a risk.   
Castel (1991) and G. Tait (1995) claim that risk surveillance has replaced the spatial 
surveillance of disciplinary society (see Foucault, 1977).  My own analysis did not confirm 
this; rather, authors described risk surveillance as involving both techniques of knowledge 
production and techniques of spatial control.  For example, they described how practitioners 
could use knowledge production techniques to survey and ‘observe’ youth and identify 
abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk.  However, they also identified spatial surveillance 
techniques such as surveillance cameras and the architectural control of space as key 
techniques to intervene into youth deviance. 
Writers used risk language, knowledge, and knowledge-informed practices to construct the 
youth-at-risk.  In this construction of youth, they argued that “risk factors” allowed 
practitioners to identify variables of risk (c.f. Castel, 1991).  However, writers also used 
“protective factors” to reinforce covertly a construction of risk.  This is because they talked 
about how protective factors allowed for the elimination or reduction of risk within individuals.  
In this way, protective factors existed only because of a notion of risk.  So, writers used both 
 111 
protective factors and risk factors to construct the youth-at-risk.  When this happened, they 
brought together the knowledges of development and risk.   
Within the analysed texts, when those writing on youth deviance focused on risk, potentiality, 
and development, they developed an argument for early intervention.  Early intervention 
worked on the premise that practitioners could identify potential criminals before adulthood 
(and the solidification of deviant characteristics), and then, due to the child’s developmental 
level, they could re-direct the child onto a ‘path’ of normality.  Reflecting developmental 
knowledge, these authors conceptualised schools as key institutions for risk factor 
identification and control.  In the school, practitioners, like teachers, could apply risk factor 
observations and assessments to identify the youth-at-risk. 
Castel (1991) and G. Tait (1995) argue that in contemporary society, risk factors are a 
common instrument of governance.  Governing groups in these societies are able to apply 
risk factors to survey a population, identify potentially threatening groups and, consequently, 
control any threat.  G. Tait argues that a concept of risk has allowed governing groups and 
those in authority to replace the delinquent of disciplinary society with ‘youth-at-risk’: 
A youth no longer possesses a seed of delinquency, visible to the competent expert, 
rather delinquency lies within any number of statistically validated ‘risk’ factors.   
(G. Tait, 1995, p.127) 
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You could call Rick an angry child.  He’s been dubbed the kid from hell more than 
once and has been thrown out of schools because he’s a serious risk to others.  
Fighting, enjoying dope-filled sessions with his mates, terrorising anyone who got in 
his way and taking on all-comers, Rick was out of control.   
New Plymouth’s Young People’s Trust, which picks up those kids nobody else wants 
to know about, have had a lot of dealings with Rick. They have no hesitation in saying 
he could kill one day.   
(Humphreys, 2002a, p.17, media context, feature article) 
Across the texts, authors used a construction of the ‘youth-at-risk’ to separate and define 
abnormal and normal deviance43.  When authors used the words ‘at-risk’ to talk about a 
youth they meant, and implied, two things.  They explicitly conveyed the youth as vulnerable 
but covertly implied that the youth was a potential threat.  As such, the youth-at-risk had a 
duality of risk – s/he was individually at-risk and socially a risk (c.f. Donzelot, 1979).  In 
contrast, authors constructed the normally-deviant youth as vulnerable as a child but a social 
threat as an adolescent.  What made these constructions possible was the merging of 
development and risk knowledges from the 1970s. 
                                                    
43
 When I first began my doctorate, I was sceptical about using this construction.  I felt it had been overused and 
that it restricted possibilities for youth (c.f. G. Tait, 1995).  However, this construction was central in my analysis as 
authors explicitly used the words “youth-at-risk” to identify and construct a particular group of dangerous youth.  I 
could not avoid this construction, I needed to return to it and critique it. 
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Children and young people who offend are not a homogeneous group.  They differ in 
both the seriousness of their offending, and the presence of risk and protective factors 
in their lives.  Streaming children and young people into different groups based on 
these characteristics can facilitate more effective and appropriate interventions. 
(Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p.16, government context, 
policy document) 
By 2002, it was evident that authors discussing youth crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand used a 
combination of risk and developmental knowledge to identify and construct the deviant 
youth.  Furthermore, societal groups have used both developmental knowledge and risk over 
the last 200 years to identify and control deviant individuals and populations.  However, as I 
have shown in these last two chapters, these groups have not always combined 
developmental knowledge with risk knowledge to explain youth deviance.  Instead, both 
knowledges shared particular aspects – both emerged in popular thought and expertise at 
the beginning of the 19th century; both informed, and were informed by, psychology; both 
arose in times of societal instability; both, in some way, were connected to the control of 
marginal groups (particularly the working-classes); and both involved the use of statistical 
data.  However, before the 1970s, developmental knowledge and risk were two different 
knowledges.  Whereas those in industrial societies used developmental knowledge to focus 
on the development of children and young people, those in industrial societies originally used 
risk knowledge to focus on the pathological character of the (usually adult) criminal.  Building 
on Figure 2 in Chapter 6 (p.84), Figure 3 illustrates this relationship between developmental 
knowledge and risk knowledge prior to 1970.   
 
Figure 3: Developmental Knowledge and Risk Knowledge Prior to the 1970s 
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The technological and social changes to contemporary industrial societies in the 1970s saw 
a merging of developmental knowledge and risk knowledge.  Developmental knowledge and 
risk knowledge mirrored the unpredictability and uncertainty of contemporary industrial 
societies.  In these societies, adults focused on the potentiality of young people and any risk 
they posed to the future of society.  In the analysed texts of 2002, this was evident through a 
shared language of risk and development.  Figure 4 shows the merging of these knowledges 
with their shared concepts. 
   
Figure 4: Developmental Knowledge and Risk Knowledge After the 1970s 
 
Centrally, writers constructed age and becomingness as an unpredictable concept – a 
concept that drew together the vulnerability of the young child and the unpredictable threat 
that young people posed to society.  In constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, 
they coupled this with a language of potentiality and focused on statistically determining 
possible outcomes.  These outcomes could either help or hinder society and writers argued 
that practitioners should use developmental risk knowledge to identify, divide, and separate 
problematic youth.  In contrast, writers coupled a concept of age with a concept of liminality 
in descriptions of the risk posed by normally-deviant adolescents.  In this context, they 
constructed youth as being in an unpredictable present in which youth needed the guidance 
and support of adults.  Hence, by combining risk and development, writers displaced societal 
instabilities onto young people.  As a social problem, they constructed deviance as an 
individual psychological condition, controlled through the application of knowledge and 
knowledge-informed practices. 
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Consequently, writers used knowledges of development and risk to construct youth deviance 
in 2002.  As I have shown so far, groups in contemporary industrial societies have used 
these knowledges since the 1970s to construct and control youth deviance.  Being one of 
these societies, Aotearoa/New Zealand shares a similar history; and, since the 1970s, those 
working in New Zealand’s political and justice systems have further situated risk and 
developmental knowledges in context.       
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The initial excitement that greeted the 1974 Act soon gave way to criticisms similar to 
those levelled at welfare models of youth justice around the world: too many and 
inappropriate arrests of young people for minor offences and the subsequent 
stigmatising; the inherent injustice of open-ended sanctions; and the realisation that 
many young people who offend do not have any special family or social problems, 
meaning welfare dispositions are thus inappropriate.  
In line with international trends, New Zealand also faced a public loss of faith in the 
welfare model as it seemed to be having little impact on the levels of youth offending.  
This was exacerbated by the perceived increase in numbers of street kids (Wittman, 
1995) and a belief that the system was unable to deal with persistent young offenders.  
Later amendments to the Act exemplify attempts to counter these accusations: a 1977 
amendment allowing children to be tried for murder, and in 1981 and 1982 police were 
granted greater powers to deal with street kids.  The public was calling for control 
rather than benevolence.   
There was also strong criticism of the lack of accountability for young offenders.  As 
Robert Ludbrook observed (cited in Ministerial Review Team, 1992, p.4)  
‘Our juvenile justice system prior to the 1989 Act had the effect of cushioning young 
people from the human, social and economic consequences of their behaviour.  By 
parading young people before a line of public officials – Police, Judges, lawyers, social 
workers and residential care workers, they were sheltered from the consequences of 
their misbehaviour.  They often came to see themselves as victims of the system 
rather than as the cause of suffering and anxiety to ordinary people in the community.  
Both the welfare and the punishment philosophy stressed the role of the young 
offender as “victim” …’.   
(Watt, 2002, para 42-44, part 2, government context, web page) 
Beore the 1980s, Aotearoa/New Zealand was a welfare state in which healthcare and 
education were free to all with the state supporting those at the lower end of the socio-
economic scale.  This form of governance saw the state having control over individuals’ 
lives.  During the 1970s, this welfare state began to collapse.  This led to a series of 
Government policies in the 1980s aimed at reducing national debt and devolving and 
decentralising political power.  Liberal forms of thinking entered into governance, and many 
in the country began to privilege individual autonomy, choice, and freedom over state control 
and support (c.f. Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996).   
In 2002, the political context of Aotearoa/New Zealand saw a mixture of welfare (left wing) 
and liberal (right wing) ideals.  As such, it is possible to describe the political climate as a 
paradoxical climate, where political argument was at times in states of tension, flux and 
contradiction.  For example, liberal ideals stressed the autonomy of the individual with little 
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state control; in contrast, welfare ideals emphasised the power of the state to create a 
system of equality for all people.   
Up to the 1980s, the guise of the welfare state subsumed any differences and inequalities.  
However, the reforms of the 1980s formed, or brought to the surface, a “newly poor” (Kelsey, 
1995, p.271) – a new social threat to society.  Divisions of gender, race, and culture began to 
appear in New Zealand society (Kelsey, 1995; Kelsey & O’Brian, 1995).  By 2002, some 
researchers (Blaiklock, et al., 2002; Maxwell & Morris, 2002a) began to connect the welfare 
reforms of the 1980s with the increased marginalisation of societal groups, particularly 
children and young people.  These researchers found that the changes of the 1980s affected 
the welfare of children and youth crime. 
Like in the history of Western society, youth crime increased during the unstable time of the 
1980s (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a).  Also reflecting international trends, by the mid-1980s 
authors in Aotearoa/New Zealand began to talk about youth-at-risk (e.g. Kelsey, 1985) and 
youth passing through a phase of deviance (e.g. Doolan, 1988).    
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Agencies failed to fully utilise the youth justice provisions of CYPF Act to deal with 
Kurariki’s offending.  The CYPF Act is very clear that child offenders are to be held 
accountable for their offending.  A youth justice family group conference should have 
been convened to hold Kurariki accountable for the assaults he committed on other 
young people.  In hindsight, poor communication between Child, Youth and Family 
and Police impeded this process being utilised.   
(Ministry of Justice, 2002a, p.9, government context, ministerial report) 
Alongside this changing climate, the New Zealand youth justice system began to change and 
reflect a decentralisation of power.  This began with the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 (CYPF Act 1989) which established New Zealand’s present youth justice 
system.  Morris and Maxwell (1998, p.247) describe this current system as a “family-centred 
approach” to youth justice.  Essentially, through the CYPF Act 1989, Aotearoa/New Zealand 
moved juvenile justice from a focus on welfare to a focus on justice (Doolan, 1988, 1993; 
Morris & Maxwell, 1997; Watt, 2002).   
Before 1989, Aotearoa/New Zealand applied a welfare approach to youth offending to focus 
on the individual who had committed the crime.  Developmental and psychological 
knowledge of pathologies and offending informed this penology.  This meant that welfare-
based policies described the offending young person as either pathological or from a 
pathological family.  Court intervention focused on the care and protection of the young 
offender (Watt, 2002) and early intervention into offending (Doolan, 1988, 1993).  In a way, 
the old system reflected current conceptions of the youth-at-risk; however, it differed as it 
assumed the deviant youth to be inherently pathological and an explicit threat to society.  
Finally, the welfare penology gave the state overall power and control over the lives of 
families and young people.  Using a welfare-based reasoning, the state assumed absolute 
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power and directed interventions at the assumed threat the youth and their family posed to 
society. 
In contrast, the justice penology that Aotearoa/New Zealand, applied from 1989, reflected a 
liberal ideology stressing a decentralisation of power and interventions that were more 
family-based.  These interventions defused any focus on social threat and focused on the 
assumed ‘normally’ deviant behaviour of young people, something that was “a relatively 
common aspect of growing up” (Doolan, 1993, p.18).  A central advocate of the justice 
penology in the 1980s, Mike Doolan (1988, 1993), argued that early intervention did more 
harm to the individual than good.  Using arguments from labelling theory, Doolan (1993) 
claimed that formal sanctions such as care and protection orders and early intervention 
reinforced the young person’s behaviour.  Furthermore, Doolan argued for the minimisation 
and delaying of state treatment and intervention.  Policies using the justice penology 
concentrated on the offending, not on the individual, and on the state providing social 
support to the family (Maxwell & Morris, 2002a; Morris & Maxwell, 1997, 1998).   
In 2002, key features of the justice penology in Aotearoa/New Zealand included: the use of 
diversion or alternative action by police as a first response to youth offending, Family Group 
Conferences (FGCs) and the establishment of a separate court for young people (Maxwell & 
Morris, 2002a; Maxwell, Robertson, & Anderson, 2002; Ministry of Justice, 2002a; Morris & 
Maxwell, 1997, 1998, 2003).  The FGC has become the hallmark of the justice penology in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand as, through conferencing, practitioners can encourage the young 
person to develop responsibility and accountability (Maxwell, et al., 2004; Maxwell & Morris, 
2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Morris, 2002; Morris & Maxwell, 2003).  Since the 1980s, other 
countries have adapted and used conferencing in their youth justice system (e.g. Bargen, 
2001; Hil & McMahon, 2001; Maxwell & Morris, 2002a; Morris & Maxwell, 1997; Schmid, 
2001).  However, FGCs seemed biased towards a particular type of individual and family. 
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At these conferences, a youth and family members, the victim and a support person, a 
police representative, and possibly a social worker or probation officer can meet with a 
youth justice coordinator to discuss the offence, and arrange an appropriate 
(noncustodial) resolution that takes account of the concerns of the victim and the 
needs of the youth and family, as well as the interests of society.  The youth is 
encouraged to be actively involved in this process and take responsibility for his acts. 
(Maxwell & Morris, 2002a, p.189, academic context, book chapter) 
The CYPF Act 1989 did not empower all families as intended.  Whilst some families were 
able to resolve the offending of their children, many were not (c.f. Maxwell & Morris, 2002b) 
as the CYPF Act 1989 brought to the surface differences between families.  These 
differences resided within the economic and neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. 
Through the 1980s the Government transformed social services, such as education and 
health, into commodities, whilst, concurrently, slashing welfare assistance to low-income 
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families (Kelsey, 1995).  The Government assumed that making families on welfare 
assistance poorer would encourage them to seek employment; however, many families got 
poorer and found they could not access adequate social assistance.  Mass unemployment in 
manufacturing and public service jobs, and minimal welfare assistance exacerbated this 
poverty.  Consequently, New Zealand society divided families between those who could 
effectively self-govern and those who could not because they could not access resources 
(Kelsey, 1995).  Reflecting the early history of developmental knowledge, these lower socio-
economic families began to pose a risk to society and, by 2002, lower socio-economic level 
became a key, if not the key, risk factor for youth offending (Jacka, 2003). 
In 2002, many authors and commentators still praised the CYPF Act 1989.  However, by 
2002 law professionals and those who worked with young people began to advocate for 
early intervention and treatment provisions to help serious offenders (e.g. Dalmer, 2002; 
Henwood, 2003; Ministerial Taskforce on Youth Offending, 2002; Ministry of Justice, 2002a).  
Practitioners would direct these interventions at the family of the youth-at-risk (Carruthers, 
2002).  This is in contrast to families of normally-deviant youth who would continue through a 
diversionary system of youth justice.  The Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Justice & 
Ministry of Social Development, 2002) was one political example of a return to a welfare 
ideal of early intervention alongside, and coexisting with, a justice penology.  In effect, the 
Strategy allowed for the division of young offenders into two groups, a division based on risk 
with particular implications for young people.   
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It all started on a May morning much like this.  It was nearly 18 years ago, in 
Invercargill, and a young couple were welcoming a second child into their crime-filled 
world.  
He was a baby boy ... they called him Aaron … His father was career-criminal Robert 
… his mother … a bubbly redhead who was developing a terminal illness which would 
kill her before this child’s 15th birthday.  
Experts say the story which follows was virtually inevitable: At six, a smiley boy who 
likes building playhuts with his big brother is sent to live with his uncle Eric ... Uncle 
Eric is a car thief, just like Aaron’s Dad.  So when his little nephew comes to stay, 
Uncle Eric takes the opportunity to pass on a little McDonald know-how.  
At seven, Aaron picks up his first conviction.  Over the next decade, he will clock up 
64 convictions ranging from driving offences, to unlawfully taking cars, to theft … He 
spends his childhood shuttled between homes … Aaron leaves school altogether after 
a couple of years split between … high schools.  He is 14 when his mother dies.  He is 
17, and in prison, when his father dies in a truck crash.  He smashes his cell, and later 
attends the funeral.   
(Welham, 2002, p.4, media context, focus article) 
Through applying risk knowledge with developmental knowledge, authors constructed youth 
as objects, not subjects (c.f. Castel, 1991).  These authors tended to do this through 
expertise and language in which they objectively described young people without allowing for 
any contingency.  As such, they positioned youth as ‘objects’ to be governed, by the state or 
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their family, rather than as subjects with the ability to exercise power and self-govern 
(Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990, 1996a).   
Rose (1996a) argues that identifying populations-at-risk is a governmental attempt to 
produce self-governing individuals.  My analysis did not fully support this finding.  Although 
authors aimed interventions at producing self-governing individuals, they constructed young 
people as being unable to self-govern because of a knowledgeable risk in the young person.  
This particularly occurred in constructions of the youth-at-risk and of the normally-deviant 
adolescent where they used a language and practice of risk to give reason for the control 
(not the self-control) of youth. 
When societal groups use risk knowledge to justify the control of youth, they also re-create 
inequalities through applying that knowledge.  Beck (1992) describes risk society as a 
classless society, or a society in which other social divisions exist.  Inequality still exists in 
this society, but, using Beck’s language (1992, p.101), it is an inequality of “ascribed 
characteristics”, such as race, culture, sexuality, and gender.  Beck argues that 
characteristics are no longer determined through economic variables but through variables of 
risk.  In a risk society, groups in authority use risk factors as ‘ascribed characteristics’ to 
group people by variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, family, peer group, sexuality, 
socio-economic status, and community.  Indeed, these groups use ‘ascribed characteristics’ 
to reinforce, often classic, structural differences.  This form of ascribed marginalisation is 
evident in Aotearoa/New Zealand where the events of the 1980s have led to increased 
marginalisation through a variety of ‘ascribed characteristics’. 
In constructions of youth deviance, writers clearly, however unintentionally, reinforced 
inequalities of ascribed characteristics.  Within the analysed texts, they struggled with a 
concept of ethnicity because of the disproportionate representation of young Mori people in 
the criminal justice system.  Writers clearly did not want to ‘ascribe’ ethnicity as a 
characteristic of offending.  Instead, they highlighted this discrepancy and focused on 
attributing it to other risk factors such as socio-economic levels.  However, their continual 
focus on Mori youth subtly constituted all Mori youth as at-risk.  So, by focusing on 
ethnicity, writers did not address inequalities, they just reinforced them.  Furthermore, rather 
than positioning young Mori as subjects of development, they used risk to position them as 
victims of social circumstances. 
Through using risk, these authors also reinforced inequalities along the line of gender.  They 
constructed youth-at-risk as male youths.  In this way, authors problematised female’s 
access to constructions of criminality.  When authors constructed young ‘deviant’ women, 
they saw them as doubly deviant or acting outside of any feminine disposition (c.f. Carlen, 
1983).  This meant that, when adult society read about and saw female deviance, they were 
doubly anxious.   
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Hence, when authors used risk factors, they increased marginalisation of young people 
through ascribed characteristics.  This particularly happened for the youth-at-risk where they 
constructed this youth as a young male from a dysfunctional and disadvantaged family.  
Authors added ethnicity to these characteristics by arguing that this offending youth would 
most likely be Mori.  However, they also marginalised young females by denying a place in 
this construction and implying that only males had ‘right of access’ to deviance.  Alongside 
all of this, they also used age as an ascribed characteristic.  Authors constructed all young 
people through risk as being vulnerable and prone to deviant behaviours.  Governing groups 
in a society could then use this argument to justify the marginalisation of young people from 
societal participation. 
Finally, authors also constructed and positioned families through a knowledge of 
development and risk.  In the next chapter, I further examine this construction of the family.   
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Parents and teachers were now to take responsibility for regulating not just [children’s] 
habits and morals, but their feelings, wishes and anxieties, if they were not to produce 
troubled and troublesome children … [This would be achieved through love] … Love 
was no longer merely a moral duty or a romantic ideal, it was the element in which 
were produced normal and abnormal children.   
(Rose, 1990, p.156) 
So far, I have established that New Zealand authors in 2002 constructed the family, 
alongside deviant youth, as a key site of risk and intervention.  In this chapter, I will explore 
and discuss further the ways in which these authors constructed families.  Reflecting 
constructions of deviant youth, the construction of the family is very much a contextual 
construction.  These contexts reflect the development of contemporary industrial societies 
such as Aotearoa/New Zealand.  By 2002, authors were constructing the New Zealand 
family as a site of pathology and an instrument of governance and representing the school, 
and mass education, as a ‘pseudo’ family through which the state could counter the 
influence of pathological or dysfunctional families.  Like constructions of deviant youth, these 
constructions of family and the school have a history. 
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A number stated that the ‘youth problems’ simply reflect the problems in the wider 
community, for example community-wide alcohol and drug abuse.  Similarly, some 
stated that young people tend to be the victims of social and community problems, for 
example socio economic.  This was confirmed by the literature review … A small 
minority identified that poor parenting was the cause of the youth problem.  However, 
most respondents acknowledged the association between parenting and socio 
economic disadvantage and argued that poor parenting was often a symptom not a 
cause.  Similarly, a minority cited that single parenting or lack of a ‘father figure’ was a 
problem.  However, others noted that sole parenting is associated with poverty and 
that in the absence of social or family disadvantage sole parenting is not a factor that 
makes a major contribution to childhood risk.  This was not supported by the other 
respondents or by the findings in the literature review.  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.33, government context, evaluation report) 
A history of the contemporary family is a history of governance during a time where liberal 
forms of government replaced sovereign forms of government in industrial societies.  During 
these reforms, the family was established as the smallest governing unit in a population 
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(Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1994a).  Governing groups used the family unit to reproduce 
social order and the ruling ideology (Donzelot, 1979).   
In order to maintain stability, those in power constructed deviant families as pathological and 
dysfunctional.  These families engaged in deviant activities, threatened social order, and 
were perceived as failing to reproduce the dominant ideology.  Reflecting the histories of 
development and risk knowledge, those in power saw the working-class family as this 
pathological and/or dysfunctional threat (c.f. Donzelot, 1979).  This family became the site of 
pathology and the cause of deviance (Hil & McMahon, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004).  Even in 
2002 New Zealand, this type of positioning was still apparent. 
In New Zealand institutional texts in 2002, authors continued to connect poverty to 
pathology.  However, they renamed ‘working-class’ families ‘lower socio-economic’ families; 
thus displacing or suppressing any class factors 44.  In this way, authors did not directly 
associate economic structural differences with the structure of New Zealand society.  
Instead, they tended to assume that socio-economic factors were changeable and accidental  
– something into which the family ‘fell’ rather than being ‘positioned’ and something that 
could be addressed and eliminated.  Authors considered lower socio-economic factors as 
key reasons for a family’s inability to govern and authors still considered other factors, such 
as sole parenting and negligent parenting, as pathological and often a consequence of 
dysfunction.  In this way, they positioned the middle-class two-parent family as the only type 
of family from which ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ governance could occur.  Furthermore, authors 
implied, across the texts analysed, that signs of family dysfunction (such as abuse and 
negligent parenting) were not factors evident within middle-class two-parent families.  
Instead, they clearly associated the ability to self-govern with middle-class families. 
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Michelle Temarua (26), unemployed  
‘I’d hold the parents responsible because they should be there to discipline, educate 
and support their children.  I don’t think tough sentences are any good when you’re 
dealing with wayward kids because they won’t stop them.  We need more education – 
people going into schools because if you teach them when they’re young there’s more 
chance it will stick in their heads’.   
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p.25, media context, magazine article) 
From the late 18th century, families in industrial societies were constructed and positioned as 
instruments of liberal governance (Bell, 1993; Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990).  
This construction was based on a concept of the middle-class two-parent family in which the 
patriarchal father governed and controlled his family (Foucault, 1994a).  Such a construction 
dispersed governance throughout society rather than locating it in a sovereign, or visible, 
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 Aotearoa/New Zealand has been considered a ‘classless’ society – a claim academics and researchers (e.g. 
Kelsey, 1995) have consistently questioned. 
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power-holder.  The contemporary family became a site in which governance occurred 
through its members rather than social institutions directing governance at it (Bell, 1993).  
However, alongside this, this ‘new’ construction of the family allowed for a covert 
surveillance to occur in which the gaze of the parent brought about order and conformity 
within the family (Foucault, 1994a).  In effect, the self-governing family became a site of 
normalisation where those in authority could apply developmental knowledge in practice to 
‘nurture’, ‘mould’ and ‘normalise’ the young person (Rose, 1990).   
Later, in the development of neo-liberalism in many countries in the 20th century, the family 
became a site of responsibility (Hil, 1998; Hil & McMahon, 2001; Rose, 1990).  In this re-
construction, the family came to be seen as responsible for the behaviour and the deviance 
of its members (Hil & McMahon, 2001).  As such, those in positions of authority constructed 
deficits in the self-governing family as parents not taking up their responsibility to govern and 
nurture.  Irresponsible families were viewed as contributing to the behaviour of normally-
deviant and abnormally-deviant young people and required interventions that encouraged 
the development of self-governance (Hil, 1998; White & Wyn, 2001).  This description of the 
family was evident in the 2002 texts analysed. 
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The founding objective of the legislation is ‘to promote the wellbeing of children, young 
persons, and their families and family groups’ ... The Act thus seeks to empower 
families and communities, rather than professionals, in deciding the best measures to 
respond to offending behaviour in children and young people.   
(Watt, 2002, para 2, introduction, government context, web-page) 
A clear link has been identified, according to the Ministry of Social Policy in New 
Zealand, between persistent youth offending and social disadvantage … ‘While some 
offending behaviour is widespread amongst young people, the most serious and 
persistent offending is confined to small groups who often come from disadvantaged 
and disrupted families.  Moreover, these groups are often associated with particular 
neighbourhoods or communities’.  
(Ministry of Social Policy, cited in Carruthers, 2002, p.5, academic context, conference 
paper) 
Through the Children Young Persons and their Families (CYPF) Act 1989, the Government 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand began to encourage the development of self-governing families.  
However, the introduction of the Act actually divided and reproduced structural inequalities 
between families.  Through the CYPF Act 1989, the Government effectively marginalised 
poor and lower socio-economic families by not providing these families with the resources 
needed to implement the requirements of the Act.  By 2002, those writing about youth crime 
and families reconstituted the lower socio-economic family as the dysfunctional and 
disadvantaged family (c.f. Hil & McMahon, 2001; White & Wyn, 2004).   
Those writing in institutional contexts in 2002 divided families into two groups.  Writers based 
the first group on a concept of the self-governing family as the unit in which the normally-
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deviant youth was more likely to come from.  They described how interventions aimed at this 
family utilised the family’s alibility to self-govern and encouraged the development of 
responsibility in the family and in the young person.  Those writing about families based the 
second group on a concept of the dysfunctional and/or pathological family and argued that 
this family did not have the capability to self-govern.  Writers constructed this family as the 
unit from which the abnormally-deviant youth was more likely to come.  They used an 
understanding of socio-economic levels to describe and distinguish between these two 
families. 
Although, those writing about families in the context of youth crime explicitly used a socio-
economic division to divide families into the two groups, they did not overtly position middle-
class two-parent families as the norm.  Instead, they focused on socio-economic 
disadvantage and constructed dysfunctional families as a divergence from the two-parent 
model.  Hence, writers implied that middle-class two-parent families could be used as a 
benchmark to measure and construct dysfunction (c.f. Hil, 1998).  Problematic families were 
not only poor but they tended to diverge from the two-parent model.  It was from these types 
of families that authors argued abnormally-deviant young people came (c.f. Hil & McMahon, 
2001), although it was possible for these families to produce ‘normal’ children. 
Authors writing about families and youth crime did not consider, or paid very little attention 
to, certain ‘realities’ or contradictions to their constructions.  In particular, they did not 
consider that dysfunctional families from lower socio-economic communities could produce 
functional children.  When authors did mention this, they only expressed it as a known 
anomaly to an expertise of development and risk.  Neither did authors attempt to engage 
with the economic structure of New Zealand society, which requires some people to be 
‘lower socio-economic’.  New Zealand society has a differential pay system like most 
capitalist societies.  In reality, Aotearoa/New Zealand needs people like cleaners and road 
workers; but, these workers cannot earn the same amount of money as those in professional 
work.45   
It would be difficult to eliminate socio-economic differences, as New Zealand requires low-
waged workers for essential jobs.  And, it is also possible to assume that middle-class 
workers would be resistant to paying the same salary they get to their household cleaner.  
Hence, it is almost impossible to devise an intervention to eliminate socio-economic ‘risk 
factors’ – such an intervention would, at some point, either require substantial changes to the 
economic structure of Aotearoa/New Zealand or the importation of other groups to fill lower 
waged jobs (hence, reproducing socio-economic difference).   
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 Although New Zealand has had times of near full employment, authors such as Jane Kelsey (1995) would argue 
that it is problematic to assume that during these times New Zealand was classless.   Indeed, in the late 1960s, in a 
time of economic prosperity, New Zealand imported vast amounts of ‘cheep’ labour from the Pacific Islands. 
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In this sense, lower socio-economic groups remain, and will remain in New Zealand’s current 
economic structure, a key point of risk and threat to the stability of middle-class society.  
Furthermore, when people in positions of authority locate the causes of deviance within 
dysfunctional and lower socio-economic status, they create and reinforce the assumption 
that all young people raised in different environments are potential threats to society (c.f. Hil, 
1998).  At the same time, these people reinforce an assumption that, because normal 
deviance is a developmental trait that young people outgrow, middle-class families are 
‘naturally’ normal.  This construction reinforces the reasoning that a ‘society’ needs to target 
interventions into abnormal deviance at dysfunctional families (Donzelot, 1979).  In a society, 
like New Zealand, families are constructed as both the cause of deviance and the site of 
intervention (Bell, 1993; Hil, 1998; White & Wyn, 2004) and rather than eliminating socio-
economic disadvantage, interventions control the family through surveillance and institutional 
control. 
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‘What we’re into is prevention, which is addressing causes,’ Mr O’Connor [Police 
youth coordinator for the Hutt district] says.  ‘It’s also about making them accountable.  
For this age group, if you can’t get into the family, if you can’t work with them, there is 
very little you can do.  
‘The parents don’t have the resources themselves often, and are really tearing their 
own hair out as to what to do.  A lot of them are also action learners, they won’t go 
along to a course and you have to go into the home and become an educator.  To do 
that you need their trust’.   
(Mirams, 2002, p.B5, media context, feature article) 
When governing groups target interventions at the dysfunctional family, they are generally 
not applying a direct coercive action through social institutions.  Indeed, when these groups 
target interventions at the family, the interventions are often philanthropic in nature and 
appear explicitly to be a genuine attempt by others (typically those who are seen as being 
‘normal’) to make things ‘better’ for the less advantaged people in society (c.f. Donzelot, 
1979).  However, whilst these interventions may help to support families, over the last 200 
years these interventions have not eliminated poverty or deviance.  Poverty and deviance 
are both a consequence of contemporary industrial societies and cannot be completely 
eliminated (c.f. Foucault, 1977).  Because of this, interventions are really a form of social 
control in which governing groups target the family from a variety of institutional angles 
(Donzelot, 1979). 
One angle used in societal interventions is that of educating and controlling the dysfunctional 
family (Donzelot, 1979; Hil & McMahon, 2001).  Additionally, on a covert level, these 
interventions also work as a form of surveillance in which institutional experts can supervise 
and direct the development of the child or young person (Bell, 1993; Donzelot, 1979; Hil & 
McMahon, 2001).  The surveillance by institutional experts may explicitly appear to support 
the family but, also, covertly it encourages the dysfunctional family to become self-governing 
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as the family recognises that it is the target of surveillance.  Those applying these 
interventions assume that this dual function of support and observation is able to target and 
reduce criminal activity.   
However, structural differences (such as socio-economic differences, ethnic differences, and 
gender differences) are reinforced in these interventions and, consequently, do not fully 
eliminate deviance.  Instead, governing groups reinforce difference through the assertion 
that families cannot be normal unless they are middle-class, two-parent, and white.  Hence, 
there is an inherent incompatibility between the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk’s family and 
the family of the normally-deviant youth.  This incompatibility shows a point of struggle 
between the different groups in a society.  In this struggle, both groups attempt to maintain 
some control over their own identity and position, and the identities and positions of other 
groups.  In Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, authors demonstrated this focus and showed how 
New Zealand society attempted to control lower socio-economic groups.    
In the analysed texts, authors argued that institutions needed to target lower socio-economic 
families in interventions.  They constructed philanthropic services such as youth work, social 
work, community work, and education as key tools in the addressing of socio-economic 
problems and youth deviance.  However, they also showed how targeting philanthropic 
services at the family assisted New Zealand ‘society’ in the control and observation of youth 
deviance.  They described social workers and youth workers as gathering data about youth 
offending which researchers and police could later use.  Authors identified schools as key 
sites of deviance identification and control.  In a way, authors positioned schools as a state 
pseudo family. 
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Once upon a time, says Dr Maxwell [a criminologist], before the deterioration of family 
circumstances and support in the mid-1980s, there used to be adjustment classes in 
primary schools into which a child such as Kurariki would have been put.  
‘It’s always difficult to manage these children but we have had better options in the 
past. We need better options now.’  She says she is shocked that a 13-year-old could 
have been out of school since he was nine.  
‘We can’t just say the education system can’t cope.  If a child is not being educated 
he’s being a risk to himself and others.  Education has to manage to provide for every 
child in society.’  Yes, says Wellington High School teacher Shona Grenfell -- who has 
been in secondary and primary classrooms for four decades -- problem children can 
be identified very early.  
‘Primary school teachers know which kids are going off the rails and it’s really hard to 
get help for them from within the system.’  She doesn’t believe that children’s 
behaviour is worse.  
‘I’m horrified at the way children behave at school, but I was when I started.  The 
biggest problem is that no one is doing anything about the poor kids without breakfast 
or no raincoat.  That worries me more than their behaviour.’  Many years ago, ‘I had 
my lip split by a primary school kid who got angry.  That hasn’t happened again.’  
Children have not got worse but society has changed.   
(Dekker, 2002, p.F1, media context, feature article) 
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In the 19th century, governments in industrial counties (such as New Zealand (Harker, 1990; 
Shuker, 1987a, 1990; Shuker, et al., 1990), Great Britain (Gleeson, 1992; Sturt, 1967; 
Walkerdine, 1998) and the United States of America (Murphy, 1998)), implemented mass 
schooling in order to counter deviant groups in society.  Mass schooling allowed the state to 
intervene into the dysfunction of some families and, in effect, worked as a pseudo parent 
(Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1990).  The school system positioned teachers, typically female, as 
nurturers and empowerers countering the negative influence of the pathological parent 
(Rose, 1990; Walkerdine, 1992, 1998; Wyn & White, 1997).  In order to be effective, these 
schools needed young people to attend – they needed young people to be there.   
Like the philanthropic social services supporting the family, education through mass 
schooling also allowed for the surveillance and control of deviant children (Foucault, 1977; 
Walkerdine, 1992).  Through a supposed function of ‘care’, schools were able to identify 
those children in ‘need’ and socialise them into civilised workers contributing to society 
(Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1990).  The teacher played a major part in this socialisation as they 
gently guided the development of young people through an institutional ‘love’ (Rose, 1990; 
Walkerdine, 1992).  However, through identification and socialisation, schools did not 
eliminate deviance but, rather, reproduced social difference (which encouraged and 
reproduced deviance) (c.f. Wyn & White, 1997). 
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Overall, the plans developed to address P Kaukasi’s offending were not effective. He 
continued to offend with increasing frequency.  It would appear that the plans were 
ineffective because they did not address the underlying causes of the behaviours 
exhibited – namely boredom, and a lack of structured environments and adult 
supervision in his life.  With hindsight, it was clearly not a good option to allow P 
Kaukasi to complete community work instead of attending school, as school would 
have provided him with a structured environment, activity during the day, and adult 
supervision.  
(Ministry of Justice, 2002b, p.10, government context, ministerial report) 
There are evident flaws in the argument that schools can effectively address and can 
potentially eliminate deviance.  This is mainly due to the function schools have in society in 
producing and reproducing inequalities (Harker, 1990; Wyn & White, 1997).  Schools and 
education produce and reproduce inequalities through the function of social control.  As a 
form of social control, educationalists intervene into deviance, first, through the removal of 
the deviant from the street into a structured and supervised environment and, second, 
through the controlling of outcomes.  As a function of social control, governing groups in 
industrial societies assume education to be a powerful force turning the deviant or the 
potential deviant into a civilised individual through socialisation (Bessant, Sercombe, & 
Watts, 1998; Murphy, 1998; Shuker, et al., 1990).  
Arguments for education as a form of social control involve reference to a perceived good of 
education.  That is, advocates subsume the socialising role of education within an argument 
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that education is essentially good.  These advocates assume that education offers ‘equal 
opportunities’ to all young people no matter what structural differences exist.  In other words, 
young people can use education as an access to upward mobility.  In the analysed texts, 
equality of opportunity and the promise of upward mobility permeated arguments about 
education as a crime intervention.  Those writing reiterated the ‘good of education’ through 
references to educational opportunities and the capability of education as an effective 
intervention into ‘negative’ outcomes.  They constructed deviance as a negative outcome 
connected to lower socio-economic circumstances.  For deviant and potentially deviant 
young people, education, supposedly, allowed for upward mobility beyond the structural and 
material confines of a criminal life.   
However, authors limited this upward mobility and education to a particular type of 
education.  They assumed that lower socio-economic level was due mainly to illiteracy and, 
as such, they argued that being able to read and write were essential, if not the only needed, 
tools for upward mobility.  Authors did not mention, discuss, or emphasise other forms of 
literacy (such as technological literacy, creative literacy, and critical literacy).  Whilst they 
emphasised written literacy for abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, it is debatable as to whether 
this literacy alone provides opportunities for upward mobility. 
So, especially for the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, the function of education was not to 
provide equal opportunity and upward mobility; instead, the function of education was to 
control the young person through surveillance and socialisation.  First, being in the 
classroom and under the gaze of an adult teacher ensured that the deviant youth was 
removed from any opportunity to commit crime or plan crime.  Second, through socialisation, 
education could transform the young person into a conforming and obedient adult. 
Despite the continual reference to equality of opportunity and upward mobility in the 
analysed texts, it is questionable whether the egalitarianism principle of education is truly 
achievable.  Educational theorists (Bessant, et al., 1998; Harker & McConnochie, 1985) have 
described the egalitarianism principle as one of the “myths” (Harker & McConnochie, 1985, 
p.136) of the mass education system occurring in “unequal societies” (Bessant, et al., 1998, 
p.148).  Furthermore, education as a form of social control tends to work as a tool of social 
division or stratification in which educational experiences influence the life outcomes of 
young people (Harker & McConnochie, 1985).  This involves an education of difference and 
division, where practitioners, through pedagogical practices reflective of a dominant norm, 
divide a group of young people into different life outcomes. 
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He [a former principal youth court judge] believes prevention is the key to solve the 
youth offending problem.  ‘Schools are important – they are the people who 
theoretically have access to youngsters and are in the best place to identify any 
problems before people start offending.   
‘I don’t think harsher penalties work.  I would rather we saved someone from 
 128 
becoming a victim and that can only come with prevention’.   
(Mulu & Nealon, 2002, p. 24-25, media context, magazine article) 
Traditionally, theorists (c.f. Harker & McConnochie, 1985) have argued that education as a 
dividing practice works as a class-dividing mechanism.  In contemporary education, a form of 
division based on deviance occurs, which divides the normal and the pathological.  The first 
way this division occurs is through the identification of ‘problems’ (either by the teacher, 
other educational professionals or people in other social agencies).  Identification allows 
practitioners to separate the deviant young person from other ‘normal’ young people in the 
classroom.  Across the 2002 texts analysed, authors argued that educational practitioners 
needed to apply a knowledge of child/youth development and risk (particularly risk factors) to 
identify youth-at-risk and separate them from the potentially normally-deviant youth. 
After identifying the potential deviant, a practitioner could design pedagogical practices that 
would influence the outcomes of the young person.  In 2002, those writing described this 
through specialist adaptations of class programmes that educational practitioners designed 
to meet the ‘needs’ of individuals.  For the deviant or potentially deviant, writers described 
how these programmes focused on thinking and/or disruptive/abnormal behaviour.  In effect, 
these programmes would allow for a more direct form of socialisation to change the young 
person’s thinking.  Adapted programmes also focused on curriculum needs like written 
literacy and numeracy.  
Those writing about education in the context of youth crime in 2002 also described how 
education-based interventions in other settings continued to, and needed to, concentrate on 
thinking, behaviour, written literacy, and numeracy.  These interventions attempted to 
replace the outcome of criminality with an outcome of work and vocation.  Rather than 
ensuring the young person from a disadvantaged background had an opportunity of upward 
mobility, authors described interventions focusing on manual vocational work.  In this way, 
authors constructed deviant youth as ‘limited’ people – lacking the skills and abilities for 
professional work.  Hence, once a young person offended, authors had two possible 
outcomes for them – low-paid manual employment or criminality.   
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... the number of young Mori male truants is disproportionately higher for groupings 
by ethnicity and gender over the three years: 23 (out of 66) in 1999, 40 (out of 97) in 
2000 and 19 (out of 41) in 2001.  The Ministry of Mori Development found in 1998 
that, on average, Mori have lower levels of educational achievement than non-Mori.  
While the reasons are complex, a factor may be the failure of the mainstream 
education system to adequately meet the educational needs and aspirations of Mori.  
(Kilmister & Baxter, 2002b, pp.5-6, academic context, conference paper) 
Disappointingly, youths’ school performance and attitudes towards school did not 
appear to benefit from their increased attendance.   
(Milne, et al., 2002, p.201, academic context, journal article) 
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A young person cannot fully enjoy an education that is designed to control them because it is 
an education of socialisation.  Those in authority see these ‘potential criminals’ as needing to 
be socialised not ‘educated’.  Teachers and others working with them may see young 
deviants and potential young deviants as individuals, but the mechanism of education 
attempts to push them into a homogeneous position of self-discipline and self-governance.   
If, through education, a ‘society’ could effectively identify, control, and socialise a young 
deviant, deviance would have been dealt with years ago.  However, this is not the case.  
Something is going wrong.  Identification and separation of the deviant in education has not 
eliminated deviance; and, as research suggests (Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 
2002a; Ministry of Justice & Ministry of Social Development, 2002), there is a group of young 
people who continue to be deviant through to adulthood.   
Consequently, education, like other family-based interventions, does little to intervene into 
deviance; in contrast, education, through the identification and separation of 
deviants/potential deviants, plays a part in producing deviance (c.f. Foucault, 1977).  In 
effect, governing groups in industrial societies did originally conceptualise, and continue to 
conceptualise, education as a panacea to social problems.  However, the effect of education 
is more like an ineffective placebo covering up the ‘real’ structural problem.  Since its 
conception in the 19th century, industrial society has assumed mass schooling capable of 
countering the risk that problematic families and socio-economic groups pose to society.  
Education has not been effective in its function.  Instead, we are now faced with the 
implications of constructing families, and their children, in divisive ways. 
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Results revealed that those who left school without qualifications were more likely to 
have had a young mother, who had no school qualification, and belong to families 
characterised by low socioeconomic status, and below average living standards.  The 
child’s parents were more likely to have used illicit substances, to have alcohol 
problems, to smoke, and to have participated in criminal offending.  At 15 the children 
had poorer attachment to these parents.  
The young people who left school without qualifications were also more likely to have 
low IQ scores at 8 years and low TOSCA scores at 13 years.  They had higher truancy 
levels, greater risks of early conduct problems, school suspensions and were more 
likely to have associated with deviant peers.  They were also more likely to be 
smoking at 15 years, have low self-esteem and high neuroticism scores.  Those who 
left school without qualifications were also slightly more likely to be males.   
(Fergusson, Swain-Campbell, & Horwood, 2002b, p.47, academic context, journal 
article) 
Essentially, when authors constructed the family and school as sites for intervention, they 
emphasised ideas of socialisation and counter-socialisation.  Reflecting developmental 
theory, authors built on ideas of childhood malleability to see institutions, like the family and 
the school, as contributing to, and affecting, developmental outcomes.  They also saw these 
sites as points of governance in schools. 
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However, through constructions of the family and pseudo family (the school), those writing 
also reinforced a construction of society as one in which governance is not overtly visible but 
rather is internal to the governmental structures in society – public institutions, private 
institutions, and, ultimately the individual.  By constructing the family as a mechanism for 
governance, writers rejected a need for overt and direct governance and reinforced the 
current governmental structure in which governance occurs from a distance (Donzelot, 1979; 
Foucault, 1994a).  This resulted in writers dividing families. 
Through covertly focusing on governance, those writing were able to divide families and 
young people into the dysfunctional and functional.  They positioned the middle-class two-
parent families as a norm and saw any diversion from this as pathological and abnormal (c.f. 
Hil & McMahon, 2001).  This meant that, even when writers focused on fostering difference 
through interventions, they still reinforced difference as a problem.  For example, in 
culturally-based interventions for Mori youth, writers talked about using the extended family 
in the care and protection of children and young people.  In some instances, the extended 
family might have adopted several children from other family members.  However, in 
discussions about the causes of youth crime, writers implied that cultural differences also 
were problematic by discussing how the abnormally-deviant youth was disadvantaged 
because they did not live with their natural parents and/or lived in over-crowded households.  
In this way, they conceptualised differing cultural approaches to parenting as abnormal, 
pathological, and dysfunctional. 
Like the abnormally-deviant youth, authors described the dysfunctional family as an object in 
which the state needed to target interventions.  They encouraged practitioners and 
policymakers to target interventions at the family and at the young person in the state school 
system.  In contrast, authors constructed the normal and functional family as subjects 
through which society could exercise governance.  These two types of families were 
reflective of Jacques Donzelot’s (1979) analysis of the 19th century family.  Like Donzelot’s 
analysis, authors connected the family to the functioning of contemporary society and the 
exercising of governing power.  As a site of governance, the family became a site of 
struggle, power, and resistance.  In the following chapter, I explore the functioning of power 
further in interventions.  
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What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in 
direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, 
its target, its field of application, there - that is to say - where it installs itself and 
produces its real effects.   
(Foucault, 1980e, p.97) 
Previously I showed how the relationship between power and knowledge is a reciprocal 
relationship where any application of knowledge also involves the application of power.  So 
far, I have focused on the application of knowledge in communication – or the construction of 
deviant youth through texts.  In this chapter, I focus on a discussion of practice by examining 
the types of interventions argued for by authors – interventions informed by developmental 
and risk knowledge. 
Interventions are the logical site to investigate the complex relationship between power and 
knowledge (c.f. Foucault, 1980e).  Interventions can be described as programmes in which a 
conception of power is essential because interventions, particularly in youth deviance, 
explicitly involve the use of power to control or redirect outcomes.  Hence, through 
reconceptualising power it is possible to address the implications of knowledge for young 
people.  In this chapter and Chapter 10, I want to pose the idea that re-conceptualising 
power should be the focus in re-constructions of youth deviance rather than re-
conceptualising knowledge.  Positioning involves both knowledge and power.  Therefore, 
any ‘intervention’ into positioning has to address both knowledge and power at the point of 
fusion.  Interventions are the site of struggle. 
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The majority of respondents believed that the venue needed to be a Police Station, for 
a variety of reasons, such as the ability to respond in emergency or violent situations, 
the overflow capacity and the ability to do police computer checks.  For example, one 
respondent stated:  
‘It needs to be at the Police Station when such things as computer checks are 
required, weapons are detected or disruptive/fighting type behaviour - good to have 
use of cells if required ...’.   
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.27, government context, evaluation report) 
So far, I have discussed how authors applied knowledge in 2002 in such a way that they 
positioned young people, and, at times, their families as objects.  At times, they also 
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constructed these young people as powerless and an effect of social conditions.  Clear 
contradictions existed in these constructions but, when authors discussed these 
contradictions, they tended to give a tokenistic acknowledgment to the known anomaly.  
They did not acknowledge or explore how the existence of a contradiction could pose a 
questioning of ‘Truth’ to developmental knowledge and risk knowledge.  Hence, even when 
young people exercised any power and control over their own lives, authors countered this in 
their constructions of deviance with the positioning of the youth as a powerless object.   
This was apparent in both the construction of abnormal deviance and normal deviance.  In 
constructions of abnormal deviance, those writing would acknowledge that some ‘youth-at-
risk’ would not grow into criminals.  However, they were quick to point out that these youth 
were an exception to the norm – an exception to the truths of risk and development.  In 
constructions of normal deviance, authors would construct the young person as exercising a 
threatening power over adult society.  However, they would associate this ‘power’ as the 
effect of adolescent development rather than constructing this power as being an intentional 
action of the youth.   
However, it is possible that these contradictions not only point out problems in constructions 
of ‘Truth’ but also show that young people were not absolute objects or effects.  That at 
some point, and in some way, these young people were also subjects.  This possibility 
suggests that the adults of New Zealand society could not exercise full and absolute power 
over young people.  Instead, adults and young people were engaged in a struggle in which 
some adults attempted to position the youth as an object and young people attempted to 
reassert themselves as a subject (c.f. Foucault, 1980b; Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002).  
Power was not one-sided. 
Foucault (1976, 1980b) argues that power and resistance have a reciprocal relationship in 
which any relation of power coexists with relations of resistance.  Brought together power 
and resistance show a struggle, which is apparent in the relationships between adults and 
youth.  In this struggle, each party attempts to regain or maintain control over their own 
identity and the identity of the other.  In a way, struggles of power and resistance are 
struggles for control.  We can see these struggles as we look back at the historical contexts 
of knowledge. 
Previously, I suggested that knowledges of development and human risk arose in times of 
instability.  In these times, governing groups in industrial societies attempted to resist the 
threat of social and structural instability through transferring the point of struggle onto young 
people.  In a sense, these groups attempted to control social and structural instabilities by 
controlling the futures and outcomes of young people.  In Chapter 10, I will discuss a 
possible youth reaction to this adult attempt at control, that of resistance.  In this chapter, I 
will explore how the site of intervention into deviance is the point in which adults struggle to 
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control the young person in differing ways.  Adults base these interventions on the risk the 
youth poses to themselves and to society. 
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If we look closely at interventions, we can see that there is more to interventions than adults 
trying to help young people.  Interventions are the adult side of the struggle in which adults 
attempt to control young people with knowledge-informed practices.  Technically, 
interventions are knowledge-informed programmes and strategies by adults and adult-based 
institutions into a social problem.  Whilst adults may use knowledge alone to attribute 
reasons of social instability onto youth, when they combine knowledge with power, they 
construct the problem of ‘youth’ as a point on which programmes and strategies can be 
targeted.  Interventions in the form of programmes are, in effect, a centralising force 
combining power and knowledge to address issues and enforce stability (Gordon, 1980; 
Lacombe, 1996): 
… a programme is always something more than a formulation of wishes and 
intentions.  Every programme also either articulates or presupposes a knowledge of 
the field of reality upon which it is to intervene and/or which is calculated to bring into 
being.  The common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is and must be 
power which knows the objects upon which it is exercised.  Further, the condition that 
programmatic knowledge must satisfy is that it renders reality in the form of an object 
which is programmable.   
(Gordon, 1980, p.248, author’s italics) 
Hence, knowledge allows groups in authority to ‘know’ a problem or object, and practice 
allows these groups to position the problem or object in such a way that programmes and 
interventions disrupt and diffuse any threat that the problem or object poses to society 
(Gordon, 1980).  In 2002, New Zealand authors used developmental and risk knowledge in 
such a way to attribute societal instability to young people and position them as objects.  
They designed interventions into youth deviance as intentional social strategies controlling 
the threat or risk youth pose to society (c.f. Foucault, 1976).  Authors needed to do this.  
They needed to have adults in a position of power and youth in such a position that 
knowledge would render them somewhat powerless to the developmental changes in their 
bodies. 
Adults writing on interventions into youth deviance need to position the youth as an object.  If 
they position the youth as a subject, there is a possibility that these adults might not change 
the young person through an intervention.  If adults construct the young person as a subject, 
there is a possibility that the youth might resist the intervening actions of adults, but, as a 
developmental object, adults are able to, metaphorically, mould and change the young 
person like a piece of clay.  Indeed, developmental conceptions of malleability and 
vulnerability reflect this metaphorical positioning.  In contrast, if adults construct the young 
person as a subject, interventions cannot ‘work on’ the young person; rather interventions 
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have to ‘work with’ the young person46.  To some extent, in 2002, this was evident in 
constructions of the normally-deviant youth.  However, even in this construction writers still 
referred to the young person as a malleable and vulnerable object situated in the 
developmental stages of childhood and adolescence. 
Through interventions, adults attempt to reposition the deviant youth as a self-governing 
subject or attempt to change the young person into a self-governing subject.  In this way, 
interventions represent a liminal moment in which transformation occurs (c.f. Turner, 1977).  
In the moment of an intervention, the young person is neither a complete object nor a subject 
but is in the process of becoming a subject.  This contradictory dual positioning is difficult to 
represent fully and, as such, it is possible to slip between constructions of the subject and 
object.  In the analysed texts, authors constructed many interventions as intrusively 
intervening into the object ‘deviant youth’.  The outcome practitioners aimed for (the 
construction of the subject) meant that there were times in which authors simultaneously 
positioned youth as being both subject and object (c.f. Panelli, Nairn, & McCormack, 2002).  
For example, they described abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as objects of development and 
risk and subjects of their future; in contrast, they described normally-deviant adolescents 
engaging in deviant behaviour as objects of development and subjects with the ability to 
choose.   
As expected, at times this dual positioning led to contradictions in the texts, especially in 
constructions of the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk and the normally-deviant young person 
as a social threat.  It was during these points that the moment of struggle between adults 
and young people became clearly apparent.  Those writing no longer described interventions 
as points of transformation.  Rather, they described interventions as points in which the 
young person had to be overpowered – practitioners had to control the power of 
development in order to stop the young person misusing power or exercising resistance.  In 
this struggle, practitioners directed the flow of power. 
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Foucault (1980d, 1980e) uses notions of networks and capillaries to describe struggles that 
occur within power and the role of power in contemporary society.  Foucault (1980e) argues 
that classical notions of power (based on repression and subjection), do not capture the 
complexity of power in contemporary society.  This is because they tend to concentrate on 
local or immediate power relationships between two parties (Foucault, 1976).   
                                                    
46
 This construction is somewhat contradictory to the actual practices of youth work in which youth workers actively 
attempt to work with the young person.  However, what this construction highlights is the difficulty many of these 
youth workers experience as they attempt to work with the young person with a knowledge of the young person that 
sees the young person as an object of development which needs to be ‘moulded’ and ‘shepherded’ (e.g. McLaren, 
2000) onto the right developmental path. 
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In contrast, Foucault (1994a) argues that, by using a capillary notion of power, we can 
acknowledge the placement of local struggles within a wider governmental framework.  In 
youth deviance, if we use a classical notion of power, we would see deviance as “one-
dimensional” (Krips, 1990, p.174) in which an individual’s deviance is an immediate reaction 
to immediate and identifiable circumstances.  Hence, we would focus our analysis on the 
immediate and local relationship between the youth and law-enforcement.  In contrast, if we 
use a capillary of power, we would recognise the relationship between the deviant and 
society as representing part of a wider societal structure.  That is, we would see power 
exercised on a local level as representing, and being part of, the wider governmental 
network.  We would see young people engaging in deviance as not just performing an 
immediate reaction but also taking part in a wider societal structure.   
Foucault (1980e) argues that by applying a capillary notion of power, we can recognise the 
productive relationship between power and knowledge in which a society reproduces ‘reality’ 
and ‘Truth’ through the combination of power and resistance.  In this sense, individuals 
create themselves through power but also rearticulate themselves in their exercising of 
power.  For example, the relationship between adults and young people creates and 
rearticulates many positions, one of which is youth deviance.  In contemporary industrial 
societies, such as Aotearoa/New Zealand, social stability is maintained through the 
rearticulation of each member’s position and this occurs through the application of power 
and knowledge.  Self-governance and self-discipline enable power to be internalised and 
social control to occur without the need for coercive and repressive technologies (c.f. 
Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1990, 1996b).   
As such, Foucault’s notion of capillary power tends to be more suited to contemporary 
industrial society than to earlier, and other, societies in which other modes of governance 
occur.  For the New Zealand context, which is neo-liberal in its governing style, we can use a 
capillary notion of power to analyse the complexities in the relationships between youth and 
adults.  We can see this complexity in interventions into youth deviance at the point in which 
adults want to, and attempt to, position youth as self-governing subjects, but need to, and 
end up, positioning youth as objects in order to exercise some control them.  We can see 
interventions as the site of a complex struggle, and a point of strategy, where adults attempt 
to exercise some control over the development of youth.  One way they try to achieve this is 
by dispersing and networking power. 
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Intervention  
Information about problems, strengths and goals for the future was used to formulate 
individualised management plans for each youth.  These detailed how to meet each 
individual’s goals and needs in the following four areas:  
Education.  The primary goal in this area was to re-establish regular school 
attendance.  This was achieved by, for instance, providing transport to school in the 
mornings if getting to school or oversleeping was a problem, or enrolling youths in a 
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different (less structured, more work-skills orientated) school if school structure or 
child-child/child-teacher conflicts were factors contributing to school nonattendance.  
Where required, tutoring for particular subjects was arranged (n=7).  
Health.  Individuals who had a drug or alcohol problem were provided with information 
about the health dangers of substance abuse.  Some were enrolled in a drug 
education programme (n=6).  Those youths attempting to cope with a pregnancy or 
STD were referred to a family planning or sexual health clinic (n=4).  Those with 
mental health problems were referred to the appropriate services for assessment and 
treatment (n=11).   
Social/family.  Youths who had to fulfil the requirements of a court sentence by doing 
community service were aided in doing so by liaising with Youth Justice to arrange 
appropriate times, and endeavouring to ensure that the youth attended by offering 
transport or making a reminder telephone call.  If parents were having difficulty dealing 
with their child, they were given guidance in the form of educational material and 
details on parenting courses.  Individuals needing assistance with motivation, anger or 
stress were advised of courses that would help them in these areas.  
Recreation/work.  As a means to foster self-worth, sporting, cultural and occupational 
pursuits were encouraged.  For example, youths with an existing sporting or cultural 
interest were encouraged to increase their involvement, while those with no current 
pursuits were encouraged to develop some, based either on their talents or what they 
enjoyed doing, or around the recreational interests of their friends.  Where 
appropriate, active involvement in these was facilitated by offering transport to venues.  
Work opportunities were fostered by arranging a meeting between the youth and an 
employer in the field of work of the youth’s interests.   
(Milne, et al., 2002, p.194, academic context, journal article, author’s italics) 
The described interventions into youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, not only 
incorporated an explicit use of power but also illustrated the capillary nature of power.  
Through a knowledge of development and an understanding that young people needed to be 
socialised, authors diffused the use of interventional power across a variety of institutional 
contexts.  Through diffusing the sites of intervention, they positioned the young person as an 
object of power.  In this way, authors described how practitioners and other adults could 
control the flow of power, or even, control the possibilities for struggle or resistance by the 
youth.  They reinforced this positioning through constructing the youth as powerless and 
predominately (but not always) without resistance. 
Those writing about youth crime identified the family, the school, and the youth justice 
system as key and typical sites for intervention.  To a lesser extent, they included other 
institutions connected to health, recreation, work, and defence.  Perhaps due to the 
separation in New Zealand policy of welfare and justice in 1984, authors were unlikely to 
describe social and welfare institutions as part of this intervention network.  They even 
separated Family Group Conferences (FGCs) into those aimed at welfare and those aimed 
at justice. 
Authors described multiple and diffused intervention sites for normal and abnormal youth 
deviance.  However, in abnormal deviance, they explicitly recognised this approach, within 
expertise, as an ‘effective’ intervention called ‘multi-systemic therapy’.  According to those 
writing about multi-systemic therapy, practitioners could use a knowledge of abnormal 
deviance to target the youth from a variety of institutional angles.  In this way, they 
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positioned the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk as an object and a target of intervention.  
This approach differed to that used for normally-deviant youth. 
Writers presented the diffusion of power for the normally-deviant youth in quite a covert way 
across texts.  In interventions into passing phase deviance, they described the application of 
diversion across the youth justice system as involving a variety of groups and members 
including the family, the community, and the youth justice system.  For example, described 
FGCs involved each of these institutions and focused on encouraging the development of 
responsibility or self-governance in the young person.  In this way, power was spread across 
a variety of institutional contexts. 
In contrast, those writing described interventions into the normally-deviant youth posing a 
threat to society as being diffused and networked through social institutions and spatial 
arrangements.  Police, youth workers, social workers, and council workers played a central 
role in these interventions as they utilised technology to centralise power onto, and into, the 
youth.  For example, writers highlighted lighting, surveillance, and adult presence as key 
technologies in the control of youth deviance. 
Hence, the way writers described power differed across the constructions of the deviant 
youth.  However, all interventions shared a concept of power diffusion and networking.  As 
well as this, writers described this networked power as promoting or creating self-
governance in the young person.  In this way, they positioned youth, through interventions, 
as both the object and the subject of power. 
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In considering these issues today, I would like to look at the role of the community in 
the lives of our young people.  I would like to suggest that in focusing on crime 
prevention, we must think about the need for our communities to comprehensively 
support and sustain our young people as they grow and develop.  As a community we 
must confront the problems our youth face, and offer solutions to those problems.  In 
doing so we are able to eliminate some of the poor consequences those problems 
have for our youth.   
(Carruthers, 2002, p.2, academic context, conference paper) 
On my first reading of the analysed texts, there appeared to be a clear one-dimensional 
power struggle between adults and young people.  Often authors’ description of power ran 
contrary to the capillary notion of power and, instead, they constructed adults as possessing, 
or holding, power over a young person’s development.  Furthermore, they presented this 
relationship as being one devoid of any larger context, or picture – it was simply a struggle 
between adults and young people and did not represent any challenge to the ideological 
structure, or stability of, New Zealand as a society.  Typically, through using developmental 
and risk knowledge to inform interventions, authors constructed young people as effects of 
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power whilst constructing adults as the ones being able to exercise power in order to change 
the course of development.  By doing this, they were able to reassure adults that they were 
in control and that they could control the threat of young people.   
Authors reinforced this power relationship by applying a developmental construction of the 
malleable objectified ‘youth’.  Through using developmental knowledge, they reinforced a 
conception that young people were powerless because they could not control their own 
development and depended upon adults for ‘healthy’, or socially-determined, outcomes.  In a 
way, they presented this as a repressive relationship between adults and young people 
where adults and adult-based institutions were constructed as the ‘we’ whilst children and 
young people were constructed as a different and dependent ‘other’.   
Through positioning youth as targets or objects of power, those writing about youth crime 
described how practitioners and other adults could transform young people and children into 
self-governing and self-disciplined adults.  Hence, they described the developmental 
transformation from childhood to adulthood as one in which the object ‘youth’ developed into 
a subject – an autonomous and self-governing adult.  This knowledge-informed construction 
continued through to interventions where writers constructed power in a more possessive 
sense in that young people and children were the effects of power whilst adults were the 
subjects of power.  Through interventions, writers depicted adults transferring power to 
young people in a controlled manner. 
By using a developmental idea of becomingness, writers produced and reinforced a 
construction of young people as powerless to the influences of developmental risk and adults 
being able to control that risk (i.e. as having the ability to exercise power).  Through using 
the concept of becomingness, they constructed children and young people as essentially 
different to adults.  They depicted children and young people as ‘lacking’ any power to 
control their development and needing the assistance of adults.  Once these young people 
became adults, those writing implied that they would be able to access power and would be, 
therefore, able to resist any intervention into their deviance.   
Writers further demonstrated this assumption through the idea of early intervention.  
According to those writing about early intervention, adults could intervene into a young 
person’s life at a young age and transform the young person.  These writers assumed, within 
this idea of early intervention, that younger children were more powerless and dependent 
than adolescents and adults.  As the child developed into an adult, the child became less 
susceptive to the effects of development making interventions less effective. 
By using developmental knowledge, authors described interventions targeting the deviant 
youth.  In this sense, they described how practitioners could direct interventions onto a youth 
from a variety of angles in order to control the developmental and social outcomes of a 
young person.  Additionally, authors implied that practitioners could also position the young 
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person in a network of governance and power.  In this sense, authors described how 
practitioners could use interventions into youth deviance to ‘hold’ power over a single youth 
in order to control their deviance.  Hence, authors implied that through knowledge and 
knowledge-informed practice, adults in authority could develop an understanding of a young 
person’s development and reproduce stability through interventions into developmental risk.   
However, the interventions described by authors were not societal reactions to the deviance 
of one or two individuals; they were societal attempts to maintain stability by controlling the 
behaviour and outcomes of all young people.  Hence, those writing did not construct the 
deviant youth as a single individual; rather, the deviant youth represented a group of 
individuals.  By using a knowledge of risk and development, these authors reinforced the 
need for adult society to ensure that young people developed into productive and self-
governing adults.  This enabled them to construct young people as the object on whom 
practitioners could direct developmental knowledge and as the point of intervention into 
social stability.  Authors implied that adult society could use interventions as the point in 
which power could be gradually internalised or transferred to the young person until the 
young person could be ‘trusted’ and left to develop on their own.  The types of interventions 
and the degree to which authors would construct the young person as a powerless object 
depended on the construction of the young person. 
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Inside Kingslea, the day begins for Kurariki and the others at 7.30am, followed by 
hours of work designed to end their criminal careers.  They are supervised at a ratio of 
about one staff member to five youths.  
Under the guidance of manager Shirley Johnson, the staff at Kingslea have developed 
a seven-week programme called ‘Challenging Offending’ which all new arrivals are put 
through.  
The programme, which CYF hopes to introduce to the other two youth justice centres, 
targets specific areas that may have led to their journey into crime - problems such as 
poor decision-making and problem-solving skills.  
‘It’s about getting young people to think about what triggers them and to think about 
the consequences [of their behaviour] and the impact on their families,’ says Pakura 
[CYF’s chief social worker].   
(Bingham, 2002, p.B5, media context, focus article) 
When authors constructed the youth-at-risk, they tended to conceptualise power as a 
repressive relationship between adults and young people in which adults possessed power.  
In doing this, they constructed abnormally-deviant young people as powerless to the effects 
of development.  This powerlessness reinforced the youth’s abnormality and dependence on 
adult society.  They were, first, powerless to counter the influence of adverse developmental 
factors on their life and they were, second, powerless to control their abnormal deviance.  
Additionally, the threat that these young people posed to the stability of society reinforced a 
need for authors to position them as powerless.  By constructing the youth as powerless, 
 140 
those writing could encourage adult society – adults could make a change and control the 
youth.  In contrast, if authors constructed youth as having access to power then the ‘power’ 
of adult society would diminish. 
Those writing about interventions for the youth-at-risk, did not completely draw upon the idea 
that a society could only control the young person if the young person had limited or no 
access to power.  Indeed, ‘true’ powerlessness is not possible in a contemporary industrial 
society.  In these societies, power is everywhere rather than being in someone’s possession 
(Foucault, 1980d).  For this reason, interventions also needed to direct the flow and use of 
power by the abnormally-deviant youth.  In the analysed texts, authors demonstrated this in 
descriptions of therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT).   
Authors described how practitioners could use CBT to redirect the young person’s thinking 
processes47.  Through CBT, practitioners could counter deviance and develop conformity in 
the young person.  In this sense, practitioners could reconstruct and reposition deviant youth 
as a self-governing subject.  When authors described CBT, they did not promote a 
construction of the young person as lacking power; rather, they constructed the young 
person as lacking the ‘right’ knowledge to effectively direct and use power.  However, to 
some extent, this involved them positioning adults in a controlling position.  In this 
positioning, adults could control the types of knowledge to which the young person had 
access and the developmental outcomes of the young person.  So, even though authors 
attempted to use interventions, such as CBT, to position and acknowledge the young person 
as a subject, they still constructed young people as objects of CBT and other interventions. 
Education was another intervention that writers argued for, which simultaneously positioned 
the young person as internalising power as well as being an object of educational power.  
Those writing described how, through education, the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk could 
internalise the power of socialisation and, thus, become self-governing.  However, at the 
same time, these writers constructed this young person as an object of development and risk 
on which practitioners directed this socialising power.   
Consequently, in construction of interventions into abnormal deviance, writers 
simultaneously positioned the young person as a subject and object of power.  Through 
ideas of risk and development, writers constructed young people as objects or effects of the 
conditions around them.  Furthermore, when writers described interventions, they tended to 
reinforce this position as well as attempt to transform these young people into self-governing 
adults.  Hence, the ways in which those writing described normal deviance tended to focus 
on building self-governance. 
                                                    
47
 Authors describing CBT provided a somewhat superficial description of it.  Keith Hawton, Paul Salkovskis, Joan 
Kirk & David Clark (1989) provide an indepth description of the therapy. 
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… involving young people in the decisions about how to deal with their offending is 
seen as a technique for holding them responsible for their offending.  And about a 
third of young offenders in the research on conferencing by Maxwell and Morris (1993) 
said that they had felt involved in the process.   
(Morris, 2002, p.170, academic context, book chapter) 
There is only one surveillance camera in the carpark.  A second is to be installed but 
Wilson [a police inspector] says the group would like to see four, with monitoring 
carried out by volunteers or security firms.  
It also wants an emergency telephone in the carpark with a direct line to the police 
station.   
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article) 
Those authors discussing normal deviance constructed young people in two differing ways – 
youth were either going through a passing phase or being a threat to society.  In both of 
these constructions, authors represented young people as objects of development.  
However, there were also times in which authors described them as subjects.  Reflecting 
interventions into abnormal deviance, these authors described how, through interventions 
into normal deviance, practitioners could attempt to transform the young person into a self-
governing subject whilst simultaneously positioning young people as a controllable object.  
This occurred in constructions of deviance as a passing phase and constructions of deviance 
as a threatening adolescent behaviour. 
In constructions of passing phase deviance, writers positioned youth as becoming a 
responsible self-governing adult.  These writers described how, in interventions into normal 
deviance, practitioners needed to focus on the development of self-governance.  In this way, 
in less intrusive interventions such as FGCs, practitioners worked on the principle of 
encouraging the development of acceptance and responsibility.  So, writers described how, 
through the diffusion of power, adults and adult-based institutions could surround the young 
person and ‘care’ for the young person and their outcomes.  However, like interventions into 
the abnormally-deviant youth, these writers also described power differently in relation to 
adults and young people.    
In constructions of normal deviance, those writing implied that practitioners, and other adults, 
needed to control the ways they directed power onto the young person.  In this way, authors 
positioned adults as subjects of power.  When authors focused on diversionary interventions, 
like FGCs, they implied that power, as a force, became more visible and coercive as the 
young person’s offending worsened.  Like in constructions of interventions for the youth-at-
risk, constructions of interventions into the offending of normally-deviant youth demonstrated 
a complexity in the operation of power where authors simultaneously conceptualised power 
as a repressive and controlling force as well as a productive and governing force. 
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In constructions of social threat deviance, authors positioned youth in a captive adolescent 
body.  They simultaneously constructed young people as powerless (unable to control their 
own development) and powerful (having some of the traits and rights of adults).  It was their 
access to power that rendered them dangerous to society and symbolised a struggle 
between adults and young people.   
In argued somewhat more intrusive interventions, such as surveillance, writers described 
how adult society could control the young person through a form of diffused, flowing, and 
invisible power, which would make the young person self-conscious.  As a result, this would 
build self-discipline and self-governance in the young person.  In interventions such as 
surveillance, writers described how practitioners could apply a capillary understanding of 
power to direct and target power at young people.  These writers did not separate these 
interventions and argue that interventions, like surveillance, were the only solution.  Instead, 
they argued that these interventions needed to incorporate coercive disciplinary techniques 
and the direct intervention of family, police, community wardens, youth workers, and social 
workers.   
Hence, reflecting constructions of abnormal youth deviance and the interventions into 
abnormal youth deviance, writers described how interventions into the deviance of normal 
youth involved practitioners positioning the young person as an object in which power could 
be internalised.  Through the internalisation of power, practitioners could transform the 
young person into a self-governing adult. 
$ 

C( D 




… clients are referred by Police Youth Aid Officers and are aged between 12 and 16 
years.  Typically they have appeared in the Youth Court two or three times and it is 
common for them to have significant family issues.  They often appear disconnected 
from their communities and many have problems within the education system.  When 
meeting a newly referred client for the first time the Youth Workers make it clear that 
the project is affiliated to the police and that if the Youth Workers become aware of 
criminal activity undertaken by the client, they will tell the police.  Young people with 
curfews are told that if the Youth Workers find them in breach of the curfew, they will 
inform the police.  With this information on board, prospective clients are free to 
choose whether or not they want the support of the Youth Worker to make positive 
changes in their life.   
(Moore, 2002, p.3, academic context, conference paper) 
Whether coercive or diversionary, authors described how interventions could transform the 
young person from a powerless and dependent child into a self-governing adult contributing 
to New Zealand society.  In a way, this positioning reflected New Zealand society in 2002, a 
society Jane Kelsey (2002) describes as neo-liberal.  Neo-liberal societies are built on 
concepts of self-discipline and self-governance (Foucault, 1994a; Rose, 1990).  They are 
societies of self-regulation rather than overt and clearly visible institutional regulation (Fraser, 
2003; Hindess, 1996; Rose, 1990).  These societies promote and develop self-governance in 
order to maintain stability and coherence.   
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Ideas of self-governance suit a capillary notion of power where no individual or institution 
holds power.  In these societies, power is diffused and decentralised.  So it is of no surprise 
that interventions into youth deviance are diffused and decentred as well as being focused 
on the development of self-discipline and self-governance.  In this way, interventions are a 
societal attempt to build self-governance; but, is self-governance a reality of interventions? 
For young people, self-governance may not be an immediate reality and we can see this in 
the analysed texts.  Once combined with developmental knowledge, authors assumed that 
only adults had the ability to self govern; children and young people needed to develop self-
governing behaviours.  They used developmental arguments to show young people and 
children lacking the ability and developmental level for self-governance.  This ‘lack’ meant 
that interventions could never truly involve young people in self-governance and if adults, 
through interventions, ‘gave’ power to the young person they risked making this young 
person a greater threat to society.   
Additionally, those writing about interventions into youth crime in 2002 implied that the 
outcomes of development (one being self-governance) tended to be determined by societal 
structures rather than biological development (c.f. Rose, 1990) (i.e. the development of the 
child into a productive adult, rather than a biological adult).  Along with this, authors 
suggested that the society needed to have self-governing people to maintain economic and 
social stability.  Furthermore, society needed to determine and control any threat to stability 
through knowledge (c.f. Foucault, 1999; Fraser, 2003; Hindess, 1996; Peters, 2000; Rose, 
1996b).   
On the surface, researchers and practitioners gathered data and knowledge to assist in the 
young person’s development.  However, the need for social stability covertly justified the 
need for these groups to gather data about young people and the risk they posed to society.  
Once these data were gathered, practitioners could implement intervention programmes 
focusing on controlling ‘developmental’ outcomes (Foucault, 1999; Hindess, 1996; Rose, 
1990). 
It is at this point, that the complexity of power becomes apparent as adults use interventions 
to encourage self-governance whilst also governing or controlling the young person.  This 
reasoning positions the youth as a subject and an object.  This reasoning was also evident in 
the analysed texts.  Authors constructed young people as both objects and subjects of 
power.  However, they also constructed adults as determining the position of young people.  
So, they positioned young people into contradictory positions by using ideas of development 
and risk to construct young people as an effect and an outcome of knowledge, whilst 
showing interventions countering this by making youth subjects or agents of their future.  
However, authors argued for more objectifying interventions when the developmental risk of 
the young person was high.  These interventions would target the youth from many angles.  
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In this sense, the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk was not just an object of knowledge but 
also became an object of power as interventions attempted to transform them into subjects. 
However, any attempt to intervene and reposition the young person as a subject or as 
having some form of agency cannot resolve problems of youth deviance.  We can see this 
when authors described interventions aimed at the individual and their family but 
downplayed any intervention into structural differences in society (including age).  For 
example, in 2002, New Zealand writers attributed crime to socio-economic level but did not 
describe any direct intervention into socio-economic status.  Instead, these writers 
suggested that the family and young person needed skills to move up the socio-economic 
‘ladder’.  In effect, writers did not engage in a discussion of the ‘reality’ in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand where there is a need to have low-paid workers. 
Furthermore, through positioning the individual as an object of knowledge and power, writers 
failed to acknowledge any apparent struggle between the young person and adults.  When 
such a struggle became apparent, writers would quickly apply developmental knowledge to 
reposition and reassert the youth’s position as an object.  In such a way, they did not see 
young people as exercising power over their development or, at times, even having the 
ability to access power or assert resistance.  In this way, writers tended to show deviance as 
a purely negative construct in society.  They also ignored the possibility that deviance may 
be a reaction or a form of resistance by the young person, which the young person directs at 
the limitations of social and ideological structures in a society, a type of resistance that is 
productive. 
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Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. 
(Foucault, 1983, p.216) 
Up to this point, I have represented the relationship between institutions, adults, and young 
people in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, as one of control – particularly a one-sided control 
where authors described adults and adult-based institutions attempting to manage the 
development, outcomes, future productivity, and deviance of young people through 
knowledge and practice.  In Chapter 9, I problematised this relationship by suggesting that 
adults and adult-based institutions were not maintaining control over youth but, rather, were 
struggling to maintain control.  In effect, authors could not fully represent power as a one-
sided object that adults held and wielded over young people.  Instead, there was a need to 
see power as being more complex – something that flowed, working on specific individuals, 
but also insuring social stability.   
Indeed, if adults did hold power and if young people were nothing but objects, then adults 
could fully control the young people through interventions.  This would be especially evident 
with children at a young age and further away from adulthood, and it would mean that we 
could use an absolute and complete knowledge about youth deviance.  We could be certain 
that we could use this knowledge to fully and completely predict, and then control, 
developmental outcomes of young people.  We would know that any intervention we applied 
from this knowledge would be effective.  However, this was not the case in the texts 
analysed.  Instead, whenever authors constructed youth, there were possibilities for 
contradictory outcomes; in a sense, they replaced absolute developmental predictability with 
probability – where there was always a chance of an unpredictable outcome.  Authors did 
not concentrate on any apparent contradictions; they did mention these contradictions but 
stressed that they were a rarity – something adult society should overlook and dismiss. 
In this chapter, I want to concentrate on these moments of contradiction.  I want to suggest 
that these moments of contradiction are actually moments of freedom.  These moments of 
freedom demonstrate a struggle within the young person or between the young person and 
the adult society in which they live.  In a way, the struggle at the moment of contradiction 
indicates two issues: first, a struggle between the young person and ‘society’; and, second, 
the existence of, not only, power, but also, resistance.  I want to suggest that constructing 
young people as engaging in struggles of power and resistance offers another perspective 
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on youth deviance.  Young people, themselves, and people working with/writing about young 
people can use resistance to offer another, potentially more ‘positive’, construction of youth 
deviance, which causes a society to look in on itself, in interventions, and work with the 
young person rather than concentrating on deficits in the young person and working on the 
young person.  
$   & 

# 
   $ A 7 




Of course, negative experiences in early childhood do not affect everyone in the same 
way … Not all children who are at risk of poor outcomes actually experience those 
poor outcomes.  Where some children grow up in relatively deprived circumstances 
but go on to lead productive lives, others grow up in stable and positive environments 
yet still experience poor outcomes in adulthood.  
(Carruthers, 2002, p.8, academic context, conference paper)  
Those writing about youth crime in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002, referred to unpredictable 
developmental outcomes as contradictions.  They acknowledged that there were possibilities 
that abnormal youth might not offend and that normal youth might develop into criminal 
adults.  However, these writers reasoned that this was a small possibility and, because of 
this, interventions needed to be directed at abnormally-deviant youth and the threatening 
behaviours of adolescents.      
The unpredictability of outcomes showed that, even in constructions of youth deviance 
verified by expertise, there was a moment of uncertainty – an “indeterminate” moment where 
writers could not determine the ‘truths’ of youth deviance (c.f. Bhabha, 1995, p.47).  Although 
some critical youth studies theorists (e.g. Wyn & White, 2000) argue that contradictions 
actually limit the possibilities available for youth, postcolonial theorists, such as Homi 
Bhabha (1995), argue that contradictions are moments of freedom and uncertainty.   
For the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, the indeterminate moment of contradiction provides 
a moment of positivity – their life may not be one of ‘poor outcomes’ or, in a colloquial sense, 
‘doom and gloom’.  Instead, somehow, this young person could resist the effect of risk 
factors – they could resist the influence of their circumstances and the ‘negative’ influences 
in their life.  The moment of uncertainty provides this youth with a possibility for resistance 
(c.f. Foucault, 1980b).  
Bhabha (1995) also notes that these moments of freedom and possibility are indeterminate 
moments.  Indeterminate moments are not just moments of contradiction but also the 
moments between the word and the object being described.  In a sense, they are liminal 
moments, where the word is not quite fixated on the object.  Youth, itself, is a liminal 
construct and, as such, the ‘not quite’ nature of youth enforces an unpredictability even when 
adults apply an expertise or science to fixate the object youth. 
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In this sense, the moments of indeterminacy and freedom are also moments of self-
negotiation in which the subject, or individual, negotiates, and in a sense ‘creates’, their self 
through the forms of knowledge to which they have access and the structures in which they 
are embedded (c.f. Bevir, 1999; Foucault, 1976, 1997; Viriasova, 2006).  In this sense, it is 
possible for a young person to occupy several positions simultaneously and to consciously, 
or subconsciously, position themselves, or find themselves positioned, differently in 
accordance to the different situations they face (c.f. Besley, n.d.).  Hence, it is not only 
authors that may construct the youth simultaneously in several contradictory positions (such 
as deviant and normal) but young people themselves may position themselves, or be 
positioned, in more than one position simultaneously.  Furthermore, young people may draw 
upon the different positions to which they have access to resist the ways in which adults 
construct them.  The direction that a young person takes is an event of contingency and 
unpredictability, dependent upon other alternative constructions available to a young person 
within the structural and material contexts in which they live. 
As well as freedom and possibilities for resistance, moments of contradiction and 
indeterminability can also illustrate a moment of struggle and contestation between the 
young person and adults (c.f. Edwards & Ribbens, 1998; Foucault, 1980b, 1980e).  These 
moments of contestation and struggle are points in which youth and adults attempt to define 
themselves and the other.  In effect, we can see this struggle as a relationship of power and 
resistance where adults and adult-based institutions attempt to control the development of 
the youth into a subject (and, therefore, in the attempt of repositioning, they position the 
youth as a powerless object of developmental knowledge).  In this relationship, we can read 
the deviance (and, at times, non-deviance) of the youth as a resistance to this adult-
determined positioning.  Therefore, adults attempting to understand youth and make 
meaning of their lives can never fully construct young people as ‘powerless’.  They may 
attempt to dominate and control youth but can never fully achieve this because knowledge of 
‘youth’ is never complete and closed.  There will always be moments of resistance. 
Although it is easy to represent this relationship as a clear two-sided struggle between adults 
and young people, we must also acknowledge the complexity of identity and positioning on 
both sides.  In theoretical discussions, or written texts, often a theorist, or writer, may provide 
a two-dimensional representation of the objects, or subjects of, research without 
acknowledging the complexity of the object, or subject, being studied.  Indeed, we can see 
this in the author descriptions of youth deviance – where often authors ‘labelled’ or 
positioned particular types of youth as deviant with brief acknowledgement to the 
contradictory aspects of their argument.  In effect, many authors implied that an ‘us’ (adults) 
and ‘them’ (youth) relationship existed.  In reality, the two groups ‘adults’ and ‘youth’ were 
more complex and consisted of many more contradictions – it was more than just an ‘us’ and 
‘them’ relationship. 
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For example, the argument developed by authors showed practitioners working with and on 
youth simultaneously although many authors emphasised the need to control deviant 
outcomes (or the ‘on’ side of the relationship).  In reality, many practitioners working with 
young people daily (like teachers and youth workers) are actively having to work at the 
interface of with and on.  In reality, many practitioners are working with youth, and with youth 
knowledge, to contest the spaces in which youth are positioned.  These people are not only 
having to question current youth knowledges but having to negotiate their own identity as 
‘youth workers’.  There are adults attempting to make a difference in young people’s lives (to 
be a significant someone)48 and there are adults contesting the ways in which youth have 
been positioned (such as critical youth studies theorists).  Both kinds of people attempt to 
work with young people, and with youth knowledge, in the struggle for identification. 
In this sense, in the negotiation of the self and the exercising of resistance, there is a social 
element.  Just as we socially construct knowledge, we also construct ourselves in social 
contexts.  Young people understand and position themselves in their negotiation with 
institutions, adults, and other young people.  Their construction of identity occurs in the 
moments where they ‘learn about’, or negotiate, themselves through the knowledges and 
people to which and whom they have access.  Hence, we have to be aware of the types of 
relationships we develop with young people and the ways in which the contestation of 
identity can affect and influence the young person in the now and in the future (c.f Apple, 
2001).  Perhaps, instead of searching for better and more comprehensive interventions in 
the control of deviance, we need to find opportunities for young people to negotiate 
themselves and their identity.  Perhaps, in the struggle for identity, we need to be looking at 
the possibilities for power and resistance. 
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He [a 15 year-old male] thinks changing the lighting or video surveillance won’t stop 
the problems but will move them somewhere else.  
‘If they close down Buxton, we will go to Montgomery and then the Church Steps and 
Queen’s Gardens,’ he says.  
(S. Smith, 2002, p.13, media context, focus article) 
Foucault (1976, 1980b) argues that power cannot be conceptualised without resistance 
because in any incidence of power there is also resistance.  Even though Foucault offers 
very little expansion on this theory (Grimshaw, 1993; Lacombe, 1996; McNay, 1992; Said, 
1986) or very little development on his ideas of resistance (Hoy, 1986a), the idea that power 
and resistance are intertwined allows for an explanation of the complexity of youth deviance.  
It first allows for the acknowledgement of a struggle.  In this sense, individuals and groups do 
                                                    
48
 During the time in which I researched and wrote this thesis, the most supportive group towards my study were 
actually youth workers and other practitioners working with youth.  These people are aware of the difficulties young 
people experience with developmental and risk knowledge and are looking for alternative ways to construct their 
ideas of youth so that they can work with youth to make a difference. 
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not own or possess power; rather, power is a force, which individuals or groups attempt 
tactically to use in order to control or dominate others (Foucault, 1980b; Lacombe, 1996).  
However, one group can never fully dominate the other; rather, it is the interplay of a struggle 
and the exercising of power and resistance.   
Furthermore, this struggle for domination is not physical or material in the traditional sense of 
violent political revolutions, although it may have physical aspects.  Rather, this struggle for 
domination is first ideological in that it is a struggle for ‘truth’ and, in the case of an adult 
middle-case Pakeha society, it is the application of a ‘truth’ in order to maintain a sense of 
social stability and cohesion:  
The government of men by men — whether they form small or large groups, whether it 
is power exerted by men over women, or by adults over children, or by one class over 
another, or by a bureaucracy over a population - involves a certain type of rationality.  
It doesn’t involve instrumental violence.  
(Foucault, 1999, p.152) 
Foucault (1999) argues that there is an intrinsic link between power and knowledge in any 
struggle for domination and control.  We can find a similar argument in Marxist writing where 
theorists such as Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Raymond Williams (1977) argue that a 
‘hegemonic’ struggle occurs, particularly in capitalist societies, as one group (often the 
middle-class) attempts to control another through forcing a particular ‘truth’, or view, of 
reality.  To these theorists, hegemony consists of: 
… a whole body of practices and expectations … It is a lived system of meanings and 
values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices 
appear as reciprocally confirming.  It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most 
people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond it is 
very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.  
(Williams, 1977, p.110) 
Critical youth studies theorists (esp. Griffin, 1993) have used this concept of hegemony in 
their attempts to explain the application of knowledge by adults on young people to control 
their development.  To a certain extent, this is true as the struggle that is occurring between 
adults and youth is one of identity and the ‘reality’ of that identity. However, we are limited 
when we use a conception of hegemony.  On a purely theoretical level, when we focus on 
hegemony within an analysis of resistance, we focus the class struggles that occur within a 
society.  Furthermore, in focusing on hegemony, we may find ourselves slipping into the 
Marxist argument that hegemony and ideology are simply mistruths and that scientific reason 
may lead us to the ‘Truth’ (c.f. Williams, 1977).  In a way, we may find ourselves returning to 
an assumption that the subject and knowledge are completely separate (i.e. that we can 
discover our true selves if we take ourselves away from hegemonic knowledge), instead of 
recognising the complex constitutive relationship between the subject and knowledge.  
Finally, on an analytical level, if we focus our analysis of youth resistance to an analysis of 
hegemonic struggles, we may find ourselves overlooking the micro acts of resistance that 
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occur when a young person attempts to negotiate their own being, and make meaning of 
their own life, within a particular context.   
Moreover, when we use references to hegemony, we tend to assume that groups, to a 
varying extent, accept and believe another group’s position as ‘Truth’ (Shuker, 1987b; 
Williams, 1977).  In doing this, we limit the forms of resistance in which an individual may 
engage.  On one level, we may imply that that ‘real’ resistance can only be collective 
resistance and that ‘real’ resistance leads to a group’s emancipation (see White & Wyn 
1998; Wyn & White, 1998).  In effect, when we might focus only on overt oppositional 
resistance, the type of which manifests in collective conscious raising movements (c.f. 
Freire, 1993) and neglect to see that an individual’s or group’s choice to ‘play the game’ may 
also be an act of resistance. 
So, even though we can use hegemony effectively to investigate these struggles as they 
occur across class dimensions, we do need to broaden our understanding of resistance to 
acknowledge the complex interactions between a variety of structural dimensions (such as 
gender, class, ethnicity, and age).  We also need a concept of resistance that acknowledges 
the less visible forms of resistance – the types of resistance that occur by, and through, 
individuals in silent conformity and in moments of contradiction.  However, like hegemonic 
class struggles, we also need to recognise that there is a connection between acts of 
resistance and struggles of identity and agency. 
A struggle cannot be one-sided; even the word struggle implies that there are opposing 
forces.  Subsequently, a struggle for domination and control should involve more than one 
party and, as such, an analyst should be able to observe both power and resistance.  David 
Hoy (1986b) uses a metaphor of programming a computer for a game of chess to illustrate 
this: 
To program a computer for chess, presumably one must include some considerations 
about counter-attacks … the strategy explains why the one piece can or ought to 
capture the other, but it does not determine that the piece must capture the other.  
(Hoy, 1986b, p.136, author’s emphasis) 
A game of chess is about domination and control where one player exercises power over 
another.  However, as Hoy (1986b) rightly points out, in a game of chess there are also 
moments of resistance.  Each time one player exercises power in the form of attack there is 
always a possibility of a counter attack.  Hoy also describes a moment of indeterminability in 
chess – a moment of freedom and unpredictability – where the attacking player cannot 
determine their opponent’s move or counterattack, even with an established knowledge or 
logic of chess.  In a struggle for domination and control, Hoy’s illustration shows us that 
domination may be used to restrict any possible moves of resistance, but this does not 
extinguish any possibility of resistance (even in a game of chess the losing opponent might 
decide to flip over the chess board).  We can also see evidence of these moments within the 
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texts of 2002, even through using developmental reasoning and techniques of risk 
assessment, authors acknowledged a possibility of contradiction – that young people may 
not do as predicted.  Hence, although authors used knowledge to describe, and to a certain 
extent, determine the deviant youth, they could never fully determine the youth as the youth 
could, at times, contradict, and in effect, resist the predictions of authors.  Furthermore, even 
in the methodical and systematic theorisation of interventions, authors were unable to fully 
determine the youth – instead the ‘gap’ between adult society and young people became 
more evident.   
We can see the ideas of struggle, domination, and resistance in Foucault’s (1999) own 
explanation of power and government:  
First, power is not a substance.  Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must 
be delved into.  Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals.  Such 
relations are specific, that is, they have nothing to do with exchange, production, 
communication, even though they combine with them.  The characteristic feature of 
power is that some men can more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct - but 
never exhaustively or coercively.  A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to 
force being exerted over him.  Not power.  But if he can be induced to speak, when his 
ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has 
been caused to behave in a certain way.  His freedom has been subjected to power.  
He has been submitted to government.  If an individual can remain free, however little 
his freedom may be, power can subject him to government.  There is no power without 
potential refusal or revolt.  
(Foucault, 1999, p.152) 
In this quote, Foucault acknowledges the presence of a struggle in which one group attempts 
to determine the actions of another.  Foucault argues that, although these moments might 
involve domination and actions of violence, a governing group can never fully determine the 
subject.  He argues that the subject does have the ability to resist – for Foucault, in any 
action of domination there are always points of resistance.  We are able to find examples of 
this in the everyday ‘reactions’ of young people to adults as young people defy or manipulate 
adult rules to their advantage.  We can also find examples of this in literary works such as 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Beecher Stowe, 1966), which describe the struggle for identity in 
contexts of slavery.  In Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe describes how, in a 
moment of domination and control, Tom (a slave) is able to assert some resistance and 
reconstruct himself within a particular context (not as a slave but as a believer): 
"Mas'r Legree, as ye bought me, I'll be a true and faithful servant to ye. I'll give ye all 
the work of my hands, all my time, all my strength; but my soul I won't give up to 
mortal man. I will hold on to the Lord, and put his commands before all, – die or live; 
you may be sure on 't. Mas'r Legree, I ain't a grain afeard to die. I'd as soon die as not. 
Ye may whip me, starve me, burn me, – it'll only send me sooner where I want to go." 
(Beecher Stowe, 1966, p.406-407)   
As the above quote suggesst, it is within struggles of domination, and the exercising of 
power and resistance, that the self is formed (Butin, 2001; Foucault, 1976; Lacombe, 1996).  
In one sense, adults and adult-based institutions force a positioning of deviance upon 
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particular youth.  In this positioning, adults may use the knowledge and supposed ‘Truth’ of 
developmental growth and risk to construct and control the young person (c.f. Foucault, 
1980e).  It is in this positioning that they attempt to define the self of the young person as 
‘adolescent’, ‘child’, ‘deviant’ and so forth.  However, this knowledge cannot determine the 
young person – the young person may consciously, or subconsciously, resist this 
positioning, or may consciously, or subconsciously, take up this positioning – which, in itself, 
may be read as a form of resistance against other factors in the young person’s life.  In this 
sense, the young person is also involved in the taking up, or resisting, of positions.  The 
young person is never fully determined through knowledge but actually plays a role in the 
construction of self.  Hence, even in the internal construction of self there is both power and 
resistance (Foucault, 1976; Hindess, 1996). 
As I have already shown in this thesis, New Zealand authors in 2002 tended to position 
young people as lacking the power to control development.  They did not consider any 
construction of resistance.  If they did this, they would need to conceptualise what agency 
was, or could be, for young people. 
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… the ways in which agency is conceptualised has important political implications in 
relation to our understanding of the nature of social order, and hence likewise for the 
development of particular institutional interventions and strategies for social change 
involving young people.   
(White & Wyn, 1998, p.325) 
Using a concept of agency in a thesis that is claiming some poststructural tenets can be 
problematic.  For poststructural authors (see Bevir, 1999; Viriasova, 2006), agency is a 
debatable concept because of the differing views of the relationship between discourse and 
the ‘subject’.  These authors argue that traditional notions of agency connect agency to 
autonomy and the actions of an authentic self in making rational decisions.  That is, 
traditional notions of agency tend to construct agency as a concept of liberal society in which 
the self-determined and autonomous individual has the ability to choose and make decisions 
on their own lives.  Poststructural theorists (e.g. Jones, 1992) consider this construction of 
agency problematic because of its connection to a particular discourse (liberalism) and its 
distancing from the relationship between the subject and knowledge (in which particular 
discourses limit the subject positions available).   
However, we can reconceptualise agency in a way that acknowledges resistance (c.f. 
Tobias, 2005).  This involves taking the position that agency is not a concept limited to a 
single discourse that claims an authentic autonomous self (i.e. liberalism) but can be 
reconstructed across, and through, many knowledges.  White and Wyn (1998) argue that 
“[a]gency is something which is ‘done’” (p.315).  One of the ways agency can be ‘done’ is 
through choice – another way, which may involve some form of choice, is through 
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resistance.  Although both positions, at times, acknowledge the complex relationship 
between the subject and knowledge, it is this second way that does not reify the position of 
the subject as an autonomous ‘choosing’ individual separate to discourse.  Rather this 
second position acknowledges that the individual is located in the moment of the 
indeterminate, at the point in which knowledge is exercised on an individual, but does not 
determine the individual.  However, before I go on to discuss how agency can be 
conceptualised as resistance, I want to outline the traditional conception of agency as choice 
and highlight why this conception of agency would not work in a reconstruction of youth 
deviance. 
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Canterbury University criminologist Dr Greg Newbold says children of career criminals 
still make their own decisions, still opt to commit crimes – but research shows they are 
hugely disadvantaged.  ‘Just as boys follow their fathers into law or the police force or 
cricket or rugby, so boys with criminal families follow their fathers into crime.’  
There are three hopes: he needs to find a paid job, a clean-living girlfriend, or a 
positive male role model.  
Canterbury police youth aid co-ordinator Sergeant Chris Roper says: ‘There are no 
two ways about it: quite significant recidivist offenders can turn their lives around’.  
(Welham, 2002, p.4, media context, focus article) 
Critical youth studies (White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1998) arguments for increased 
opportunities for agency tend to connect agency to freedom and choice.  That is, they tend to 
base their theory of agency on the traditional notion of choice made by an autonomous and 
authentic self.  These theorists define agency as conscious and rational goal-directed activity 
occurring on three dimensions – the personal, the immediate social, and the wider social (or 
collective) (White & Wyn, 1998; Wyn & White, 1998).  White and Wyn (1998) have described 
effective agency as occurring on this third level and involving conscious action, challenging 
existing structures, and involving collective activities: 
Effective agency, we argue, embodies the three dimensions previously outlined.  That 
is, it involves consciousness of the potential to take action, the willingness to engage 
in collective action in the interests of the group and, importantly, the knowledge and 
willingness to challenge existing structures.  Thus, agency is about knowledge, power 
and the ability to activate resources.  Social divisions and inequalities have an impact 
on the extent to which individuals and groups have access to each of these aspects of 
effective agency.  Furthermore, agency is a continuous process, involving constant 
ebbs and flows depending upon immediate material circumstances and group 
dynamics. 
(White & Wyn, 1998, p.318) 
Within my own research, I found White and Wyn’s (1998) construction of agency initially 
problematic, in a theoretical sense, as I attempted to locate their concept of agency into a 
poststructural framework.  This was particularly difficult because of the conceptualisation of 
agency as conscious and rational choice.  We can see discussion of this theoretical problem 
in the work of Mark Bevir (1999) and Inna Viriasova (2006).  Both Bevir and Viriasova use 
Foucault’s ideas about power and knowledge to explore agency in liberal societies.  Like me, 
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Bevir and Viriasova both come from the position that there is a complex and constitutive 
relationship between knowledge, power, and the self.  To Bevir and Viriasova, traditional 
concepts of agency as rational choice are awkward as they assume an autonomous subject 
who exists outside of knowledge and who makes discrete and objective decisions and 
choices.  In a poststructural sense, this is problematic as the subject can never be fully 
autonomous and that any choice or decision made by the subject is, in itself, influenced by 
the knowledges and power that imbue the subject.  Taking this argument further, when we 
associate a concept of agency with rational choice, it could be said that we risk returning to a 
concept of agency that is devoid of context and ignores the constitutive connection between 
the subject and knowledge.  Additionally, in associating agency with choice and then defining 
that choice, we might overlook the moments of agency where an individual makes irrational 
choices and decisions. 
However, if we read White and Wyn’s (1998) theorisation closely, it is possible to see that 
White and Wyn do acknowledge that agency can never be an authentic autonomous choice 
devoid of power.  White and Wyn clearly see an association between knowledge and 
agency; to them, the use of developmental knowledge has had an impact on youth agency – 
developmental knowledge has limited agency by positioning the youth as powerless and 
dependent upon adults.  In turn, White and Wyn argue, the opposite, that is that the use of 
liberal knowledge, has totally decontextualised agency and has ignored the role of structural 
and material limitations for, and on, youth.  White and Wyn encourage us to contextualise 
agency and to acknowledge the role that contexts (material, structural, and knowledge-
based) play on the exercising of agency: 
We must attempt to understand the way in which different groups of young people are 
situated within the local community, group or school, and how these relationships are, 
in turn, shaped by wider processes and social divisions associations with the dominant 
mode of production and power relations in society. 
(White & Wyn, 1998, p.325)   
So, to White and Wyn (1998), agency is about rational choice but that choice is affected by 
the contexts in which it is embedded.  In this sense, even in a claim to rationality, White and 
Wyn, to a certain extent, reflect a poststructural argument of agency, in that they 
acknowledge the influence of knowledge, power, and context.  They do not see agency as 
absent of context but totally imbued within power, knowledge, material, and structural 
boundaries.   
Perhaps a more problematic feature of White and Wyn’s (1998) argument is that effective 
agency needs to occur at the social (or collective level).  In this latter argument, even though 
White and Wyn acknowledge that agency can occur on a micro level, they minimise many 
micro acts of agency (such as an individual’s acts of deviance or non-deviance) and, 
therefore, downplay the importance of these acts in the construction of self and the 
exercising of agency.   
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However, there are also practical problems in discussing a theory of agency as choice, 
particularly around the definition of choice, the groups of young people that get to make 
choices, and the outcomes of choice.  For example, White and Wyn (1998) tend to define 
choice as a positive, collective, and rational action that leads to the development of 
“emancipatory projects” (p.324).  In effect, even though they have defined agency as a 
“process” (p.318), they have limited this process to choices that lead to emancipation.  
Furthermore, in focusing on emancipation, White and Wyn, in effect, have defined the 
concept of ‘rational choice’ and, although their reading of rational choice acknowledges the 
existence of complex power relationships between adults and young people, their theory 
depends upon adults being open to challenge from young people and providing opportunities 
for young people to exercise agency.   
In this moment of dependency between adults and youth, there is also a risk that this choice 
might become adult-determined choice, not youth choice, as adults may (and this may be 
unintentional) pre-determine whatever choice the young person may make.  In effect, agency 
as choice may reflect a questionnaire with listed issues where the researcher asks the 
participants what issues affect them by providing them with group of issues from which to 
choose.  Hence, in connecting effective agency to choice, adults might give young people 
opportunities to choose but place those choices within clearly determined boundaries.  
Adults might also attempt to determine the types of choices young people should not make.  
For example, in discussions of youth deviance in 2002, authors implied that deviance was 
not an appropriate ‘choice’ for young people.  
We can see this problem of choice restriction and determination in philosophical discussions 
of choice, where theorists (such as Rose, 1990; Vaughan, 2001) argue that there is a 
complex and contradictory relationship between choice and restraint in liberal societies.  
These theorists argue that it is difficult to connect agency to authentic choice because in 
order to have more choices we often need to determine and set up more restraints around 
the types of choices we can make. That is, in opening up more opportunities to choose, we 
also ‘over’ situate those choices within defined and complex limits.  Foucault (1977) shows 
this in his book Discipline and Punish, where he describes the transformation of feudal 
society into liberal society.  Foucault argues that we often associate freedom and choice with 
liberal societies; however, to him, in liberal societies, the function of power is transformed 
and actually leads to a different kind of regulation – one in which practices of self-discipline 
and practices of surveillance restrict and determine the freedom of the individual.  As, Dany 
Lacombe (1996) describes: 
It soon became obvious that every attempt to reform society, to give people more 
freedom ineluctably becomes its opposite – a technique of domination.   
(Lacombe, 1996, p.332) 
 156 
Connected to the restraints surrounding choice, it is possible that when adults and adult-
based institutions open up opportunities for choice for youth they are selective on the types 
of youth to whom they give choice.  Indeed, the types of youth who participate in 
emancipatory projects may not be deviant youth.  In effect, in ‘giving’ youth opportunities to 
participate, adults might find themselves giving opportunities to some groups of youth whilst 
denying opportunities to others.  A good example of this, in New Zealand, is the 
development of the Youth Development Strategy Aotearoa (Ministry of Youth Affairs, 2002).  
Although the Ministry of Youth Affairs developed this strategy as a policy to work with all 
young people between the ages of 12-25 and as a model of youth participation, the young 
people surveyed for this strategy came from New Zealand secondary schools49.  In effect, 
young people outside the school system, young people working, young people in 
intermediate schools, and young people in tertiary institutions were not included (although 
the policy included these young people in its framework).  We can also see this in the 
constructions of youth deviance in New Zealand texts in 2002, authors often associated 
choice with the normally-deviant youth; whereas authors constructed the abnormally-deviant 
youth as an effect of knowledge.  In doing this, authors often restricted the ‘irrational’ choice 
to be deviant to a particular kind of youth. 
As such, choice is a loaded and problematic concept.  It is particularly problematic when we 
use it to understand the actions of youth.  At a conceptional level, it becomes problematic 
when we attempt to reconstruct youth deviance through an idea of rational choice (even if it 
occurs within contextual restraints) because, at some point, we could find ourselves 
mistaking deviance as an act of limited agency involving irrational decisions that do not lead 
to emancipation.  Indeed, we could find ourselves arguing conclusively that deviant youth 
(particularly abnormally-deviant youth) have limited, or no, agency because of the contextual 
constraints in which they live.   
Furthermore, we also risk ignoring the power relations occurring between adults and youth in 
the exercising of agency.  In effect, in allowing youth to choose, someone needs to 
determine what choices are available, any restraints needed (who should do the choosing 
and how) and the types of outcomes to which that choice should lead.  Instead, what we 
need is an alternative conception of agency, which attempts to explain the anomalies in the 
current ideas about youth deviance, the implications of current ideas of youth deviance, and 
to provide a possible alternative conception of youth deviance, which acknowledges that, in 
some way, young people are exercising resistance.  We also need an interpretation of 
agency that acknowledges that the ‘choices’ young people make may be both irrational and 
acts of agency. A concept of resistance can help us develop this new interpretation.  On the 
surface, agency can be both resistance and choice – however, through connecting agency 
with resistance, we are able to acknowledge the struggle that occurs in the construction of 
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 A single focus group of selected Wellington young people were also included in the development of the strategy. 
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the self and we are able to recognize the constitutive role of knowledge in the formation of 
self without reinforcing a traditional notion of agency based on notions of rational choice.  We 
are also able to acknowledge that ‘we’ do not have total control over the ‘choices’ young 
people make and that, sometimes, the choices young people may make will challenge us 
and the knowledges we see as ‘Truth’. 

#' '
 

Respondents identified a range of reactions of young people referred to the Centre 
from frightened to aggressive and from cooperative to uncooperative.  
Some young people were reportedly annoyed about being detained or resented being 
picked up as they reportedly felt that they ‘weren’t getting into trouble’.  For example, 
one commented that young people were:  
‘A bit cranky as their plans for the evening had been disrupted but were okay.’   
Respondents reported that some young people were:  
‘Abusive to Police, angry, dishonest about personal details, resistant to giving 
information about themselves’,   
and  
‘… those who were intoxicated [were] often full of smart comments - vocal but mostly 
complaining, one or two abusive’.  
Respondents stated that some young people were confused as to why they were at 
the Police Station ‘when they were not offending’.  They reportedly found the safety 
aspect ‘difficult to grasp as nothing had actually happened to them’.  However, others 
were reportedly well behaved and understood why they had been referred to the 
Centre after the objectives were explained to them.  
(Social Policy Team of Christchurch City Council & Contracting Group of Child, Youth 
and Family Services, 2002, p.26, government context, evaluation report) 
We achieve three things when we conceptualise agency in terms of resistance.  First, we are 
able to acknowledge that the self (our own identity) occurs through a struggle for domination 
(c.f. Butin, 2001; Foucault, 1976; Krips, 1990; Tobias, 2005).  Second, we are able to move 
away from choice and, as such, better reflect the contingency of contemporary society and 
the human condition (c.f. Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992).  Third, we are able to acknowledge 
that agency is a ‘creative’ or an unpredictable process of self-negotiation that occurs in 
moments of indeterminacy.  Hence, when we conceptualise agency as resistance, we 
acknowledge that a society is contingent – continuously being formed in the moment through 
struggles for domination and control.  So, we can see that, at any point in time, the members 
of a society cannot be fully determined and that the struggles for domination are just one 
attempt to enable some form of determination to occur.  These struggles are the attempts in 
a society at closure to any apparent contradictions to the ‘truths’ or indeterminate moments.  
Agency is about the indeterminate moment in this struggle (c.f. Tobias, 2005).  It is about the 
moments of unpredictability and creativity in which the individual uses the resources to which 
they have access to negotiate and position themselves within a framework: 
Agents, in contrast, exist only in specific contexts, but these contexts never determine 
how they try to construct themselves.  Although agents necessarily exist within 
regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they 
can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the 
actions they can attempt to perform.  Agents are creative beings; it is just that their 
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creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it.  
(Bevir, 1999, p.67) 
Like agency in the form of choice, some theorists (Davies, 1997; Ginwright & Cammarota, 
2002) argue that there needs to be a conscious element to resistance.  In other words, in 
order for someone to be able to resist a construction or positioning, that person must be 
conscious of that construction and consciously resisting or accepting that construction.  To a 
certain extent, there is some truth to this position, as people do actively choose to resist.  We 
can find an illustration of this in moments of hegemonic struggles, where, through 
consciousness raising, oppressed groups actively resist and reposition themselves as active 
subjects.  However, other people or groups may not interpret these choices of resistance as 
rational; indeed, to other groups the choice to resist may be irrational.  This is the ‘power’ of 
resistance as it enables us to see the irrational choice as an act of agency – even if it does 
not lead to change or emancipation.  Perhaps a better example of irrational resistance 
comes through explanations for normal deviance where authors describe the youth going 
through a passing phase as choosing to be deviant – but, in being deviant, authors interpret 
their choices as irrational and needing redirection.   
Although an individual may exercise resistance in the form of choice, there are often times of 
contradiction and indeterminacy where there is no evidence of a conscious choice.  We can 
see this, across the texts analysed, in the moments where authors describe the abnormally-
deviant youth who does not ‘become’ a deviant adult.  Often authors are perplexed as to the 
reasons for this and, instead of looking at the actions of the youth, look to developmental 
explanations in protective factors or resilience.  In this, authors imply that the young person 
has not consciously chosen to resist a deviant position.  Indeed in my own Masters research 
(Beals, 2002a), I found that women who had been through the prison system had resisted 
particular constructions of criminality.  These women re-positioned themselves outside of the 
criminological construction of the criminal woman.  They only became ‘conscious’ of their 
resistance during the course of their involvement in my research.  Resistance was not an 
explicit conscious choice before the research. 
Judith Butler (1995b) would agree with the argument that resistance may not be a conscious 
action of the subject.  For Butler, resistance is located in the psyche or subconsciousness of 
the individual.  Like Michel Foucault (1976) and Dan Butin (2001), Butler argues that power 
and resistance occur in the construction of the self where power is directed at the self and 
the self attempts to resist power.  The subject of power is not produced in one moment but is 
always in the moment of being produced – it is this contingent and indeterminate positioning 
of the subject that enables resistance and new possibilities (Butler, 1995b; Lacombe, 1996).  
Other authors such as Bevir (1999) agree with Butler and develop the argument for freedom 
and resistance further by arguing that the process of becoming a subject occurs in moments 
of freedom and is a creative process in which an individual consciously and subconsciously 
negotiates their identity.   
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Although, Butler (1995) and Bevir (1999) provide us with interesting insights into the 
subconscious elements of resistance, we must also acknowledge the role of structural 
elements.  That is, even in a negotiation for identity, the subject is somewhat limited to the 
types of self they can fashion.  The moment of indeterminacy is not a moment of ‘pure’ 
freedom where the individual can totally reconstruct himself or herself as someone else 
through choice or subconscious action.  In a moment of indeterminacy, a young person 
cannot completely and absolutely reconstruct themselves into another position, such as 
adult; and, at particular points in history, it would be difficult for a young person to position 
themselves as adolescents.  Indeed, the possibilities for resistance are somewhat restricted, 
but not limited to, the positions available, and accessible, at a certain point in time to the 
individual.  Furthermore, the ways in which an individual may exercise resistance (through 
conscious ‘choice’ or subconscious action) may move towards a reconstruction of positions 
available to themselves and others.  In this sense, resistance involves the individual within 
acts of ‘self’ negotiation as the individual uses the resources (including knowledges and their 
relationships with other people) available to them to reassert their identity within particular 
contexts in a way that is meaningful to them, but not necessarily meaningful to others. 
Hence, there is a productive element of resistance as current structures and ideologies are 
challenged; but, there is also a reproductive element of resistance as current conditions may 
be, and are, reproduced.  This does not suggest that structural and ideological conditions 
determine the types of positions available, rather that, as White and Wyn (1998) remind us, 
the positions a young person can occupy are embedded within a contextual framework.  
That is, there is a constitutive relationship between the individual and the contexts in which 
they are embedded in that contexts provide boundaries and gaps for possibilities of agency.  
Using this, we can argue that same structures that ‘limit’ the agency of an individual may 
also provide points for resistance: 
… if we understand the ubiquity of power as an expression of the fact that the subject 
always exists in a social context that influences his agency, then we must allow that 
any regime of power will provide him with resources for challenging social norms as 
well as pressures to follow them.  
(Bevir, 1999, p.71) 
In 2002, authors did not construct young people as unquestionably deviant.  Indeed, across 
the institutional contexts, authors allowed some slippage in constructions.  For example, in 
constructions of abnormal deviance, although authors described the deviant youth as an 
effect of developmental knowledge, they also acknowledged the contradictions in their 
constructions – it was possible for a young person in ‘abnormal’ circumstances to resist 
deviant outcomes.  Indeed, the fact that in all constructions of youth, authors argued that 
development was a process of becoming meant that adults could never really determine the 
end-point of development.  These indeterminate moments, to use Bevir’s (1999) words 
provided young people with some “resources” of resistance. 
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Furthermore, if we apply this understanding of resistance and power to constructions of the 
youth deviant it becomes apparent that it is not just adults constructing young people as 
deviant; but, rather, there is a complex relationship where the young person is constructed 
as deviant through an interaction between adult society and their own self.  This means that 
the reproduction of inequalities, particularly age inequalities, for young people do not just 
occur through some adults imposing an unequal power structure on young people – instead, 
somehow, young people themselves are involved in reproducing constructions about young 
people.  Indeed, the relationship between the individual and knowledge is a constitutive 
relationship as knowledges do not determine the individual but provide the individual with the 
resources to understand him or herself and, in a sense, construct him or herself.  In effect, 
we are not constructed by knowledge but constructed through the negotiation between other 
people, ourselves, and knowledge; and that knowledge must, in some way, be reflective of 
who we are.  In his early work, Foucault (1972a) argues that we only tend to accept 
discourses as truth if we sense that a discourse is reflective of our society and ourselves.  In 
this sense, as represented by ideas of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Williams, 1977), young 
people, at some point, recognise a knowledge as truth about themselves and construct an 
understanding about themselves through that knowledge – they are not constantly resisting 
knowledge but are, instead, negotiating themselves through knowledge.  For example, a 
young person might consider him or herself a youth-at-risk because they may feel that ideas 
of developmental risk reflect and explain their reality to them. 
So, adults and young people are both involved in producing and reproducing the 
construction of the youth deviant.  However, this does not mean that this power relationship 
positions adults and youth as equal.  Indeed, at times, the adult reaction to any possibility of 
deviance by the youth is to limit the opportunities for resistance by constructing the youth as 
a powerless object through knowledge.   
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… it is only by occupying - being occupied by - that injurious term that I become 
enabled to resist and oppose that term, and the power that constitutes me is recast as 
the power I oppose.  
(Butler, 1995b, p.245) 
Up to this point, I described how developmental knowledge and risk knowledge have been 
used in contemporary industrial societies to control particular groups of people posing a 
threat to social stability.  As I have shown in previous chapters, these groups tended to cross 
lower socio-economic, ethnic, gender, and age dimensions.  Often governing groups in 
industrial societies attempted to control young people coming from these groups.  Adults as 
well as adult-based institutions were able to control the risk that these young people posed 
through knowledge and practices such as education.  The histories of developmental 
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knowledge and risk knowledge illustrate clearly the adult side of the struggle for domination 
in which particular adult groups have attempted to control young people through knowledge.  
In this struggle for domination, adults making meaning of youth deviance applied 
developmental and risk knowledge in practices to control the potential threat the deviant 
youth posed to society.  These practices attempted to transform or socialise the deviant 
youth into a self-governing person ready for adulthood and participation in adult society.  
These interventions were logically compatible for the normally-deviant youth where their risk 
was evidence of a passing phase or maturation process because this youth possessed 
factors of normality in their lives – they tended to come from middle-class, white, two-parent 
families.  Age was the only dimension providing an adequate reasoning for the adult 
domination of this group of youth.  The normally-deviant youth’s deviance in adolescence 
could be a resistance towards future expectations or their non-deviance could be a 
resistance to the expectation that they would be deviant.  In other words, adults attempting to 
make meaning of deviance used age to construct these youth as deviant.  However, these 
adults also used factors of normality to construct this youth as non-deviant.  Hence, young 
people had two possible positions to occupy and resist – and many points of freedom in 
which society did not attempt to control them – many points in which adults had not tried to 
fully determine and dominate. 
However, the aim of interventions to reconstruct the abnormally-deviant youth as a self-
governing subject demonstrated a stronger struggle for domination.  In these interventions, 
adults and adult-based institutions attempted to override and control the influence of other 
‘risk’ or threatening factors in the young person’s life.  Rather than being just dominated and 
objectified through a knowledge of age, adults attempting to understand these youth 
attempted to dominate and objectify these youth across many dimensions (or ‘factors’) of 
difference.   
This placed the young person in a difficult position.  They could do one of two things.  First, 
young people could resist the influence of the various different dimensions in their lives to 
become non-deviant.  For many young people this is difficult because it requires resisting an 
aspect of oneself.  Second, young people could resist the controlling intention of 
interventions by becoming deviant.  In other words, a young person’s non-deviance 
demonstrated a resistance towards the expectation that structural inequalities would lead to 
deviance; and, a young person’s deviance showed a resistance towards a socialising 
intention of interventions to transform the young person into a self-governing individual. 
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Resistance may take the form of running away or standing still, of saying no or not 
saying anything at all.  Likewise, even the acceptance of the imposition, the lack of 
resistance, is an act.  
(Butin, 2001, p.168) 
 162 
Researchers taking a sociological standpoint (e.g. S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b; Merton, 1999) 
typically conceptualise resistance as a physical reaction to social positionings in the form of 
deviance.  However, we do not have to associate resistance with deviance.  Instead, it is 
possible to see an individual’s resistance to deviance as a form of resistance in itself.  This is 
especially apparent in young people when adults expect them to be deviant (either because 
of risk factors or because of a developmental position).  Hence, resistance can be deviance 
and non-deviance.  In short, it is when someone takes up one position to resist another. 
As I have shown already, just the construction of youth itself as an object provokes and 
elicits some form of resistance.  Through resistance, young people might try to resist the 
factors that position them as an object (age, socio-economic level, developmental level, 
social environment, gender and so forth) or they may attempt to resist practices in adult 
society that attempt to socialise them into a self-governing, and conforming, subject.  For 
example, young people may participate in a programme in an attempt to ‘play the game’ or 
just get through it so that they can be themselves again.  Hence, we can see their deviance 
here as a form of conformity (c.f. Dayle & McIntyre, 2003).  In this sense, resistance does not 
have to be revolutionary (c.f. Walkerdine, 1990) and does not need to be a physical reaction 
to something.   
When an individual resists a position or expectation by doing the opposite, they are also 
engaged in resistance (c.f. Butler, 1995b).  This form of resistance is evident in the 
contradiction in constructions – where normally-deviant youth become deviant adults and 
abnormally-deviant youth become productive working adults.  In this sense, resistance 
allows the unpredictable to become probable.   
Hence, resistance may not be an intentional reaction of the young person towards adults and 
adult-based institutions, but it is a reaction.  Through understanding that young people can, 
and do, resist, we are able to recognise that young people do have some agency and they 
can react against the constructions they are ‘forced’ into or they can take up a construction 
to react against some other ‘force’ in their life (c.f. Nairn, Panelli, & McCormack, 2003).   
Furthermore, through understanding resistance in terms of a struggle for domination we can 
explore and explain why it is so difficult for young people constructed as ‘youth-at-risk’ to 
resist deviance.  In the struggle for domination, practitioners and experts identify many, if not 
all, dimensions of the young person’s life as problematic.  They then construct interventions 
to target these dimensions.  By diffusing power across many dimensions, practitioners and 
experts limit the possibilities for resistance.  So, adults, through interventions, place a young 
person in a difficult position where any non-deviant outcomes require the young person to 
resist who they may be as a gendered, ethnic, socio-economic individual.   
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So resistance is more complex that a simple reaction.  Resistance is about a struggle for 
identity, a struggle for domination.  Nevertheless, this concept of resistance is different to 
traditional sociological concepts of resistance and to psychological concepts of resilience. 
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More recently, resilience has been conceptualised as a dynamic process involving an 
interaction between both risk and protective processes, internal and external to the 
individual, that act to modify the effects of an adverse life event … Resilience does not 
so much imply an invulnerability to stress, but rather an ability to recover from 
negative events … [it is] ‘normal development under difficult conditions’.   
(Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003, pp.1-2) 
Psychologists (e.g. Olsson, et al., 2003) use the term resilience to describe a young person’s 
ability to resist the influence of risk factors in their life.  Resilience tends to refer to some 
inner strength within the young person, which experts can locate with scientific investigation, 
build through interventions, and predict.  In contrast to resilience, resistance does not 
depend on the existence of risk factors, rather it depends on an inherent struggle for 
domination.  Adults cannot predict and manipulate resistance.  Even though adults could 
attempt to control possibilities for resistance, they cannot completely control the possibility 
for resistance.   
Those using psychological theory connect a concept of resilience to ideas of normality:  
resilience does not lead to deviance; instead, resilience leads to the ‘healthy’ developmental 
outcome of autonomy and economic productivity (although these people do not explicitly 
claim the second).  In contrast, resistance is different to resilience, because it may lead to 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ outcomes.  In other words, the needs of a society do not determine 
how resistance manifests but they do ensure that there is some struggle over the definition 
of these ‘needs’.  So, in the context of my research, I have not defined resistance through 
psychological terms.  Instead, I have defined it sociologically as the struggle between 
individuals and groups although it differs to traditional sociological concepts of resistance. 
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Resistance is no longer to be seen centrally as an intentional and violent response by 
an individual to his or her oppression.  Instead, resistance must be reconceptualized 
so that it can be both nonactive (unintended) and dispersed, manifested in localized 
acts of defiance which together form a global pattern of resistance that transcends the 
intentional engagement of any of the agents.   
(Krips, 1990, p.177) 
My use of resistance to describe and reflect upon youth deviance is not new.  Indeed, as 
shown in Chapter 3, theorists from a sociological standpoint (S. Hall & Jefferson, 1993b) 
have looked at resistance and youth for some time.  However, these theorists tend to focus 
on one type of resistance (class resistance) manifesting in the form of deviance (not 
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conformity).  Indeed, critical youth studies theorists (Besley, n.d.; Bucholtz, 2002) have been 
critical of using the term ‘resistance’ in youth analysis because of its association to class 
resistance and the complexity of youth experience in contemporary society.  Their criticism is 
valid as these ‘subcultural’ explanations of resistance tend to focus on the negativity and 
inherent ‘hopelessness’ of the working-class position. 
However, we should not remove resistance from analyses into youth deviance and non-
deviance because of the ways some theorists have used resistance.  As I have shown in this 
chapter, resistance works alongside power in a productive way – alongside power, 
resistance makes things including ourselves.  Through using resistance with the idea of a 
struggle for domination, we can see that using resistance and power allows for a relational 
analysis, an analysis, in which, we can explore the relationship between adults, adult-based 
institutions, and young people.  If we neglect to analyse this relationship, we run the risk of 
ignoring any role young people have in constructing or resisting constructions of youth.   
Furthermore, those using subcultural theory tend to conceptualise resistance as an act or 
event – it is a pure reaction.  However, resistance is also connected to the construction of 
the self.  In this sense, resistance is not an event but a process where the self is negotiated, 
formed and transformed within a struggle (Besley, n.d.; Bucholtz, 2002; Butin, 2001; 
Foucault, 1983).  This struggle for domination is not just a class struggle; rather, it is more a 
struggle for ‘truth’ and control.  In this way, we are able to see resistance as a concept 
connected to knowledge and the production, reproduction, resistance, and transformation of 
structural inequalities. 
Finally, traditional subcultural theorists tend to connect resistance directly to deviance.  They 
do not explicitly see acts of conformity as acts of resistance.  It is this ‘non-connection’ that, 
perhaps, leads to the inherent hopelessness in subcultural analysis where the deviant youth 
becoming a conforming adult is no longer resisting but rather just accepting their unequal 
positioning in a society.  However, individuals can resist through conformity.  By conforming, 
an individual may be resisting another construction or expectation of their self.  Resistance 
shows us that, whether individuals conform or deviate, they are engaged in a struggle.  The 
implications this construction open up are new possibilities for both the ways in which adults 
see youth and in the ways youth see themselves. 
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I used to like to call myself a delinquent – at least I got my resistance acknowledged. 
(my own personal reflection on my own ‘adolescence’) 
Rather than positing a new knowledge of youth, I have argued in this chapter that we should 
begin to see young people as being in a moment of contradiction or indeterminability where 
anything is possible.  Within this moment, young people are engaged in a struggle with 
adults and adult-based institutions about the constitution of themselves.  Young people, 
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themselves, are involved in the social construction of knowledge about young people.  This 
construction of youth has particular implications – implications we can see through using the 
work of Dan Butin (2001). 
First, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth 
deviance, we are able to see that young people are neither passive nor autonomous (Butin, 
2001).  On one level, young people are fully involved in the construction of themselves.  
However, this does not make them autonomous because they are also an effect of 
knowledge and they have structural and ideological limitations surrounding them, which 
inhibit them independently constructing themselves. 
Second, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth 
deviance, we are able to begin to include other knowledges into this discussion (Butin, 
2001).  My analysis of youth deviance has shown that psychological knowledge and risk 
knowledge have been predominant knowledges in New Zealand’s discussion of youth 
deviance in 2002.  Through bringing resistance into the discussion, it is possible to enter into 
different discussions, which could lead to some subjugated or less known knowledges being 
heard and being included.  It is possible to include young people in discussions about 
themselves and let young people, themselves, participate in constructing a knowledge about 
deviance. 
Third, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth 
deviance we are able to add another theoretical tool to the toolkit (Foucault, 1980b).  
Psychological knowledge and risk knowledge have been useful but, unfortunately, because 
many individuals and institutional groups of individuals see these knowledges as the ‘Truth’, 
there has been a reluctance to critique or question these knowledges.  As I have shown in 
this thesis, there are problems with these knowledges and, because of this, we should be 
prepared to use other knowledges and other methods of analysis. 
Finally, through bringing a knowledge of resistance into a discussion about youth and youth 
deviance, we can begin to experiment with new truths (Butin, 2001).  We do not have to 
succumb to the idea that knowledge is a truth that we need to discover or that we are the 
direct powerless effects of knowledge.  We use knowledge to construct the truths that keep 
our society stable.  We use these same knowledges in constructions of youth and youth 
deviance.  The socially-constructed nature of knowledge means that we can challenge, 
question, and even change this ‘Truth’, whilst experimenting with other truths. 
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The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an advisor.  The project, tactics and 
goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting.  What the intellectual 
can do is to provide instruments of analysis …  What’s effectively needed is a 
ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate 
lines of weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured 
and implanted themselves by a system of organisation dating back over 150 years.  In 
other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield – that is the 
intellectual’s role.  But as for saying, ‘Here is what you must do!’, certainly not.  
(Foucault, 1980a, p.62) 
Like most doctoral theses, this thesis is a symbolic journey.  I started this research in 2002 
hoping to make a difference, but not knowing that this could be possible.  Indeed, in the 
second half of 2005, I began to share the findings of this research, and the general ideas 
found within critical studies research, with practitioners and researchers in youth work and 
youth studies here in New Zealand.  Their positive and enthusiastic response encouraged 
me to get this research finished so that they could take it and apply it in practice.  Therefore, 
it is with excitement and apprehension that I approach this final chapter in the thesis, 
because this journey is only really beginning and I am yet to confront the challenge this 
research posits.  This challenge occurs when this research begins to be translated into 
action and the stories of young people are told in new ways and with their voices. 
In this final chapter, I will review the findings and the argument that I have presented in this 
thesis.  I will then explore the relevance of the year 2002 for Aotearoa/New Zealand in 2006 
and beyond.  I will finally discuss what comes after this research and the possibilities for 
knowledge and practice.  I will not outline what we must do; but rather, I will suggest what 
may be possible (c.f. Foucault, 1980a). 
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In this research, I explored how authors constructed youth in New Zealand institutional 
discussions of youth deviance in 2002.  I examined the implications of these constructions 
and posited an alternative construction of youth deviance.  In order to achieve this, I applied 
a form of discourse analysis, which focused on knowledge, power, and positioning through 
expertise and commonsense.  Context was an important element in my analysis and I 
attempted to use historical, political, and social contexts to examine the implications of 
knowledge and knowledge-informed practice for young people. 
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I used arguments from critical youth studies to inform my analysis and critique of the 
constructions located in the texts.  As such, early on in this thesis, I explored how critical 
youth studies research has questioned and critiqued dominant constructions of youth found 
within developmental psychology.  It was in my overview of critical youth studies research in 
Chapter 3 that I introduced three constructions of youth deviance – the normally-deviant, the 
abnormally-deviant and the socially-created deviant.  As I showed later, authors applied 
these constructions in their discussions of youth deviance. 
I presented the findings of my research in Chapters 4 and 5 and showed how those writing 
about youth deviance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2002 used developmental knowledge and 
risk knowledge to describe young people.  Developmental knowledge and risk knowledge 
allowed these writers to divide and separate young people on the premise of developmental 
and psychological differences.  First, they used developmental knowledge to define and 
separate all young people from an understanding of adulthood, in that, a youth’s age and 
their susceptibility to negative influences (biological and social) rendered them powerless.  
Second, they used developmental knowledge to divide young people into the abnormally-
deviant youth-at-risk and the normally-deviant adolescent engaging in risk behaviours.  
Although writers did not explicitly state this, the existence of both these groups posed a 
threat to the stability of adult society.  To a much lesser extent authors referred to the 
socially-created deviant; instead authors focused on the abnormally-deviant and the 
normally-deviant youth and the ways in which these youth could be described through 
development and risk. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I suggested that it was through developmental knowledge and risk 
knowledge that adults attempted to control any potential threat posed by young people.  
Indeed, at least in the last two hundred years, adults based in institutional contexts have 
used developmental psychology and risk psychology to define, divide or separate, and 
control different and deviant groups in society.  In 2002, developmental knowledge and risk 
knowledge were still evident in the analysed texts and in New Zealand policies and 
practices. 
I took this idea of definition, division and control further in Chapter 8 where I explored the 
function and role of the family in the control of youth deviance.  I described how the family 
represented a unit of governance in contemporary industrial societies.  Governing groups in 
these societies used the family as the target of interventions or the site of support.  However, 
often for the abnormally-deviant youth-at-risk, authors described the family in the analysed 
texts as a site of risk, and as such, authors positioned the school and public education as a 
pseudo family.  Authors suggested that, in schools, practitioners could identify potential 
deviants and separate them from others in order to intervene into their life and control any 
potential risk.  Hence, it was through schools, and other interventions, that adults could 
control deviance.   
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In Chapter 9, I looked at interventions further by positing that interventions symbolise a site 
of struggle between adults, adult-based institutions, and young people.  I explained how 
adult society attempted to transform the young person from an object of development and 
environmental conditions to a self-governing subject through interventions.  I argued that 
interventions, in themselves, required the young person to be positioned as a passive object, 
which can be transformed by adults.  In this sense, the young person could never fully ‘have’ 
power; the young person could only ever ‘have’ power on the terms and conditions of adults.  
Any resistance by the young person was difficult, if not impossible, in this construction.  
I took the ideas of power, resistance, and struggle further in Chapter 10 and argued that an 
alternative construction is possible about youth deviance, which centred on an idea of 
agency as resistance.  I argued that traditional notions of agency (in terms of choice) were 
problematic, particularly, for young people because adults needed to first determine the 
choices young people could make.  Alternatively, I argued that resistance allows us to see 
deviance and non-deviance as a manifestation of a struggle between the youth and adults.  I 
further argued that, if we see agency in the form of resistance, we can explain the 
indeterminate or contradictory moments that occur through, and between, knowledge and 
human action.  This alternative explanation of deviance allowed for a different perspective of 
youth deviance, one grounded in sociological theory but not limited to subcultural theory.  
And, one that may still be relevant in 2006. 
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Celia Lashlie: The middle class – our kids if they get into trouble – they have to step 
onto the pathway to prison.  I know a significant number of kids that as they emerge 
from the womb their feet are firmly planted on the path to prison because of 
circumstances.  And before everybody says – ‘Well that’s parenting.’  That’s 
nonsense.  That’s about well ‘They are one of those families’, and they get treated that 
way by teachers, by police, and by the system.  
John Campbell: I want to read to you from the Department of Corrections, an amazing 
report that I urge everyone to access on the web.  It is readily accessible on their 
website – it is readily available there: “Young people who are at-risk of becoming 
serious adult offenders are recognisable with increasing certainty as new-borns, as 
school entrants, as young offenders and …” In other words, you are popping out of the 
womb and you are already in trouble – Why?  
(Campbell, 2006, 6.18-6.59 minutes) 
In 2006, observers and commentators in Aotearoa/New Zealand continued to debate, and 
show concern about, youth deviance.  Like 2002, this debate has focused on the causes of 
youth deviance and the ways to control youth.  Much of this debate is evident in media 
discussions, which involve interviews with government and academic experts.  As in 2002, 
media reporters continued to interview, and position as ‘expert’ social advocate and ex-
prison officer Celia Lashlie.   
Adults in Aotearoa/New Zealand are still very anxious about the abnormally-deviant youth-at-
risk.  Many adults still see their developmental pathway into deviance as problematic and 
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some commentators continue to argue that practitioners should identify these young people 
so that adult ‘society’ can counter the powerless vulnerability of young people.  By 2005, the 
media was reporting that adults could identity a youth-at-risk as early as age three (Neville, 
2005).  By 2006, commentators had lowered this age to birth (Campbell, 2006).  Reflecting 
the discussions of 2002, there continued to be limited, if any, critical discussion of the 
implications of early identification.  Instead, these commentators continued to imply that 
identification is more than a social good, in that all society benefits; it is also an individual 
good, in which the individual can benefit.  They continued to use this implied ‘positive’ 
individual good to reinforce coercive interventions. 
Some policy makers and commentators in 2005 suggested that giving identification numbers 
to all children and youth (Chalmers, 2006), and electronic tagging of high risk young people 
(Thomas, 2005) could be realistic and effective measures to control deviance.  Despite a 
concern for the young person’s privacy, these people have posited that identification 
numbers are an effective intervention, which would enable practitioners and experts to track 
a young child through the education, welfare, and justice systems.  Other commentators 
have also suggested electronic tagging, as an alternative solution to youth detention, would 
enable a young person to stay within the community and would reduce any exposure of the 
young person to ‘career’ criminals.   
In addition to electronic tagging, in 2006 the New Zealand’s youth justice system went 
though a dramatic change where the New Zealand Government increased funding to New 
Zealand’s social welfare service (Child, Youth and Family).  In effect, this reversed some of 
the changes that happened in 1989, in which the New Zealand Government separated youth 
welfare and justice.  It brought together the  reasoning  of  commentators,  such  as  Judge 
C. Henwood (2003) who argued that the New Zealand youth justice system failed the most 
vulnerable youth – the youth-at-risk.  In effect, it centred the control of these youth with one 
Government agency.   
In Parliament, increased discussion of the control of young offenders occurred through Ron 
Mark’s (Member of Parliament) bill (Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill).  The Young 
Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill was developed in response to the crimes of 2002 and aimed 
to legislate the ability for the state to prosecute and institutionalise young offenders – as 
young as ten – in the adult court system. 
As shown by the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill in 2006, New Zealand society was 
still debating the difference between young people and adults.  The way Mark wrote the bill 
implies that young people can and do make rational adult decisions.  However, he did not 
ask for equality of age across all government policies.  Although he argued that young 
people can be rational enough to kill, he did not argue that young people are rational enough 
to vote.  In this way, his definition of the rational youth seemed to be quite contradictory as it 
served the adult intention to control youth rather than any intention to allow young people 
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opportunities for participation.   As such, opponents of Mark’s Bill argued that young people 
are more childlike than adult.  That is, young people continue to be vulnerable, malleable, 
and ignorant – that young people were different to adults, and, as such, committed different 
crimes, which were more reflective of their ignorance than their inherent deviance: 
The effect of [the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill] would be that a young 
person charged with stealing a litre of icecream would be dealt with next to adult 
criminals in the District Court.  This sort of over-reaction to offending by a young 
person and their possible placement in a prison-like environment can only lead to an 
increased likelihood of future offending by these young people and certainly does 
nothing to rehabilitate or improve outcomes for themselves or society. This is 
completely unacceptable as well as being in breach of a number of international 
conventions including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
(Kiro, 2006, p.1) 
It seems that many adults in Aotearoa/New Zealand society are still falling into the same trap 
by using developmental knowledge and risk knowledge to try to answer questions of youth 
deviance – knowledges that are limited and cannot provide definitive criteria to differentiate 
between adults and young people.  As long as those using developmental knowledge and 
risk knowledge use and apply these knowledges as absolute truths inherent in the individual, 
it is difficult for them to recognise the contradictions that exist in these knowledges and even 
recognise that these knowledges have a context.  That is, these knowledges are not 
definitive truths and they do not provide all the answers.  Instead, the debate needs to shift 
from what the difference is between adults and young people to what are different ways we 
can work with young people.  This shift would acknowledge that there is difference, a 
tension, and struggle in the ways in which adults and youth are positioned.  It would require 
researchers, policy makers, and practitioners to work at the point of tension where 
relationships between adults and youth meet.  A focus on this point of tension and struggle 
could offset any focus on control.     
* + 
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On the other hand, as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way 
they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very 
difficult, and entirely possible.  
(Foucault, 1994b, p.457) 
We already have a toolkit of psychological knowledges and practices in the ways that we 
work with young people.  It is now time to add some other tools to the kit, which allow for 
other possibilities (c.f. Foucault, 1980b).  The sociological approach and analysis I have 
given in this thesis adds another dimension to youth deviance.  This idea is not completely 
new (sociological theories have, in the past, talked about resistance) but it does see 
deviance, and even non-deviance, as a form of agency exercised by the youth at a point of 
struggle. 
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I finished this thesis excited.  This is an idea we can test, use, and work with.  The few young 
people who have inspired me to the completion of this thesis share my enthusiasm.  For 
them, like for me as a youth, their relationship with the ‘system’ is a struggle where the 
‘system’ only hears their voice under adult terms and conditions.  This small sample of young 
people is not enough to draw conclusions from but it is enough to encourage a researcher to 
continue to pursue a passion to make a difference somehow, somewhere, and for someone.  
Over the last four years, I have had the opportunity to establish an argument.  I am excited 
and apprehensive because, now, the challenge for me, and for others, is to make some of 
this argument a reality. 
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